Utilitarianism

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the = Greatest=20 Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they = tend to=20 promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of = happiness. By=20 happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, = pain,=20 and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral = standard set up=20 by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things = it=20 includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is = left an=20 open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the = theory of=20 life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that = pleasure, and=20 freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all = desirable=20 things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) = are=20 desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to = the=20 promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in = some of=20 the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To = suppose that=20 life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and = nobler=20 object of desire and pursuitthey designate as utterly mean and = grovelling; as a=20 doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, = at a very=20 early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine = are=20 occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its = German,=20 French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is = not they,=20 but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; = since the=20 accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except = those of=20 which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could = not be=20 gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources = of=20 pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule = of life=20 which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The = comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, = precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's = conceptions=20 of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal=20 appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything = as=20 happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, = consider=20 the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their = scheme=20 of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any = sufficient=20 manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be = included. But=20 there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the=20 pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the = moral=20 sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere = sensation. It=20 must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have = placed the=20 superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater = permanency,=20 safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former- that is, in their = circumstantial=20 advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these = points=20 utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the = other,=20 and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is = quite=20 compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that = some kinds=20 of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would = be absurd=20 that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as = well as=20 quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on = quantity=20 alone.

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or = what=20 makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, = except its=20 being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two = pleasures, if=20 there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give = a=20 decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to = prefer=20 it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those = who are=20 competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that = they prefer=20 it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of = discontent,=20 and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which = their=20 nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred = enjoyment a=20 superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in=20 comparison, of small account.

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally = acquainted with,=20 and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most = marked=20 preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher = faculties. Few=20 human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower = animals, for a=20 promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent = human=20 being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an = ignoramus, no=20 person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though = they=20 should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better = satisfied=20 with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they = possess=20 more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which = they=20 have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in = cases of=20 unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their = lot for=20 almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of = higher=20 faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more = acute=20 suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an = inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really = wish to=20 sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give = what=20 explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to = pride, a=20 name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of = the=20 least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it = to the=20 love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with = the=20 Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the = love of=20 power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into = and=20 contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of = dignity,=20 which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though = by no=20 means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so = essential=20 a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing = which=20 conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of = desire to=20 them.

Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of=20 happiness- that the superior being, in anything like equal = circumstances, is not=20 happier than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas, of = happiness,=20 and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of = enjoyment are=20 low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a = highly=20 endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, = as the=20 world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its = imperfections,=20 if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being = who is=20 indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not = at all=20 the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human = being=20 dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied = than a=20 fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it = is=20 because they only know their own side of the question. The other party = to the=20 comparison knows both sides.

It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher = pleasures,=20 occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the = lower. But=20 this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic = superiority=20 of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their = election for=20 the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this = no less=20 when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between = bodily=20 and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, = though=20 perfectly aware that health is the greater good.

It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful = enthusiasm for=20 everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and = selfishness.=20 But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, = voluntarily=20 choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I = believe=20 that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have = already=20 become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in = most=20 natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile = influences, but=20 by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it = speedily=20 dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted = them,=20 and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to = keeping=20 that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as = they lose=20 their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for = indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not = because=20 they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones = to=20 which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer = capable of=20 enjoying. It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally=20 susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly = preferred=20 the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual = attempt=20 to combine both.

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can = be no=20 appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, = or which=20 of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart = from its=20 moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who = are=20 qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority = among=20 them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation = to=20 accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is = no=20 other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What = means=20 are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the = intensest of=20 two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are = familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and = pain is=20 always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a = particular=20 pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except = the=20 feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those = feelings and=20 judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be=20 preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of = which the=20 animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is suspectible, they = are=20 entitled on this subject to the same regard.

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly = just=20 conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of = human=20 conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the = acceptance of=20 the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own = greatest=20 happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it = may=20 possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for = its=20 nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and = that=20 the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, = therefore,=20 could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of = character,=20 even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, = and his=20 own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the = benefit.=20 But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders = refutation=20 superfluous.

According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, = the=20 ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other = things are=20 desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other = people), is=20 an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as = possible in=20 enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, = and the=20 rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by = those who=20 in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their = habits of=20 self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the = means of=20 comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end = of human=20 action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may = accordingly be=20 defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of = which an=20 existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent = possible,=20 secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature = of=20 things admits, to the whole sentient creation.

Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors, = who say=20 that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational purpose of human = life and=20 action; because, in the first place, it is unattainable: and they = contemptuously=20 ask, what right hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr. Carlyle = clenches by=20 the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to be? Next, = they=20 say, that men can do without happiness; that all noble human beings have = felt=20 this, and could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of = Entsagen, or=20 renunciation; which lesson, thoroughly learnt and submitted to, they = affirm to=20 be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue.

The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were = it well=20 founded; for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the = attainment=20 of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. Though, = even in=20 that case, something might still be said for the utilitarian theory; = since=20 utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the prevention = or=20 mitigation of unhappiness; and if the former aim be chimerical, there = will be=20 all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long = at least=20 as mankind think fit to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous = act of=20 suicide recommended under certain conditions by Novalis. When, however, = it is=20 thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be = happy, the=20 assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at least an = exaggeration.=20 If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, = it is=20 evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure = lasts only=20 moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, = and is=20 the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and = steady flame.=20 Of this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of = life were=20 as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant = was not a=20 life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and = transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided = predominance of the=20 active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not = to=20 expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing. A life thus = composed, to=20 those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always appeared = worthy of=20 the name of happiness. And such an existence is even now the lot of = many, during=20 some considerable portion of their lives. The present wretched = education, and=20 wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to its being=20 attainable by almost all.

The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human beings, if taught to = consider=20 happiness as the end of life, would be satisfied with such a moderate = share of=20 it. But great numbers of mankind have been satisfied with much less. The = main=20 constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by = itself is=20 often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquillity, and excitement. = With much=20 tranquillity, many find that they can be content with very little = pleasure: with=20 much excitement, many can reconcile themselves to a considerable = quantity of=20 pain. There is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even the = mass of=20 mankind to unite both; since the two are so far from being incompatible = that=20 they are in natural alliance, the prolongation of either being a = preparation=20 for, and exciting a wish for, the other. It is only those in whom = indolence=20 amounts to a vice, that do not desire excitement after an interval of = repose: it=20 is only those in whom the need of excitement is a disease, that feel the = tranquillity which follows excitement dull and insipid, instead of = pleasurable=20 in direct proportion to the excitement which preceded it. When people = who are=20 tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient=20 enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring = for nobody=20 but themselves. To those who have neither public nor private affections, = the=20 excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value = as the=20 time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death: = while=20 those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially = those=20 who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the collective interests = of=20 mankind, retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in = the=20 vigour of youth and health. Next to selfishness, the principal cause = which makes=20 life unsatisfactory is want of mental cultivation. A cultivated mind- I = do not=20 mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of = knowledge=20 have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to = exercise its faculties- finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all = that=20 surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the=20 imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, = past and=20 present, and their prospects in the future. It is possible, indeed, to = become=20 indifferent to all this, and that too without having exhausted a = thousandth part=20 of it; but only when one has had from the beginning no moral or human = interest=20 in these things, and has sought in them only the gratification of = curiosity.

Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an = amount of=20 mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest in these = objects of=20 contemplation, should not be the inheritance of every one born in a = civilised=20 country. As little is there an inherent necessity that any human being = should be=20 a selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling or care but those which = centre in his=20 own miserable individuality. Something far superior to this is = sufficiently=20 common even now, to give ample earnest of what the human species may be = made.=20 Genuine private affections and a sincere interest in the public good, = are=20 possible, though in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought up human = being. In=20 a world in which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so = much=20 also to correct and improve, every one who has this moderate amount of = moral and=20 intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called = enviable;=20 and unless such a person, through bad laws, or subjection to the will of = others,=20 is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness within his reach, = he will=20 not fail to find this enviable existence, if he escape the positive = evils of=20 life, the great sources of physical and mental suffering- such as = indigence,=20 disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects = of=20 affection. The main stress of the problem lies, therefore, in the = contest with=20 these calamities, from which it is a rare good fortune entirely to = escape;=20 which, as things now are, cannot be obviated, and often cannot be in any = material degree mitigated. Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment's=20 consideration can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the = world are=20 in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, = be in=20 the end reduced within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying = suffering,=20 may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with = the good=20 sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable of = enemies,=20 disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and = moral=20 education, and proper control of noxious influences; while the progress = of=20 science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct = conquests over=20 this detestable foe. And every advance in that direction relieves us = from some,=20 not only of the chances which cut short our own lives, but, what = concerns us=20 still more, which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up. = As for=20 vicissitudes of fortune, and other disappointments connected with = worldly=20 circumstances, these are principally the effect either of gross = imprudence, of=20 ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect social institutions.

All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great = degree,=20 many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort; and = though=20 their removal is grievously slow- though a long succession of = generations will=20 perish in the breach before the conquest is completed, and this world = becomes=20 all that, if will and knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be = made- yet=20 every mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, however = small=20 and unconspicuous, in the endeavour, will draw a noble enjoyment from = the=20 contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form of selfish=20 indulgence consent to be without.

And this leads to the true estimation of what is said by the = objectors=20 concerning the possibility, and the obligation, of learning to do = without=20 happiness. Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness; it is = done=20 involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of mankind, even in those parts of = our=20 present world which are least deep in barbarism; and it often has to be = done=20 voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which = he prizes=20 more than his individual happiness. But this something, what is it, = unless the=20 happiness of others or some of the requisites of happiness? It is noble = to be=20 capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or chances = of it:=20 but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its = own end;=20 and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is = better=20 than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr = did not=20 believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices? = Would it=20 be made if he thought that his renunciation of happiness for himself = would=20 produce no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make their lot = like=20 his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced=20 happiness? All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the = personal=20 enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to = increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or = professes=20 to do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than = the=20 ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what = men can=20 do, but assuredly not an example of what they should.

Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's = arrangements that=20 any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice = of his=20 own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully = acknowledge=20 that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which = can be=20 found in man. I will add, that in this condition the world, paradoxical = as the=20 assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives = the best=20 prospect of realising, such happiness as is attainable. For nothing = except that=20 consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making = him feel=20 that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue = him:=20 which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils = of life,=20 and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman = Empire, to=20 cultivate in tranquillity the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, = without=20 concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more = than about=20 their inevitable end.

Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self = devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them, as = either to=20 the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. The utilitarian morality does = recognise=20 in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the = good of=20 others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A=20 sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of = happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it = applauds,=20 is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of = others;=20 either of mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits = imposed by=20 the collective interests of mankind.

I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom = have the=20 justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian = standard=20 of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that = of all=20 concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, = utilitarianism=20 requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and = benevolent=20 spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete = spirit=20 of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love = your=20 neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian = morality.=20 As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would = enjoin,=20 first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or = (as=20 speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every = individual, as=20 nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and = secondly, that=20 education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, = should=20 so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an=20 indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the = whole;=20 especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of = conduct,=20 negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; = so that=20 not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to = himself,=20 consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a = direct=20 impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of = the=20 habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may = fill a=20 large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence. If = the,=20 impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds = in this=20 its, true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any = other=20 morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it; what more = beautiful or=20 more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can = be=20 supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the=20 utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their = mandates.

The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with = representing it=20 in a discreditable light. On the contrary, those among them who = entertain=20 anything like a just idea of its disinterested character, sometimes find = fault=20 with its standard as being too high for humanity. They say it is = exacting too=20 much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of = promoting=20 the general interests of society. But this is to mistake the very = meaning of a=20 standard of morals, and confound the rule of action with the motive of = it. It is=20 the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test = we may=20 know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all = we do=20 shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of = all our=20 actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of = duty=20 does not condemn them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism that this = particular misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it, = inasmuch=20 as utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming = that=20 the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though = much with=20 the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning = does what=20 is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid = for his=20 trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a = crime, even=20 if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater=20 obligations.

But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty, and in = direct=20 obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode = of=20 thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds = upon so=20 wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority = of good=20 actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of=20 individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts = of the=20 most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the = particular=20 persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that = in=20 benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate = and=20 authorised expectations, of any one else. The multiplication of = happiness is,=20 according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions = on=20 which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do = this on an=20 extended scale, in other words to be a public benefactor, are but = exceptional;=20 and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; = in=20 every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few = persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose = actions=20 extends to society in general, need concern themselves habitually about = large an=20 object. In the case of abstinences indeed- of things which people = forbear to do=20 from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular = case might=20 be beneficial- it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be=20 consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practised = generally,=20 would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the = obligation to=20 abstain from it. The amount of regard for the public interest implied in = this=20 recognition, is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals, = for they=20 all enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to = society.

The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the = doctrine of=20 utility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose of a = standard=20 of morality, and of the very meaning of the words right and wrong. It is = often=20 affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and unsympathising; that = it chills=20 their moral feelings towards individuals; that it makes them regard only = the dry=20 and hard consideration of the consequences of actions, not taking into = their=20 moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate. If the = assertion=20 means that they do not allow their judgment respecting the rightness or=20 wrongness of an action to be influenced by their opinion of the = qualities of the=20 person who does it, this is a complaint not against utilitarianism, but = against=20 having any standard of morality at all; for certainly no known ethical = standard=20 decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or a = bad man,=20 still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or = the=20 contrary. These considerations are relevant, not to the estimation of = actions,=20 but of persons; and there is nothing in the utilitarian theory = inconsistent with=20 the fact that there are other things which interest us in persons = besides the=20 rightness and wrongness of their actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the=20 paradoxical misuse of language which was part of their system, and by = which they=20 strove to raise themselves above all concern about anything but virtue, = were=20 fond of saying that he who has that has everything; that he, and only = he, is=20 rich, is beautiful, is a king. But no claim of this description is made = for the=20 virtuous man by the utilitarian doctrine. Utilitarians are quite aware = that=20 there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and = are=20 perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are = also aware=20 that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, = and that=20 actions which are blamable, often proceed from qualities entitled to = praise.=20 When this is apparent in any particular case, it modifies their = estimation, not=20 certainly of the act, but of the agent. I grant that they are, = notwithstanding,=20 of opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good character is = good=20 actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as = good, of=20 which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes = them=20 unpopular with many people; but it is an unpopularity which they must = share with=20 every one who regards the distinction between right and wrong in a = serious=20 light; and the reproach is not one which a conscientious utilitarian = need be=20 anxious to repel.

If no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look = on the=20 morality of actions, as measured by the utilitarian standard, with too = exclusive=20 a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the other beauties of = character=20 which go towards making a human being lovable or admirable, this may be=20 admitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not = their=20 sympathies nor their artistic perceptions, do fall into this mistake; = and so do=20 all other moralists under the same conditions. What can be said in = excuse for=20 other moralists is equally available for them, namely, that, if there is = to be=20 any error, it is better that it should be on that side. As a matter of = fact, we=20 may affirm that among utilitarians as among adherents of other systems, = there is=20 every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in the application of = their=20 standard: some are even puritanically rigorous, while others are as = indulgent as=20 can possibly be desired by sinner or by sentimentalist. But on the = whole, a=20 doctrine which brings prominently forward the interest that mankind have = in the=20 repression and prevention of conduct which violates the moral law, is = likely to=20 be inferior to no other in turning the sanctions of opinion again such=20 violations. It is true, the question, What does violate the moral law? = is one on=20 which those who recognise different standards of morality are likely now = and=20 then to differ. But difference of opinion on moral questions was not = first=20 introduced into the world by utilitarianism, while that doctrine does = supply, if=20 not always an easy, at all events a tangible and intelligible mode of = deciding=20 such differences.

It may not be superfluous to notice a few more of the common = misapprehensions=20 of utilitarian ethics, even those which are so obvious and gross that it = might=20 appear impossible for any person of candour and intelligence to fall = into them;=20 since persons, even of considerable mental endowments, often give = themselves so=20 little trouble to understand the bearings of any opinion against which = they=20 entertain a prejudice, and men are in general so little conscious of = this=20 voluntary ignorance as a defect, that the vulgarest misunderstandings of = ethical=20 doctrines are continually met with in the deliberate writings of persons = of the=20 greatest pretensions both to high principle and to philosophy. We not = uncommonly=20 hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If = it be=20 necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may = say that=20 the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral = character of the=20 Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the = happiness=20 of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, = utility is=20 not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any = other.=20 If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will = of God=20 as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that a utilitarian who believes = in the=20 perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever = God has=20 thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the = requirements of=20 utility in a supreme degree. But others besides utilitarians have been = of=20 opinion that the Christian revelation was intended, and is fitted, to = inform the=20 hearts and minds of mankind with a spirit which should enable them to = find for=20 themselves what is right, and incline them to do it when found, rather = than to=20 tell them, except in a very general way, what it is; and that we need a = doctrine=20 of ethics, carefully followed out, to interpret to us the will God. = Whether this=20 opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss; since = whatever aid=20 religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical = investigation, is as=20 open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the = testimony=20 of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action, = by as=20 good a right as others can use it for the indication of a transcendental = law,=20 having no connection with usefulness or with happiness.

Again, Utility is often summarily stigmatised as an immoral doctrine = by=20 giving it the name of Expediency, and taking advantage of the popular = use of=20 that term to contrast it with Principle. But the Expedient, in the sense = in=20 which it is opposed to the Right, generally means that which is = expedient for=20 the particular interest of the agent himself; as when a minister = sacrifices the=20 interests of his country to keep himself in place. When it means = anything better=20 than this, it means that which is expedient for some immediate object, = some=20 temporary purpose, but which violates a rule whose observance is = expedient in a=20 much higher degree. The Expedient, in this sense, instead of being the = same=20 thing with the useful, is a branch of the hurtful. Thus, it would often = be=20 expedient, for the purpose of getting over some momentary embarrassment, = or=20 attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell = a lie.=20 But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on = the=20 subject of veracity, is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of = that=20 feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be=20 instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from = truth,=20 does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, = which=20 is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but = the=20 insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to = keep=20 back civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the = largest=20 scale depends; we feel that the violation, for a present advantage, of a = rule of=20 such transcendant expediency, is not expedient, and that he who, for the = sake of=20 a convenience to himself or to some other individual, does what depends = on him=20 to deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the evil, involved = in the=20 greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's word, acts = the=20 part of one of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as = it is,=20 admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the = chief of=20 which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a = malefactor,=20 or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would save an individual=20 (especially an individual other than oneself) from great and unmerited = evil, and=20 when the withholding can only be effected by denial. But in order that = the=20 exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and may have the least = possible=20 effect in weakening reliance on veracity, it ought to be recognised, = and, if=20 possible, its limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good = for=20 anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities = against one=20 another, and marking out the region within which one or the other=20 preponderates.

Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to = reply to=20 such objections as this- that there is not time, previous to action, for = calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the = general=20 happiness. This is exactly as if any one were to say that it is = impossible to=20 guide our conduct by Christianity, because there is not time, on every = occasion=20 on which anything has to be done, to read through the Old and New = Testaments.=20 The answer to the objection is, that there has been ample time, namely, = the=20 whole past duration of the human species. During all that time, mankind = have=20 been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which = experience all=20 the prudence, as well as all the morality of life, are dependent. People = talk as=20 if the commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put = off, and=20 as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the = property or=20 life of another, he had to begin considering for the first time whether = murder=20 and theft are injurious to human happiness. Even then I do not think = that he=20 would find the question very puzzling; but, at all events, the matter is = now=20 done to his hand.

It is truly a whimsical supposition that, if mankind were agreed in=20 considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain = without any=20 agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having = their=20 notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and = opinion.=20 There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work = ill, if=20 we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but on any = hypothesis short=20 of that, mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to = the=20 effects of some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs which have = thus come=20 down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the = philosopher until=20 he has succeeded in finding better. That philosophers might easily do = this, even=20 now, on many subjects; that the received code of ethics is by no means = of divine=20 right; and that mankind have still much to learn as to the effects of = actions on=20 the general happiness, I admit, or rather, earnestly maintain. The = corollaries=20 from the principle of utility, like the precepts of every practical art, = admit=20 of indefinite improvement, and, in a progressive state of the human = mind, their=20 improvement is perpetually going on.

But to consider the rules of morality as improvable, is one thing; to = pass=20 over the intermediate generalisations entirely, and endeavour to test = each=20 individual action directly by the first principle, is another. It is a = strange=20 notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with = the=20 admission of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place = of his.=20 ultimate destination, is not to forbid the use of landmarks and = direction-posts=20 on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of = morality, does=20 not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal, or that = persons going=20 thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another. = Men=20 really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject, = which they=20 would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical = concernment.=20 Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, = because=20 sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational=20 creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated; and all rational = creatures=20 go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common = questions of=20 right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions = of wise=20 and foolish. And this, as long as foresight is a human quality, it is to = be=20 presumed they will continue to do. Whatever we adopt as the fundamental=20 principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by; = the=20 impossibility of doing without them, being common to all systems, can = afford no=20 argument against any one in particular; but gravely to argue as if no = such=20 secondary principles could be had, and as if mankind had remained till = now, and=20 always must remain, without drawing any general conclusions from the = experience=20 of human life, is as high a pitch, I think, as absurdity has ever = reached in=20 philosophical controversy.

The remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly = consist in=20 laying to its charge the common infirmities of human nature, and the = general=20 difficulties which embarrass conscientious persons in shaping their = course=20 through life. We are told that a utilitarian will be apt to make his own = particular case an exception to moral rules, and, when under temptation, = will=20 see a utility in the breach of a rule, greater than he will see in its=20 observance. But is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us = with=20 excuses for evil doing, and means of cheating our own conscience? They = are=20 afforded in abundance by all doctrines which recognise as a fact in = morals the=20 existence of conflicting considerations; which all doctrines do, that = have been=20 believed by sane persons. It is not the fault of any creed, but of the=20 complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so = framed=20 as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can = safely be=20 laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. There is no = ethical=20 creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws, by giving a = certain=20 latitude, under the moral responsibility of the agent, for accommodation = to=20 peculiarities of circumstances; and under every creed, at the opening = thus made,=20 self-deception and dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral = system=20 under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting = obligation.=20 These are the real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of = ethics,=20 and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct. They are overcome = practically, with greater or with less success, according to the = intellect and=20 virtue of the individual; but it can hardly be pretended that any one = will be=20 the less qualified for dealing with them, from possessing an ultimate = standard=20 to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred. If utility is = the=20 ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide = between=20 them when their demands are incompatible. Though the application of the = standard=20 may be difficult, it is better than none at all: while in other systems, = the=20 moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no common umpire = entitled to interfere between them; their claims to precedence one over = another=20 rest on little better than sophistry, and unless determined, as they = generally=20 are, by the unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility, = afford a free=20 scope for the action of personal desires and partialities. We must = remember that=20 only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it = requisite=20 that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral=20 obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and if = only one,=20 there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of any = person by=20 whom the principle itself is recognised.

John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873

Utilitarianism

Chapter 2

What Utilitarianism Is.