PRAYING FOR UNDERSTANDING:
READING ANSELM THROUGH
WITTGENSTEIN

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Fresh out of graduate school, I eagerly attended a conference that featured one of the greatest minds of the academic world discussing the existence of God. To his credit, the plenary speaker had noted that Anselm’s ontological argument had taken the literary form of a prayer and that knowing this was important for understanding what Anselm was up to. At the break, I asked him whether Anselm’s context could be adequately described in words or whether one needed to join in at the practical level in order to understand the argument—i.e., the ontological argument only works for those who pray. He dismissed this. He said he was only interested in publicly accessible arguments, and surely arguments about God’s existence require no special attending behaviors to get their point. On the contrary, he assured me, “I only need a day or two of vacation and an occasional change of scenery to rest my mind enough for the concentration necessary to get a clear view of truth.”

I find this not only unconvincing but appalling. In stark contrast to this speaker’s view, the assumption that knowledge and practice are internally related has a long and distinguished history. Pascal’s heart had reasons of which reason itself knew not. Luther strove to be a theologian of the cross rather than a theologian of glory. Aquinas surmounted, rather than refuted, the aporias set forth by Aristotle. Athanasius advocated imitating the deeds of the saints as a means of coming to know what saints know. Of course, appreciation of these views was obscured by the Enlightenment. In this essay, I side with a growing number of recent scholars who are challenging the commonly presumed disjunction between religious knowledge and prac-
I want to use Anselm as my point of departure. If two sorts of Wittgensteinian premises are conceded at the outset, I will argue that only those who share in the practice of prayer can be rightly said to share in the sense of Anselm’s words.

“Practice Gives the Words their Sense”

The first Wittgensteinian premise I ask be granted comes from Culture and Value. Near the end of his life, Wittgenstein took objection to Karl Barth for gesticulating with words but never saying anything: “A theology which insists on the use of certain particular words and phrases, and outlaws others, does not make anything clearer.” On the contrary, he continues,

the words you utter or what you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at various points in your life. How do I know that two people mean the same when each says he believes in God? Practice gives the words their sense.

Wittgenstein appears to be saying that when devout Catholics and Hindus both serve the poor, they are giving evidence that they believe in the same God, one different, say, from the God believed in by an industrialist who exploits the poor. Of course, Wittgenstein’s claim is complicated by the fact that speaking itself is a form of acting. Therefore, we cannot simply dismiss confessional differences and say that belief reduces to nonverbal doings. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s point is that the sort of God one believes in is manifest in the shape one’s life takes.

Part and parcel of Wittgenstein’s statement is that the continuation of the practice lends sense to words. Not only is some present belief, here and now, embodied in present practice, present belief is also shown in subsequent practice. Wittgenstein’s one-time student, Rush Rhees, tells of an office worker at University College in Swansea who insisted that she had had a mystical experience. Rhees concluded,

But it was nothing of the sort that Paul’s and Simone Weil’s experiences were. And I say this categorically because I think that if it had been, then she and her life would have been impressive in a way that they were not. . . . Of course it may be that there was some side to her which I had never seen, and I may have been wrong. But the side of her which I did see was too incongruous with such an idea.

Here Rhees rightly expects that the genuineness of a religious experience is shown by actions that follow such an event. In some sense, the subsequent actions retroactively make an event what it is. For example, Wittgenstein asks,

Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space of one second—no matter what preceded or followed this second?—what is
happening now has significance—in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance. Hope is recognized as ardent by the duration and kind of behaviors that precede hope’s fulfillment (should it ever come). Similarly, love is recognized as ardent by the duration and kind of behaviors that follow one’s profession of love.

If Wittgenstein is to be our guide when considering Anselm’s Proslogion, then there is good reason to conclude, provisionally at least, that ongoing practice gives to Anselm’s words their sense. Of course, the relevant ongoing practice in the case of Anselm’s Proslogion is prayer. Anselm prayed, wrote to others who prayed ardentely, in the language of prayer.

Three sets of historical observations will help us understand Anselm’s practice of prayer. I will examine them each in turn before introducing the second Wittgensteinian premise upon which my argument turns.

Anselm Prayed Ardently

In 1077, at the age of 44, Anselm penned the Proslogion and gave it the subtitle, “Faith in Search of Understanding.” The meditation begins with deliberate instructions to the reader, to prepare his or her heart as Anselm had: “Put aside your weighty cares, let your burdensome distractions wait, free yourself awhile for God and rest awhile in him.” But there is no rest. Immediately the reader must face whether he or she is religiously up to the task. For, Anselm demands his readers join him in praying, “I seek your face, Lord, it is your face I seek.”

The preparatory prayer that readers are expected to make their own extends for 150 lines. Midway through them, Anselm laments his human depravity, confessing “I am indeed wretched . . . separated from God”. The dislocation Anselm felt so keenly was not merely an objective problem, as if simply relocating himself closer to God could close the gap. Rather, his separation took the form of a dementia that had atrophied the very faculties he might otherwise summon to find his way home.

What have I begun, and what accomplished? Where was I going and where have I got to? . . . I was going towards God, and I was my own impediment.

Anselm understood the natural human condition not as one of clarity, but as one of depravity. We are each twisted, freighted with sin, in the dark, and clueless. Thus he prays,

Lord, I am so bent I can only look downwards, raise me that I may look upwards. My iniquities have gone over my head, they cover me and weigh me down like a heavy burden.
Take this weight, this covering from me, 
lest the pit close its mouth over me. 
Let me discern your light, 
whether from afar or from the depths. 
Teach me to seek you, 
and as I seek you, show yourself to me, 
for I cannot seek you unless you show me how, 
and I will never find you 
unless you show yourself to me.  

I see no any reason to take the 157 lines that constitute the preparatory prayer as idle words or rhetorical flourish. In the first place, Anselm’s self-suspicions are evidence of a profoundly religious outlook. Wittgenstein observed that “People are religious to the extent that they believe themselves to be not so much imperfect, as ill. Any man who is halfway decent will think himself extremely imperfect, but a religious man thinks himself wretched.” Moreover, Anselm evidently assumed that his view could not be shared by anyone unwilling to undertake his journey in the same manner he had. What was the manner of this journey? Anselm admits to having written as someone “trying to raise his mind to the contemplation of God”. Apparently Anselm thought that such contemplation is not the same as an afternoon’s pondering by a well rested brain. Rather, as his life displays, it requires long obedience in the same direction.

Born into a decaying line of Italian nobility, at the age of 23 Anselm had fled north from Burgundy to escape the expectation that he was to “prop up” the family fortune by political appointment into the clergy. After three years of travel, a weary Anselm arrived at the Monastery at Bec where after a long process covering several years, Anselm completed his conversion, which culminated in the taking of monastic vows.

The Monastic Rule structured Anselm’s daily life and thoughts. Weekly recitation of the entire book of Psalms (150 chapters) began with Sunday Matins and could be completed only as the brothers met together for prayer nine times each day. As the Morning Prayers and Evening Compline were performed in total darkness, preparation for the Offices required memorization of the Psalms. To this basic Benedictine structure, Norman monasticism added extra daily prayers including the Trina Oratio, the Gradual Psalms, the Penitential Psalms, Psalms for the Dead, Psalms for Benefactors, and the Office of the Dead and for All the Saints. As Benedicta Ward observes, by the eleventh century, the liturgy was no longer simply the best part of a day whose activities were directed towards God, it was the whole day, the entirety of expected worship. Ward explains that the liturgy “was . . . their rendering to God of that which is due him, but it was also an asceticism, an exercise of charity towards the living and the dead, a social obligation, a way of life”. 

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Anselm’s own memory of the years between 1063–1070 exposes their rigor this way: he recalls (1) the study of Scripture, (2) devoted friendships, and (3) hallucinations. This last fact begins to give readers a glimpse of the seriousness with which Anselm approached the task of “trying to raise his mind to the contemplation of God”. In addition to regular religious fasts, Anselm lived in a self-imposed semi-starvation, following Augustine’s advice, “We ought not love fullness in this world.” This state when coupled with the sleep deprivation—for the only time for private meditation and prayer was in the small hours of the morning—is likely the biological cause of Anselm’s visions. But Anselm understood his asceticism not as mindless masochism but as deliberate training that was necessarily, and thus willingly, undertaken to ready himself for knowledge of God. While we moderns are tempted to wonder what Anselm might have accomplished with a little more sleep and a better diet, in contrast, Anselm assumed that clarity could only be attained at great physical cost.

A second clue to Anselm’s earnestness can be seen in the progression of his written works. As we shall see, his progress was not merely a matter of scholastic development, but of moral and spiritual development as well. At the inception of his teaching at Bec in 1059, Anselm undertook to write for his secular students a textbook, De Grammatico. Three years earlier, Bec’s theological giant, Lanfranc of Pavia, had been engaged in debate over the nature of the Eucharist. His opponent, Berengar, denied on grammatical grounds that a substantial change took place in the Eucharistic host. In order for the sentence “This is my body” (Hoc est corpus meum) to be intelligible, the pronoun “this” (hoc), which signified the substance of the bread at the beginning of the sentence, must signify the same thing at the end of the sentence. Lanfranc averred, appealing to Aristotle’s Categories in order to defend transubstantiation in its strongest form: the substance of the bread is transformed in the Mass so that it is Christ’s very body which “is handled by the priest and broken and torn by the teeth of the faithful”. At stake was whether Anselm would adopt Berengar’s grammatical approach (and run the risk of heresy) or Lanfranc’s dialectical method (and display loyalty to his teacher). Whether Anselm’s ontological argument is indebted to Berengar is a matter of debate. But it is instructive for my present purpose to note that Anselm’s study of the Categories in De Grammatico virtually ignores Aristotle’s teaching on substance and accidents that Lanfranc considered so crucial. Rather, Anselm concerned himself with clarifying logico-linguistic puzzles that Aristotle poses throughout the remainder of Categories.

De Grammatico is a benchmark for understanding Anselm’s development. First, De Grammatico is written in the form of a dialogue between a tutor and his evidently secular (rather than monastic) student. The attitude of the student shows nothing of the total submissiveness that Anselm the monk displayed toward his own monastic mentor. The fact that in De Grammatico

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Anselm does not attempt any form of natural theology may be attributed as much to the secular outlook of his lay students as to their intellectual immaturity. Second, with *De Grammatico* Anselm identifies his methodological compass: the way forward for theology necessarily involves attention to conceptual language and its grammar. The *Proslogion* is precisely such an exercise in this sort of “theology as grammar”.  

After completing the thirty-page *De Grammatico* (ca. 1063), nothing more comes from Anselm’s pen until 1070. It is easy to imagine that Anselm spent seven years simply adjusting to the rigors of the daily routine. The combination of his pedagogical prowess, robust Christian discipline, care for the community, and skill at nurturing friendships resulted in a doubling of the number of novitiates at Bec during these years, despite Lanfranc’s departure for Caen. Anselm later told his biographer that these were very difficult years. To be sure, part of this hardship was self-imposed. For, during these seven “silent” years, Anselm was in training. In addition to the physical rigors of the monastic schedule, Anselm devoted himself to private prayer, study of the Bible, and meditation. Not that these activities were separable from one another; reading, meditation and prayer were simply different aspects of the same thing. An important document from the fourth century, the *Apostolic Constitutions*, recommended that prayer be nourished by reading (*lectio divina*), prolonged in the memory by singing, and internalized by repetition throughout the day. The way prayer permeated all the activities of the monastic day means that it was natural for Anselm and his companions to think of reading itself as a form of prayer: “Reading was an action of the whole person, by which the meaning of a text was absorbed, until it became prayer.” Not surprisingly, Anselm expected those who read his work (including the *Proslogion*) would at the same time pray it. Clearly there is a meditative dimension to such prayerful reading. However, the term “meditation” was also a semi-technical term referring to the medieval practice of ascent.

In a somewhat programmatic fashion, the mind reflecting (*cogitatio*) on images derived from self-knowledge and sensory data and on the meaning of words could be trained progressively to discard concerns for worldly things and corruptible aims. As cogitation is purified it becomes meditation (*meditatio*), which by the tools of logic and grammar reveal transcendent truths and essences. Mastery of meditation readies one for contemplation (*contemplatio*), which aims at binding the soul to its true End through the apprehension of the face of God.

This three-stage process is evident in Anselm’s own biography. If the writing of *De Grammatico* was an exercise in cogitation, then the private study and prayer during the seven silent years, coupled with the asceticism of monastic life, bear a resemblance to *meditatio*. When Anselm picked up his pen again in 1070, he left for us a record of these years in the form of 19 short prayers and four longer prayers known more commonly as “medita-
tions”. In the last meditation, the Proslogion, Anselm appears to be on the doorstep of contemplation (contemplatio) of God.

We see then that Anselm’s practice of prayer was marked by deep earnestness. He was sustained in this devotion by a community of like-minded brothers for whom prayer was the warp and weft of their life together. However, we also get an inkling from Anselm’s correspondence that these monks were not the only ones who were devoted to prayer.

Anselm Wrote to those who Prayed (Ardently)

When we read Anselm’s words, “We believe that you are that thing than which nothing greater can be thought”, it is proper to ask, who is the “we”? The prayers and meditations were not written for Anselm’s private pleasure. He wrote these to be shared with others (as is evidenced by the letters that accompany the prayers he sent to friends). The fact that these 23 prayers were not merely treasured by those who received them but copied, mimicked, and circulated, suggests that their content and outlook strongly resonated with a form of private devotional practice already then widespread.

As early as 820 AD there is evidence that the Psalms were commonly used for lay as well as monastic devotion. As Alcuin (the royal tutor and Abbott of Tours) had recommended to Charlemagne,

In the Psalms, if you look carefully, you will find an intimacy of prayer, such as you could never have discovered without their help: you will find words for an intimate confession of your sins, and for a perfect supplication of the divine mercy. . . . In the Psalms you confess your weakness and misery, and thereby call down God’s mercy upon you. You will find every virtue in the Psalms.

Alcuin’s words are instructive on two counts. First, we learn that in Anselm’s context, confession of one’s weaknesses, misery and sin is central to a life of prayer. To say the same thing differently, this language of prayer presupposes that one prays from a vantage point of humility. So crucial was humility that Benedict legislated it in “Twelve Steps of Humility”. Anselm himself was a product of the very monastic culture that spent the prior century highly refining the habit of religious introspection.

Not surprisingly, Anselm eventually intensified and rewrote the practice of self-abasement (as seven steps rather than twelve): (1) know yourself to be contemptible; (2) be grieved by this knowledge; (3) confess that you are contemptible; (4) persuade others to think you are contemptible; (5) allow others to treat you with contempt; (6) be content to be so treated; and (7) rejoice to be so treated. This was an era of enormous penances and of a commensurate and growing frequency of appeals to the saints to stand as mediators between contemptible sinners and the God who is elevated in holiness beyond comprehension.

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Second, Alcuin’s advice highlights the assumption, apparently common in Anselm’s day, that prayer involves supplication for mercy. The very act of prayer places the suppliant in a stance of submissiveness and servility. The unworthiness of sinners and the enormity of the gap between them and the Object of their worship was presupposed by medieval piety and schooled by the language of prayer.

During this era, as monastic life noticeably increased the rigor of dedication to God, prayer books became increasingly employed by on-looking laity to help structure their own lives in ways parallel to the monastic office. These books were comprised mainly of Psalms, but also included prayers of contrition, hymns, canticles, the Te Deum, prayers for feast days of the saints, and “psalter collects”—short prayers that took a phrase from the Psalms and expanded it into a prayer thus giving contemporary application to the Hebrew Psalms.

What emerges is a picture of Anselm’s primary audience as one comprised of those who shared a particular practice of prayer that both presupposed and reinforced the notion of an enormous gap between one’s sinful self (all too painfully obvious) and an exalted God (all too painfully out of reach). For 250 years, lay persons—at least the sort that Anselm wrote to, namely, those wealthy enough to afford books and the leisure to pray through them—had been schooled in prayer by the Psalter and shared this practice with him.

Anselm Wrote in the Language of Prayer

Third, Anselm wrote in the language of prayer. The real argument of Proslogion, or so we are told, begins in chapter 2. There Anselm writes,

Now, Lord, since it is you who gives understanding to faith, grant me to understand as well as you think fit, that you exist as we believe, and that you are what we believe you to be. We believe that you are that thing than which nothing greater can be thought. (244, lines 158–162)

Typically, Anselm’s detractors point out that the term “greater” is a hopelessly ambiguous. Greater in what respect? Clearly Anselm does not mean economically greater or physically taller! Yet does not the adjective demand a noun, as in the phrases “greater wealth”, or “greater height”? By leaving off the noun, is not Anselm stooping to sleight of hand using the ambiguous term “greater” to move illegitimately from a comparison of ideas to a comparison of realities?

It is easy to lose sight of the fact that Anselm’s seminal methodological piece, De Grammatico, is an extended grammatical investigation of linguistic signification. For example, if the word “grammarians” signifies a substance (namely a particular human being), does the word “grammar” signify an ontologically related substance? Given Anselm’s logical expertise, it is highly
unlikely that he covered over (much less simply overlooked) the ambiguity surrounding the word “greater” en route to using the phrase as an appellation for God. So I am disinclined to fault him for employing a defective “definition” of “God” when in fact he is not offering a definition at all. Rather, he is taking what O. K. Bousma called a “short-cut”.

The only way we can account for the widespread assent by centuries of readers who would have been entirely untroubled by the locution “that than which nothing greater may be conceived” is to realize that they have instinctively taken the phrase as shorthand for praise. Anselm assumed both that his readers were biblically literate enough to catch his frequent biblical allusions, and that they were themselves habituated to the practice of praise. The very Psalter through which Anselm and his readers prayed contains the following:

Psa. 47:2 For the LORD, the Most High, is awesome, a great king over all the earth.
Psa. 77:13 Your way, O God, is holy. What god is so great as our God?
Psa. 86:10 For you are great and do wondrous things; you alone are God.
Psa. 89:7 a God feared in the council of the holy ones, great and awesome above all that are around him?
Psa. 95:3 For the LORD is a great God, and a great King above all gods.
Psa. 135:5 For I know that the LORD is great; our Lord is above all gods.
Psa. 145:3 Great is the LORD, and greatly to be praised; his greatness is unsearchable.

Granted, the phrase “than which nothing greater can be thought” strikes us as cold and limp—“praise on ice” as Bousma puts it!—when compared with the fervor of the Psalmists. But given Anselm’s familiarity with the Psalms and the widespread use of them for private lay devotion, surely we are right to think of “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” as an attenuated form of praise.

This observation might be better described in terms of a grammatical remark. The phrase upon which Anselm’s so-called argument turns functions as a law-sketch. In scientific disciplines, law-sketches, such as “f = ma”, are not stand-alone definitions. Even those who can substitute for the symbols the sentence “force equals mass times acceleration”, badly misunderstand if they try to calculate the force of love by multiplying the mass of the elephant by the acceleration of unemployment. But how many of us naturally make the correct application in a more complicated case involving, say, a torsion pendulum? My point is this: Law-sketches are not self-evident definitions but shorthand reminders for those who share relevant training in a particular conceptual language. Just as physics is learned through guided activities (student labs) and countless story problems, so too, Anselm’s language can only be handled rightly by those who would have been trained into the right sort of familiarity by the activities of prayer and the reading of scriptural narratives.
Perhaps the sort of judgment upon which the success of a law-sketch depends is precisely that which enables us to classify *Prosligion* as a proof after all; provided we follow Wittgenstein’s distinction between two types of proofs. Proofs that are external to a system and hoped to “ground” the system Wittgenstein deemed to be mythical. At the end of his life Wittgenstein wrote,

All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.

In other words, what appears to be a stand-alone argument that grounds one system is itself really part of another. Consequently, what matters are those “proofs” that are recognized as internal to a written symbolic system. For any statement within the system (e.g., the Pythagorean theorem) there could be multiple proofs, each translatable into the others, because rather than compel converts, proofs convince those who already have adopted the concepts and procedures embodied in the proof. Thus Wittgenstein’s statement that “the recursion shows nothing but itself” means that a recursive proof shows a paradigmatic recursive procedure. To say the same thing differently, what enables a proof to be compelling and conclusive is an already shared way of doing mathematics.

So too for Anselm’s “proof”. I maintain that the perennial fascination held for *Prosligion* is more an indicator of the fact that converts already share concepts and practices than of the argument’s power to compel assent from non-practicing skeptics.

What, then, may we conclude from these historical observations? If ongoing practice gives to Anselm’s words their sense, then it seems reasonable to conclude that we must attend to Anselm’s ongoing practice of prayer in order to understand the sense of his words in *Prosligion*. While it is quite possible that our notions of “prayer” and his are similar enough for us imaginatively to inhabit his frame of reference, it is also possible that the gap is too great for us to do this merely imaginatively. Perhaps their seriousness of devotion and high degree of biblical literacy demand that we actually participate in the activity of prayer. If practice gives the words their sense and the sense of Anselm’s words are to become ours, the question remains: how far must we go in becoming practitioners of prayer in order to understand what Anselm is talking about?

*Understanding is a Species of “Going On”*

The second Wittgensteinian premise I ask be granted, is that understanding is a species of knowing how to go on. Wittgenstein held that the grammar
of the word “knows” is closely related to that of “can” and “is able to”. Of course, it makes an enormous difference to my argument whether Wittgenstein meant that understanding requires an actual going on rather than simply an ability to go on. I will concede that in *Philosophical Grammar* he wrote, “‘Understanding a word’ may mean: knowing how it is used; being able to apply it.” This makes it sound as though “understanding” names merely the capacity to go on rather than an actual case of doing so. But as Wittgenstein often pointed out, what a concept amounts to is shown by what a mistake about it would look like. Imagine a student learning how to divide even numbers in half. The teacher explains, “Half of four is two; half of six is three, half of eight is four, and half of two would be . . . ?” The student bolts upright, raises her eyebrows and blurts out, “Oh, I see!” Do her behaviors indicate genuine knowledge? What if she proceeds to write down “5” having made the mistake of thinking that the teacher was looking for the next in a sequence: 2, 3, 4 . . . “5”? We see then that the cash value of the claim “Now I know!” is empty until one actually goes on to act. To the medical student who insists that she learns anatomy by intuition, the instructor replies, “That’s fine. But you’ll have to take the exam with the rest of them.”

The subsequent performance gives content to the former claim.

So let us assume that “going on” must be actual rather than an untested capacity or presupposed ability. Now then, what sort of actions might count as “going on”? One of the weakest forms of “going on” that provides a benchmark for demonstrable knowledge, it seems to me, is proper description. A primitive form of description is the correct labeling of objects. More sophisticated forms of description detail the ways that the identity of an object (or event) is bound up with its historical, spatial, social, economic, geopolitical (etc.) contexts. Clearly one cannot do this skillfully apart from deep familiarity with the respective contexts.

But in Wittgenstein’s mind, even mere labeling is a widely ramified activity because any use of language is a world-constituting act. For the later Wittgenstein, the right speaking of language involves one in the host form of life (upon which the language in question supervenes) by requiring familiarity with that form of life before intelligibility is attained. Thus he writes that the “grammar” of the word “chair” is our sitting in them. Those who have never sat in chairs, say aboriginal tribesmen, will have poor description skills—perhaps mistaking a small table for a chair or failing to label a suspended porch swing as a chair. I shall argue that the sense of Anselm’s words are open only to those who become fluent enough in his language to make skillful descriptions (which is to say, descriptions that Anselm would recognize as fitting). But how much fluency is enough? And how is such fluency attained?

Fluency in a conceptual language is gained in one of two ways. Clearly, *participation* breeds fluency. We learn our first language by immersion in a linguistic form of life, one that involves speaking and acting. So, as children,
we are not instructed that books exist or that chairs are real, we are taught
to fetch books and sit in chairs. In like fashion, we can learn a second lan-
guage by immersion in a culture. Simple translations may not do. We must
learn to bicker with the natives about things that natives bicker about by
bickering with the natives.

Therefore, if “going on” in the present case means giving a skillful descrip-
tion of Anselm’s practice, namely his prayer, and this in turn requires a
fluency in the language and terms of prayer—including terms such as
“grace”, and “sin”, and “mercy”—and such fluency comes by direct partic-
ipation in activities such as praise, confession and supplication, then it
follows that one of the conditions for understanding the sense of the words
of *Prosligion* is that we as readers be pray-ers.

However, because some languages share large tracts of conceptual terrain
with others, to learn a second language may not require total immersion. For
example, someone who is experienced at detecting “off sides” in the game
of soccer will have an easier time catching on to what “off sides” means in
hockey than will someone who has never played either sport. This is true
even if the soccer player has never yet played hockey. In other words, in
some cases, it may be possible to gain fluency by analogy (rather than by
direct participation), by imaginatively inhabiting the rival community’s form
of life. Perhaps I need not actually pray to imagine what prayer might
be like, or at least imagine this well enough to see what is going on in the
*Prosligion*.

Some will surely object that the distance between player and spectator is
too small to create such a stir. A competent referee, one may claim, is more
dependent upon good vision and a firm grasp of the rules concerning “off
sides” than upon time spent actually playing the game. But this objection
oversimplifies matters. There seem to be examples of practices that point in
both directions. On the one hand, we know of highly successful basketball
coaches who themselves were never players. They clearly had one sort of
mastery that enabled them to instruct their players in what they themselves
could not do well. (Conversely, we know of player-coaches who quickly
retired when it became obvious that excelling in playing the sport did not
guarantee them being good coaches!) On the other hand, it seems patently
ridiculous to assert that a spectator to religion could coach would be martyrs
or saints. Expertise for coaching in these fields necessarily requires
participation.

What conclusion may I draw? It depends; what sort of practice is prayer
in Anselm’s context? First, if fluency in the language of prayer is necessar-
ily gained by participation, then the rest of my argument follows: Competen-
tent description of the ongoing practice of prayer (and thus the sense of
Anselm’s words) requires participation in the practice. (Why do we naturally
chafe against this conclusion?) However, as a second option, if prayer
is the sort of practice that like basketball depends on an already widely

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shared cultural background, then my conclusion is invalid. We need not imitate Anselm’s prayer life in order to understand Anselm’s *Proslogion*, any more than we need to actually practice racism (or be racist) to become a convincing secret agent inside the KKK. There is something bothersome about that particular analogy, however. For, it seems to me that one who pretends to be racist in order to serve as a secret agent in the KKK, is more likely, through the actions and languages spoken, to move in the direction of racism. Ian Ramsey seems to suggest that the same “danger” might be involved in the language of prayer. When one uses the language of “grace,” “supplication” and “mercy” or when one imaginatively inhabits the stance of a pray-er, one may actually be engaged in proto-prayer.

**Description of an Ongoing Practice of Prayer is Likewise Self-involving**

The case I am trying to make, namely that the sense of Anselm’s words requires his readers to be pray-ers, is slightly stronger if, as a third option, the practice of prayer is akin to the practice of yoga by a guru than to either a toddler learning to speak or a referee spotting an off sides. Here what is at stake is whether the reader who offers a skillful description, as evidence of her going on, judges the practice in its entirety.

G. E. Moore recalled an example from Wittgenstein’s early lectures. When a musician renders judgment on a performance, “The bass is too heavy” only those who share in musical training are capable of agreement in judgment. If I happen to agree with their judgment, it is purely accidental, because I am not a musician and so what I am doing is not judging. And if in fact, I happen to disagree with them, my only defense is to say, “It is simply a matter of taste.” Well now, I am partly right and partly wrong about that. It is a matter of taste, namely theirs, for not all tastes are equally cultivated. In fact, the curse of the untrained ear is not only failure to hear in what sense the bass is “too heavy” but also failure to perceive that the experts have taste and I do not.

Here is my point. If a practice such as yoga admits of a range of skill in its practitioners, then skillful description requires more than the fluency in the central concepts of the practice. It also requires fluency in words such as “failure”, “authentic”, and “progress”. One uses these words only as well as one’s own judgment skills have progressed.

Some genuine agnostics claim they share enough of the cultural backdrop to be able to give skillful description of prayer. Others claim to be entirely unable to recognize themselves in such pictures. If the former seem able to reason analogically about prayer, what of the latter? Are they disqualified from spotting what counts as a mistake in prayer? After all, practitioners can be mistaken about praying. In fact, if virtues are acquired slowly, as Aristotle claims, then virtuous people will be rare. Consequently, we ought not be surprised that many who claim to pray earnestly will give faulty or
confused or incomplete accounts of their prayer. And if an agent’s own
description makes an action what it is, then their confusion may betray a
faulty practice. I concede that one’s practice may be faulty enough that even
those farthest removed from the practice can smell something fishy, even if
they cannot give a nuanced description of what is wrong. But of course, I
am not saying that the practice of prayer guarantees one’s conceptual fluency.
What I am claiming, rather, is that we have paid far too little attention to the
possibility that training in the practice of prayer (more precisely, Anselm’s
practice of prayer) may be one necessary condition to understanding the
sense of the words of Anselm’s Proslogion.

Objections

A number of objections can be raised to my line of reasoning. For example,
did not Anselm believe that his argument was sufficient to convince the fool
“who has said in his heart, ‘There is no god’” despite the fool’s obvious lack
of prayer, meditation or spiritual exercises? In the first place, I am disinclined
to equate the fool of Psalm 53 with the modern secular atheist. It may be that
as an adult he does not pray, but any conscientious Jewish mother would
have guaranteed that Shlomo had been a good boy who went to temple reg-
ularly. If so, then the fool already has the fluency necessary to follow the lan-
guage of the Proslogion. Moreover, we have to be careful with the text. The
complete text of Psalm 53:1 reads “Fools say in their hearts, ‘There is no God.’
They are corrupt, they commit abominable acts; there is no one who does
good.” The text does not say that the fool disbelieves that God exists, but
rather that he says so in his heart and then lives accordingly, committing
corrupt and abominable acts. If the sentence in question is spoken by
someone who knows better but is trying to talk himself into believing things
that diminish the sting of his conscience, then such a one is advisedly chosen
by Anselm and perfectly capable of comprehending the Proslogion.

Second, some may insist that the formal implications of Anselm’s argument
can be worked out by natural reason quite apart from the practical implica-
tions of the religious conclusion Anselm intends. However, what language
does natural reason speak when working out these formal implications?
Wittgenstein wrote that “the limit of language is shown by its being impos-
sible to describe the fact which corresponds to . . . a sentence, without simply
repeating the sentence.” If natural reason translates Anselm’s so-called
argument into another language, how can we be sure that the content of
Proslogion is not lost? Alternately, if natural reason engages the thick descrip-
tion of the Proslogion on its own terms, then it is faced with the very problem
that attention to practices is hoped to illuminate.

I am sympathetic with the worry that unless the formal implications can
be abstracted from the vocabulary, then the argument appears to be insu-
lated from criticism. But close attention to the practical nature of language

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does not necessarily result in insularity. What does follow, if Wittgenstein is taken seriously, is that the mode of discussion cannot take the form of “proof” and “refutation”. Rather, it takes the form of a conversation fraught with misunderstandings that can only be worked out by more conversation—our knowledge is contingent all the way down.

A third objection runs something like this: There is a categorical difference between understanding Anselm’s enterprise and understanding his proof. While understanding the enterprise of prayer may require one to be trained into certain skilled judgments, understanding the proof requires no such special judgment. For example, someone who has never played baseball may not have as deep an appreciation as a seasoned player of the game’s point, its difficulties, and its requisite skills. Nevertheless, it is claimed, the spectator can understand well enough to distinguish a well-turned double play from an infield error. Analogously, a spectator of prayer can understand the enterprise well enough to follow the sense of Anselm’s words as employed in his proof.

I maintain that this bifurcation of enterprise and proof is overly hasty. For what a spectator of baseball really cannot understand are what Alasdair MacIntyre calls the standards of excellence and internal goods of the practice of baseball, which only players can appreciate.65 (As my kids used to say, “It takes one to know one!”) Consider the following example from baseball history:

In the 1956 World Series, Don Larsen of the New York Yankees pitched a perfect game. By all accounts his final pitch in that game was not in the strike zone, but “high and outside.” Nonetheless, the umpire called the pitch a strike, so it was a strike, and the only perfect game in the history of the World Series was complete. Baseball enthusiasts defend this call. Technically, it was wrong. The umpire missed the call. Either he “saw” it wrong (and his call was epistemologically improper) or he “called” it wrong (and his call was morally improper). Yet baseball enthusiasts [which is to say, expert practitioners] say that it was the right call, because the pitch was so close to the strike zone and no batter should not swing at a close pitch in such a crucial situation.66

Now, I—as mere spectator—can barely grasp the logic that is supposedly invoked to defend this umpire’s call. In fact, I am tempted to see defenders of the claim as biased in favor of the Yankees or prejudiced in favor of having there be a perfect game in the record books. But my suspicions may only confirm that I do not know what I am talking about, since I lack familiarity with the standards of excellence wielded by true players.

Not only are non-players unable fully to understand standards of excellence, they do not comprehend the internal goods the attainment of which baseball players greatly sacrifice. That I do not understand those internal goods is evidenced by the fact that I do not practice five hours a day in the
off-season (as college players do at one division III school I know of on the west coast) and then travel a horrendous schedule for years on subsistence salary to work my way up through the minor baseball leagues, perhaps squandering family along the way, hoping for a shot at the major professional leagues. Rather, I teach theology because I understand the internal goods of theology. And I think that “God” for Anselm is much more like a good internal to the practices that constitute his life than it is like a crowd-pleasing triple play.

**Conclusion**

Perhaps Wittgenstein had in mind the connection between practice and knowing when he wrote that “working in philosophy . . . is really more a working on oneself.”67 For if “you cannot write anything about yourself that is more truthful than you yourself are” because “you don’t stand on stilts or on a ladder but on your bare feet”,68 then how much more difficult is it to speak truthfully of God? That Wittgenstein placed significance on the internal relation between biography and philosophical clarity has at least circumstantial evidence in his own monastic-like vows of poverty (he gave away a vast fortune and for a time lived in a gardener’s shed), chastity (in addition to the fact he never married, his diaries show that he considered sexual release to be a detrimental to intellectual rigor), and obedience (in addition to a strict diet—lunch consisted of a single boiled egg—Wittgenstein kept a strict schedule, which as he aged devoted increasing amounts of time to prayer though, predictably, he thought he prayed badly).69

We might speculate as to what Wittgenstein might have thought about the ontological argument since he collapsed the language-world distinction upon which the modern bifurcation of practice and knowledge seems to hinge. Although Wittgenstein himself never wrote explicitly on the ontological argument, Wittgensteinians such as Bousma and Malcolm did.70 However, in sharp contrast to them stands Wittgenstein’s Doktorvater, the skeptic Bertrand Russell. Russell’s story has become famous. He recalls,

I remember the precise moment, one day in 1894, as I was walking along Trinity Lane, when I saw in a flash (or thought I saw) that the ontological argument is valid. I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco; on my way back, I suddenly threw it up in the air, and exclaimed as I caught it: “Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound.”71

It is common knowledge that Russell was not a pray-er, neither prior to his so-called conversion, nor subsequent to it. In fact, Russell’s conversion only lasted “for a time” as he apparently abandoned the notion of God’s existence as quickly as he had embraced it.72

Wittgenstein may have had Russell in mind when he asked whether one could “have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space of one second—no

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One does not call hope ardent if it does not endure, because what comes after as well as before makes this moment of hope, hope. So too for belief in God. If Russell did not engage in the practice of prayer or praise either before or after his stroll down Trinity Lane, can we assume that he was sufficiently trained for adeptly handling Anselm’s law-sketch well enough to reject it? If Russell’s “conversion” lasted only for the span of a few days, can we even credit him with genuine insight?

It has been my aim all along to raise suspicions about the modern temptation to pry knowledge claims from their homes in practice. But if Wittgenstein is correct in saying that practice gives the words their sense, then Russell’s case falsifies the strong counterclaim that that a shared sense of words can be reliably attained as a spectator entirely removed from participation in the relevant practice.

Of course, many things may have gone wrong for Russell. Perhaps the ontological argument really does not work. Perhaps Russell was not very bright. I am sure I would not know. Certainly Anselm would have been baffled by Russell’s indefinite postponement of prayer. Yet, I do not think Anselm would have been troubled by charges that his argument “failed” in Russell’s case. Anselm’s advice would be unambiguous: those capable of understanding Prosligion ought to pray. Those incapable of understanding ought also to pray. Surely Anselm would recall for us the Psalmist’s words concerning God:

With the loyal you show yourself loyal;
with the blameless you show yourself blameless;
with the pure you show yourself pure;
and with the crooked you show yourself perverse.

The Psalmist might just as well have added, “with the prayerless you show yourself . . . not at all”.

NOTES

1. I want to thank William Wainwright, Terrence Tilley, Kelly Johnson, and Therese Lysaught for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.


Ibid., p. 239.

Ibid., emphasis added.

Ibid., p. 242.

Ibid.


Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 45e.

Consideration of other forms of prayer than that (or those) with which Anselm was familiar is beyond the scope of this paper. Today “prayer” names a family resemblance for a wide and diverse range of activities. However, rather than consider these, I will restrict myself to the simplest case: those who imitate Anselm’s practice(s) in prayer have the better chance of understanding Proslogion than one who is entirely disengaged from this sort of praying.

Proslogion, p. 238.

The Proslogion was written in Anselm’s eighteenth year as monk.


Ibid., p. 28. Emphasis added.


In the early days if the Christian church, asceticism was taken to be the training that readied one for the literal seeing of God: for martyrdom. See Maureen A. Tilley, “The Ascetic Body and the (Un)Making of the World of the Martyr”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion Vol. LIX, no. 3 (1991), pp. 467–479.

Southern, St. Anselm, pp. 46–47.

Cited in Ibid., p. 47.

As R. W. Southern observed, just as Berengar argued that Hoc est corpus meum self-destructs unless Hoc retains a single referent from the beginning to the end of the sentence, so too, “God does not exist” self-destructs unless the concept of “God” has the same conceptual referent at the end of the sentence as it has at the beginning, Ibid.

Ibid., p. 63.

“Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §373. I am not suggesting that Anselm and Wittgenstein’s method were identical, but there may be a family resemblance.

Southern, St. Anselm, pp. 67–68.


That such an ascetic was practiced is indisputable. Whether or not it was wrongheaded is another matter. See Caleb Thompson, “Wittgenstein, Augustine and the Fantasy of Ascent,” Philosophical Investigations Vol. 25, no. 2 (April 2002), pp. 153–171.

Southern, St. Anselm, pp. 77–80, 131.

Although Anselm’s prayers look as though they might naturally be used in corporate liturgy, several of them lack “direct liturgical associations”, a fact which Ward takes as evidence that they were used in private prayer. Ward, “Introduction”, p. 32.

Cited in Southern, St. Anselm, p. 96.

Ibid., p. 84.

Ibid., p. 450.

Ibid., p. 85.

For example, from about the eighth century, extant preces privatae (private prayers) contain “long passages in every prayer about sin”. See Ward, “Introduction”, p. 43.

Ibid., pp. 36–37.

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I mean by “language” what Wittgenstein meant: not merely the vocabulary but also certain social behaviors closely connected with that vocabulary.


A compilation of Anselm’s direct and indirect quotations of Scripture fills thirty quarto columns with references to almost every biblical book. See Southern, St. Anselm, p. 70. So deeply had Anselm internalized the language of the Psalms, that he spontaneously weaves Pss. 16, 27, and 73 into a single prayer to Christ. Ward, “Introduction”, p. 28.


Even we laity are well enough trained to spot this mistake. But if I use a more complicated example, such as the nonspatial physical location of electrons, my illustration will be immediately lost upon the general, which is to say untrained, reader.


“The difficult mathematical problems are those for whose solution we don’t yet possess a written system. . . . Once that’s done, the rest is easy.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, trans. Anthony Kenny (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press and Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1974), VIII §151.

“The spectator sees the whole impressive procedure. And he becomes convinced of something; that is the special impression he gets. He goes away from the performance convinced of something. . . . But he does not say: I realized that this happens. Rather: that it must be like that. This ‘must’ shows what kind of lesson he has drawn from the scene. The ‘must’ shows that he has gone in a circle. . . . The must shows that he has adopted a concept.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, 1978), VI §87, p. 8.


Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §151.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, §10.


This is MacIntyre’s argument. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).


I was tempted to put Rush Rhees in the latter camp until I learned that he grew up as the great, great grandson of Welsh radical preacher and pamphleteer and son of a professor of New Testament at Newton Theological Institute. Rhees apparently considered himself a religious Puritan until he “revolted into an atheist”. See D. Z. Phillips, “Introduction” in

“...it is no easy task to be good. Anyone can get angry, or give or spend money. But to do things to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; that is why goodness is rare and laudable and noble.” Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” in The Complete Works of Aristotle (Bollingen Series; 71:2), ed. Jonathon Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), II.9.

I am particularly indebted to William Wainwright for raising these objections.


Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 10e.

Ibid., 33e.

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Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 10e.

Ibid., 33e.


Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 16e.


Philosophical Investigations, §583. Wittgenstein gives us no reason to limit the temporal context of these “surroundings”; the plot of our lives may be what Wittgenstein has in mind when he muses: “...—this particular and not at all simple pattern in the drawing of our life”.

LW II, 26–27e.

Just as troubling, though not discussed here, is the temptation to abstract an argument’s “logic” and treat it in isolation from the words which embody it.


Ps 18:25–26, NRSV.