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Web Editor |
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Vernellia R. Randall
Professor of Law
The University of Dayton |
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| 1850
DCT |
Campbell v. Kirkpatrick, 4
F.Cas. 1174, 5 McLean 175, No. 2363 (C.C.Ohio,1850)(The seventh
section of the fugitive slave act of 1850, 9 Stat. 464, creates
new offenses and penalties. Under the fugitive slave act of 1850,
9 Stat. 464, jurisdiction is given to the United States District
Court both in criminal and civil prosecutions. |
| 1850
DCT |
Ex parte Garnet, 10 F.Cas. 6, 7
Leg.Int. 174, No. 5243 (C.C.Md.,1850)(In a proceeding under Act
Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, title in an executor or legatee can
be shown by oral evidence only by proof that he had the fugitive
notoriously in his own possession as a slave; but where it is in
proof that the fugitive escaped from the person under whom the
executor or legatee claims, then the title of the latter can only
be shown by the will, properly authenticated. Act Sept. 18, 1850,
9 Stat. 462, having provided a plain and easy method by which the
claimant may perfect his proofs ex parte beforehand, if he fails
to do so, and, after causing the fugitive to be arrested and
brought before the court, is then unable to establish his title
by proper evidence, the court will not grant him acontinuance,
even until the next day, for the purpose of supplying his
previous omissions, but will at once discharge the alleged
fugitive from arrest. Proof of notorious ownership will be
received by the claimants of fugitive slaves, and will not be
limited to proof of ownership by paper title. Though Act Cong.
Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, provided the method by which
claimants for fugitive slaves should prove title, plaintiff may,
on having neglected to establish title in the manner prescribed,
prove the necessary matters of title, ownership, and escape in
the court before which the fugitive is brought, according to the
ordinary rules of evidence.) |
| 1850
DCT |
Jones v. VanZandt, 13 F.Cas.
1057, 5 McLean 214, 3 Ohio F.Dec. 12, No. 7505 (In an action to
recover the value of runaway)(slaves, the acts mentioned in the
declaration must be alleged to be contrary to Act 1793, 1 Stat.
302. In an action to recover the penalty given by Act 1793, 1
Stat. 302, concerning fugitives from labor, the acts mentioned in
the declaration must be alleged to be contrary to the statute). |
| 1850
DCT |
Norris v. Newton, 18 F.Cas. 322, 5
McLean 92, 7 West.L.J. 515, No. 10,307 (C.C.Ind.,1850)(Under the
constitution of the United States, the master has a right to
seize his slave in any state where he may be found, if he can do
so without a breach of the peace, and, without any exhibition of
claim or authority, take him back to the state from which he
absconded. If the master, in his return to habeas corpus, or in
his proof, his return being denied, fail to show his right to the
services of the fugitives, the state judge may discharge them
from custody; but such discharge will not conclude the rights of
the master, who may rearrest the fugitives, and by additional
proof establish his right to their services, which he is bound to
do if required by the state authorities. |
| 1850
CirCt |
Oliver v. Kauffman, 18 F.Cas.
657, 1 Am. Law Reg. 142, 9 Leg.Int. 152, No. 10,497 (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1850)(In
an action on the case for harboring and concealing plaintiff's
fugitive slaves, plaintiff must show that the slaves were lost to
him by defendant's illegal interference, or that some other loss,
injury, or damage was suffered by him in consequence thereof. ere
acts of charity, however, as the giving food or lodging to a
destitute apprentice or slave, are not made actionable where
there is no such purpose or intent. The act contemplates not only
an escape of a slave, but an intention on the part of the master
to reclaim. Under Act February 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 302,
providing that, if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive
from labor after notice that he or she is so, such person shall
forfeit, etc., the word "notice" means knowledge, and
"harboring" means entertaining or sheltering a fugitive
with the purpose of encouraging him in his desertion of his
master, with the purpose to further his escape, and to impede and
frustrate the master's reclamation of him. "Harboring"
is not here synonymous with "concealing," used in the
same phrase with it, and there may be harboring without any
concealment. Under Act Cong. February 12, 1793, providing that,
"if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor
after notice that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit and
pay $500, to be recovered by action of debt, saving moreover to
the owner of such fugitive a right of action, on account of
injuries," etc., "notice" means merely
"knowledge," however obtained. The harboring of a
fugitive from labor, made criminal by Act February 12, 1793, 1
Stat. 305, is the lending of encouragement to the fugitive, in
his desertion of his master, to further his escape, and to impede
and frustrate his reclamation, not mere acts of kindness and
charity. The word "notice," as used in Act February 12,
1793, § 4, 1 Stat. 305, making it an offense to harbor or
conceal a person "after notice that he is a fugitive from
labor," means "knowledge.") |
| 1850
Sct |
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| 1850
Sct |
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| 1851
Sct |
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| 1851
DCT |
Ex parte Davis, 7 F.Cas. 45, 9
West.L.J. 14, 14 Law Rep. 301, No. 3613 (N.D.N.Y.,1851)(The
provisions of Fugitive Slave Act Sept. 18, 1850, § 10, 9 Stat.
462, that "when any person held to labor or service, in any
territory, or in the District of Columbia, shall escape therefrom,
the party to whom such service or labor is due," etc.,
"may apply to any court of record therein, or judge thereof
in vacation, and make satisfactory proof," etc., are clearly
prospective, and inapplicable to the case of an escape occurring
before the passage of the act. The provision of the fugitive
slave act of Sept. 18, 1850, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, that "the
certificate of the commissioner shall be conclusive," etc.,
"and shall prevent all molestation," etc., "by any
process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person
whatsoever," applies only to a certificate which appears on
its face to be granted, or by a reasonable interpretation of its
language might have been granted, in conformity with the act, and
in pursuance of the authority thereby conferred, by a person
having power to grant it, and proceeding in a manner warranted by
the act An error in a certificate under the fugitive slave law of
Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, by which it appears that the
adjudication was made without evidence, may be corrected on
habeas corpus.) |
| 1851
Sct |
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| 1851
DCT |
In re Charge to Grand
Jury - Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F.Cas. 1007, 1 Blatchf. 635, No.
18,261 (C.C.N.Y.,1851)(The "judicial power" mentioned
in the constitution and vested in the courts means the power
conferred upon courts in the strict sense of that term-courts
that compose one of the three great departments of the
government; and not power judicial in its nature, or quasi
judicial, invested from time to time in individuals, separately
or collectively, for a particular purpose and limited time, and
the provisions of Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, which confer
on commissioners the power to act under it, and which provide for
a summary hearing and decision, are not unconstitutional. The
proceeding contemplated by the cause of the constitution in
regard to the delivery of fugitives from service or labor is not
a suit at common law, within the meaning of the seventh amendment
to the constitution.) |
| 1851
DCT |
In re Long, 15 F.Cas. 821, 9 N.Y.Leg.Obs.
73, 3 Am. Law J. (N.S.) 294, 8 Leg.Int. 10, No. 8478 (S.D.N.Y.,1851)(The
fugitive slave law of Sept. 16, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, is not
unconstitutional). |
| 1851
Sct |
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| 1852
Sct |
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| 1852
CirCt |
U S v. Williams, 28 F.Cas. 631, 4
Am. Law J. (N.S.) 486, No. 16,705 (1852)(It is not necessary that
the defendant should have been actually present at the act of
"obstruction," etc., it is sufficient to render him
liable as a principal that it was in pursuance of a common plan
of himself and others. To "obstruct, hinder, or
prevent" the claimant to recover his slave within the act,
is knowingly and willfully to frustrate and retard the attempted
recaption of a fugitive slave by his master, or his
representative, by voice, active or passive, or by stratagem. The
offense of "aiding, abetting, or assisting" a slave
"to escape," in the second section of the act, applies
only to an escape after recaption. The act of aiding a slave to
escape from the domestic custody of his master is not an offense
within the act of 1850, which applies only to cases where the
slave has passed beyond the limits of the state under whose laws
he was held. The offense of frustrating or retarding the
attempted recapture of a fugitive slave being a misdemeanor, one
aiding or abetting another to commit it, whether he be absent or
present, is guilty as a principal. The fugitive slave law
(section 7) makes it a criminal offense knowingly and willfully
to frustrate or retard the attempted recapture of a fugitive
slave by his master, whether it be by force, active or passive,
or stratagem.) |
| 1852
DCT |
U. S. v. Rycraft, 27 F.Cas. 918,
No. 16,211 (D.C.Wis.,1852)(On a prosecution for aiding in the
escape of one arrested under lawful process as being a fugitive
slave, it is not necessary to show that he actually was the slave
of the person at whose instance the process was issued. The fact
that the members of a vigilance committee, formed to prevent the
execution of the fugitive slave law, stated that their object was
to prevent the "kidnapping" of the fugitive by the
officers of justice and the alleged owner, furnished strong
evidence of their responsibility for a subsequent riot and rescue
of the fugitive from the jail in which he was confined, even
though they individually counseled peaceable measures.) |
| 1852
DCT |
U.S. v. Reed, 27 F.Cas. 727, 2 Blatchf.
435, 15 Law Rep. 428, No. 16,134 (C.C.N.Y.,1852)(When, under
section 6 of the act of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 463, known as
the "Fugitive Slave Act," a warrant is issued by
competent authority, that is sufficient to justify the arrest and
detention of the fugitive until he is discharged by due course of
law, and any person concerned in rescuing or attempting to rescue
such fugitive out of the custody of the law subjects himself to
the penalties of the act.) |
| 1853
Sct |
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| 1853
DCT |
Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F.Cas.
335, 5 McLean 469, 10 West.L.J. 528, No. 9583 (C.C.Ohio,1853)(The
judges of the supreme court of the United States, whose
jurisdiction is coextensive with the country, are bound to take
judicial notice of the existence of slavery in those states where
it prevails. Slavery is a municipal regulation, and cannot exist
without the authority of law; but it need not be shown that it is
created by express enactment. It may arise from long-recognized
rights countervened by no legislative action. In slave states
color indicating African descent gave rise to a presumption that
the person was a slave. This however was not the rule in
other states, where every person was prima facie presumed to be
free. The constitution of the United States did not leave the
enforcement of the provisions for the reclamation of slaves with
the states, but it vested that power in the federal government.
In the preliminary proceedings before a judge or commissioner
under the fugitive law, the inquiry is not strictly whether the
fugitive be a slave or freeman, but whether he owes service to
the claimant; and a decision in favor of the claimant does not
finally fix the seal of slavery on the fugitive, but leaves the
question of freedom or slavery to be inquired into in the state
from whence he fled. The citizen of a slave state has a right,
under the constitution and laws of the Union, to have his
fugitive slave "delivered up on claim being made," and
no state can defeat or obstruct this right. In a proceeding under
the fugitive slave law of 1850, 9 Stat. 462, it is not necessary
to produce the record showing the status of the fugitive in
another state, but the fact that he owes service may be
established by other and oral testimony. Article 7 of the amended
constitution, U.S.C.A. which gives a right to a trial by a jury
in suits at common law where the value in controversy shall
exceed $20, does not apply to a preliminary examination under the
fugitive slave law of Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, as amended by
Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, such a proceeding not being
according to the course of the common-law, but constitutional and
statutory. The act of congress of 1850, 9 Stat. 462, relative to
the reclamation of fugitives from labor, is not
unconstitutional.) |
| 1853
DCT |
Oliver v. Weakley, 18 F.Cas. 678,
2 Wall.Jr.C.C. 324, No. 10,502 (6k5)(C.C. 3,1853(In an action for
damages, under Act Feb. 12, 1793, § 4, 1 Stat. 302, to recover
the value of escaped slaves, it is not sufficient to show merely
that the defendant harbored or concealed the fugitives, but it
must further be shown that such harboring and concealing caused
their escape or hindered their recapture.) |
| 1853
CirCt |
Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28
F.Cas. 1036, 4 Pa. L.J. 111, 7 Pa. L.J. 115, 2 Wall.Jr.C.C. 311,
No. 16,865 (C.C.W.D.Pa.,1853) Under Act February 12, 1793, § 3,
1 Stat. 302, providing that, if any person shall harbor or
conceal a fugitive from labor after notice that he or she is so,
such person shall forfeit and pay $500, to be recovered by action
of debt; saving, moreover, to the owner of such fugitive, a right
of action on account of the injuries, etc., if plaintiff brings
case "on account of the injuries" for which the act
saves a right of action, he can recover only to the amount of
actual damage which he shows he has suffered. An action will lie
at common law for recovery of damages on account of the harboring
and concealing of a fugitive slave. The harboring, made criminal
by the act of congress, is where the purpose which the act of
harboring is to encourage the fugitive in his desertion of his
master, to further his escape, and to impede and hinder his
reclamation. Such haboring may exist without any affectation of
concealment, and yet be more injurious to the master and
effective in promoting the escape of the slave and frustrating
the vigilance of the master than any attempt at concealing the
slave; The Pennsylvania act of assembly of 1847, so far as it
authorizes resistance to masters when in pursuit of fugitive
slaves, is unconstitutional; Mere acts of charity, however, as
the giving food or lodging to a destitute apprentice or slave,
are not made actionable where there is no such purpose or intent.
The act contemplates not only an escape of a slave, but an
intention on the part of the master to reclaim. Under Act
February 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, providing that, if any
person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor after notice
that he or she is so, such person shall forfeit, etc., the word
"notice" means knowledge, and "harboring"
means entertaining or sheltering a fugitive with the purpose of
encouraging him in his desertion of his master, with the purpose
to further his escape, and to impede and frustrate the master's
reclamation of him. "Harboring" is not here synonymous
with "concealing," used in the same phrase with it, and
there may be harboring without any concealment; Under Act Cong.
February 12, 1793, providing that, "if any person shall
harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor after notice that he or
she is so, such person shall forfeit and pay $500, to be
recovered by action of debt, saving moreover to the owner of such
fugitive a right of action, on account of injuries," etc.,
"notice" means merely "knowledge," however
obtained. Under Act February 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 302,
providing that if any person shall harbor or conceal a fugitive
from labor, after notice that he or she is so, such person shall
forfeit and pay $500, to be recovered by action of debt, saving,
moreover, to the owner of such fugitive a right of action on
account of the injuries, etc., if the plaintiff sues in debt for
the penalty of $500, he may recover it on proof of such harboring
or concealment, irrespectively of any proof of actual damage to
himself. Act Pa. March 1, 1780, "for the gradual abolition
of slavery," cannot have the effect of securing from
punishment those who may incur the penalty prescribed by Act
Cong. February 12, 1793, which provides that any person willfully
obstructing the claimants in seizing or arresting fugitive slaves
shall be subject to a penalty of $500) |
| 1854
DCT |
Ex parte Van Orden, 28 F.Cas.
1060, 3 Blatchf. 166, 12 N.Y.Leg.Obs. 161, No. 16,870 (C.C.N.Y.,1854)(A
commissioner appointed by the United States circuit court under
the fugitive slave act of Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, is not a
magistrate inferior to the circuit court, and hence his
proceedings are not reviewable by that court.) |
| 1854
DCT |
Gibbons v. Sloane, 10 F.Cas. 294,
6 McLean 273, 4 Am. Law Reg. 187, No. 5382 (C.C.Ohio,1854)(The
power of attorney furnished by the master to his agent to enable
him to arrest a fugitive slave under the act of 1850 must contain
the agent's name.) |
| 1854
DCT |
U S ex rel Garland v.
Morris, 26 F.Cas. 1318, 2 Am. Law Reg. 348, No. 15,811 (D.C.Wis.,1854)(A
warrant for the apprehension of a fugitive slave is in full force
until the final hearing and order; and after a rescue, a fresh
pursuit may be made by the marshal and owner with the same
warrant.The master of a fugitive slave, having been apprehended
by the marshal, in pursuance of a warrant, cannot be arrested for
assault and battery committed on such fugitive, while making the
arrest, in aid and at the request of the marshal, before the
final hearing and order of the judge.) |
| 1854
Sct |
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| 1854
DCT |
Weimer v. Sloane, 29 F.Cas. 599, 6
McLean 259, 4 Am. Law Reg. 174, No. 17,363 (D.C.Ohio,1854)(To
sustain a suit for aiding or abetting in the escape of slaves,
under the fugitive slave act of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462,
it must appear that the alleged fugitives were slaves who had
escaped from service, and had been arrested by the owner or his
agent, and that the defendant, with notice (actual or by
inference) of these facts, aided and abetted their escape. Any
words or actions tending to effect an escape, and which lead to
that result, are sufficient to implicate the defendant in the
charge of aiding or abetting the escape, under the fugitive slave
act of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462. In an action for aiding
or abetting in the escape of slaves under the fugitive slave law
of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, it was held that a party
acting as counsel for a fugitive slave is protected from the
consequences of his acts so far only as they are within the
proper limits of his professional duty. The counsel is not
justified in assisting the escape of the slave in any mode which
the law does not sanction. Under the fugitive slave law of Sept.
18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, the master, or his agent, may arrest
fugitive slaves without a warrant; but the agent must have a
written power of attorney, executed and authenticated according
to the statute.) |
| 1855
CirCt |
U S v. Darnaud, 25 F.Cas. 754, 3
Wall.Jr.C.C. 143, No. 14,918 (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1855)(Under Act May 15,
1820, c. 113, §§ 4, 5, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1585; 18
U.S.C.A. § 3238, which punishes seizing on a foreign shore any
negro or mulatto with intent to make such negro or mulatto a
slave, and forcibly confining or detaining any negro or mulatto
on board a vessel with intent to make him a slave, etc.,
ownership of the vessel by a citizen of the United States, if the
accused be not himself a citizen, or citizenship of the accused
if the ownership be not by such a citizen, is an essential
ingredient in the offense described in such sections. In a
prosecution under Act May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1585; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3238, for suppressing the slave trade, the
act of receiving negroes on the coast of Africa, and of confining
and detaining them on shipboard, and the aiding and abetting in
confining, form one transaction, and may therefore be joined
together in the indictment and prosecution under different
counts; but the selling and delivery of the negroes at the
termination of the voyage, as on the coast of Cuba, is a distinct
transaction; and if this felony is charged in the same indictment
with the other, the prosecution will be made to elect on what
counts it will proceed). |
| 1856
Sct |
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| 1856
DCT |
U S v. Naylor, 27 F.Cas. 78, 19 Law
Rep. 449, No. 15,858 (D.C.N.Y.,1856)(Act March 22, 1794, 1 Stat.
347, 18 U.S.C.A. § 429, in relation to the preparing of any
vessel within the United States to sail from any port of the
United States for the purpose of procuring inhabitants thereof to
be transported to any foreign country to be sold as slaves was
not repealed by Act March 2, 1807, 2 Stat. 426, entitled "An
act to prohibit the importation of slaves into any port or place
within the jurisdiction of the United States," or by Act
April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, entitled "An act to prohibit
the introduction of slaves into any port or place within the
jurisdiction of the United States," etc.) |
| 1857
DCT |
Ex parte Sifford, 22 F.Cas. 105, 5
Am. Law Reg. 659, 3 Ohio F.Dec. 483, No. 12,848 (S.D.Ohio,1857)(A
sheriff having a so-called "writ of habeas corpus"
under the Ohio statute of 1856, and having knowledge that the
prisoner is in custody of an officer of the United States under
legal process, is under no obligation to attempt to serve the
writ.) |
| 1857
DCT |
U S v. Cobb, 25 F.Cas. 481, 4 Am. Law J.
(N.S.) 145, 8 Leg.Int. 150, No. 14,820 (N.D.N.Y.,1857)(Where a
fugitive slave is arrested and lawfully restrained of his
liberty, under the provisions of Act Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462,
all interference by third parties, by word or act, for the
purpose of favoring his escape, and tending to that result, is a
violation of the act, rendering the offender amenable to its
penalties.) |
| 1858
Sct |
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| 1859
DCT |
eg.Int. 316, No. 15,352, 41 Hunt Mer.
Mag. 708, 4 Blatchf. 359, 4 Weekly L. Gaz. 175, 16
(356k2)(C.C.N.Y.,1859 A libel was filed against a vessel for a
violation of the act against the slave trade, but no seizure of
the vessel was actually made, although it was stipulated by the
counsel for the claimant that a seizure had been made. Held that,
under Act March 2, 1799, § 89, 1 Stat. 696, the stipulation was
a sufficient foundation for the entry of an order and certificate
of probable cause of seizure, and that the federal district court
had authority to make such order and enter the certificate.) |
| 1859
DCT |
The Orion, 18 F.Cas. 817, 4 Weekly L. Gaz.
327, No. 10,575 (S.D.N.Y.,1859)(A decree condemning a vessel for
being engaged in the slave trade is supported by evidence that
she was captured at the mouth of the Congo river carrying less
than a half cargo of miscellaneous goods apparently selected with
a view to traffic in slaves, or to be used as provisions for
them, which cargo was excessively and wrongly invoiced at New
York, where the vessel was chartered, at an excessive rate, and
where the entire crew was changed on the day of sailing, and that
the claimant could give no adequate explanation for the use of
the large quantity of water casks and coppers carried.) |
| 1860
DCT |
U. S. v. Weld, 28 F.Cas. 520, McCahon
186, No. 16,660, 1 Kan.Dass.Ed. 591 (D.Kan.,1860)(If the guardian
of an infant owner of a fugitive had authority to arrest the
fugitive, it would be necessary, in an indictment for rescuing
the fugitive from his custody after the arrest, to state the
time, place, and by what authority the appointment of guardian
was made. The indictment must also show that escape was from the
state or territory where the service or labor was due by the laws
thereof, and that defendant knew or had notice that the person
arrested was a fugitive, etc.) |
| 1860
DCT |
U.S. v. Corrie, 25 F.Cas. 658,
Brunn.Coll.C. 686, 23 Law Rep. 145, No.
14,869(C.C.S.C.,1860)(Under Act May 15, 1820, 3 St. at Large, p.
600, declaring certain acts by the master and crew of a vessel
relative to negroes piracy, the mere landing in the United States
of negroes with intent to sell them as slaves is not piracy; but
it is a part of such offense that the crew landed on a foreign
shore and there seized free negroes with intent to make them
slaves, and confined them in the vessel from which they were
landed.) |
| 1860
DCT |
U.S. v. Gould, 25 F.Cas. 1375, 8 Am.
Law Reg. 525, No. 15,239(S.D.Ala.,1860)(The mode of procedure
prescribed by Act April 20, 1818, § 7, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(4), in
relation to foreign slave trade, for enforcing the penalty for
violating its provisions, is a qui tam action, and no other.
Therefore, an indictment does not lie under that section. Persons
imported as slaves contrary to law, against their will, are still
subject to federal control, though mingled with persons in the
states. The laws of the United States prohibiting the foreign
slave trade are to be construed in reference to the mischief
intended to be remedied, and to the nature, extent, and limits of
the constitutional power of congress over this subject. Under the
law prohibiting the foreign slave trade, an indictment which only
charges that the accused, within this state, did hold, sell, or
otherwise dispose of a negro or a slave who had previously been
unlawfully imported by some other persons, without alleging that
the accused did participate, aid or abet in the unlawful
importation, is fatally defective.) |
| 1860
DCT |
U.S. v. Haun, 26 F.Cas. 227, 8 Am. Law
Reg. 663, No. 15,329(C.C.S.D.Ala.,1860)(An indictment under Act
April 20, 1818, § 6, 3 Stat. 452, 18 U.S.C.A. § 423, for the
suppression of the African slave trade, can be sustained against
one who holds, sells, or disposes of an African illegally brought
into the country from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, or
from sea, no less than against any person who shall illegally
bring such African into the country.) |
| 1860
Sct |
Vigel v. Naylor,65 U.S. 208, 16 L.Ed.
646, 24 How. 208 (1860)(On a petition for freedom, the petitioner
proved that one Kirby had emancipated all his slaves by will,
some immediately, and some at a future day. In order to bring
herself within this category and show that she had been the slave
of Kirby, she offered to prove that her mother and brother and
sister had recovered their freedom by suits brought against
George Naylor, whose administrator, Henry Naylor, was the
defendant in the present suit, and that it was very unusual to
separate from the mother a child so young as the petitioner was
at the time of Kirby's death. Held, that the evidence offered was
admissible.
1806/CirCt Butler v.
Hopper, 4 F.Cas. 904, 1 Wash.C.C. 499, No. 2241 (C.C.Pa.,1806)(P.S.
Const. art. 1, § 9, which restrains congress from prohibiting
the importation of slaves prior to the year 1808, does not apply
to the state governments. Act Pa. March 1, 1780, declares that no
person of any nation or color, except negroes registered
according to the act, shall hereafter be holden as slaves within
the state, but as free, except the domestic slaves attending on
delegates in congress from the other states and persons passing
through and sojourning in the state and not becoming resident
therein. A person who formerly lived in South Carolina, where he
had a plantation which he cultivated, kept a dwelling house in
the City of Philadelphia, where he resided with his family, with
the exception of an annual visit to his plantation. He was,
during his residence in Philadelphia, a member of congress
representing the state of South Carolina, with the exception of
two years, during which he was a member of the legislature of the
latter state. Held, on a question as to whether a slave which he
brought with him to his home in Pennsylvania, and who remained
with him for nearly ten years, was entitled to his freedom, that
the master could not claim an exemption under the act as a member
of congress, for during the two years which he was not such a
member he lost the privilege which the exemption gave him, and
that he could not be considered as sojourning in the state within
the exception of the act. P.S. Const. art. 4, § 2, which
declares that "no person held to service or labor in one
state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
consequence of any law therein, be discharged from such service
or labor," does not extend to the case of a slave
voluntarily carried by his master into another state and there
left under the protection of some law declaring him free) |
| 1861
DCT |
The Reindeer, 27 F.Cas. 753, 2 Cliff.
57, No. 16,144(C.C.R.I.,1861)(The fact that a vessel was in the
possession of a state sheriff by virtue of an attachment issued
from a state court will not operate to impair a forfeiture
thereof for engaging in the slave trade, when seized by the
United States marshal under Act March 22, 1794, § 1, 1 Stat.
347, making a vessel liable to be prosecuted and condemned, for
engaging in the slave trade, in any of the circuit or district
courts where the vessel may be found and seized. Under the first
section of the act of March 22, 1794, 1 Stat. 346, a vessel is
liable to be prosecuted and condemned for engaging in the slave
trade in any of the circuit or district courts where the vessel
may be found and seized. Therefore, where a vessel had been
fitted and prepared for a traffic of this kind in New York, it
was held that she was properly condemned by the district court of
Rhode Island, having been seized there). |
| 1861
DCT |
U S v. Gordon, 25 F.Cas. 1364, 5
Blatchf. 18, No. 15,231(C.C.N.Y.,1861)(Where a vessel is shown to
have been fitted out for the purpose of engaging in the slave
trade, her master, if he had control and charge of the vessel in
procuring the cargo, in stowing it and in shipping the seamen, is
to be held chargeable, as matter of law, with a knowledge of the
intended service of the vessel. To sustain an indictment under
Act May 15, 1820, § 5, 3 Stat. 601, 18 U.S.C.A. § 421, for
"forcibly" confining negroes, it is not necessary to
prove that there was physical or manual force. It is sufficient
that the negroes were under moral restraint and fear-their wills
controlled by superior power exercised over their minds and
bodies; and any person participating in such forcible detention
is a principal in the offense. It is no objection to an
indictment under Act May 15, 1820, § 5, 3 Stat. 601, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 421, for forcibly confining and detaining negroes on board a
vessel with intent to make them slaves, that it describes the
negroes as "not having been held to service," etc.,
instead of "not held to service," etc., the exact words
of the statute.) |
| 1861
DCT |
U S v. Westervelt, 28 F.Cas. 529,
5 Blatchf. 30, No. 16,668(C.C.N.Y.,1861)(Under Act May 15, 1820,
§ 4, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. § 422, in regard to the slave
trade, the offenses prohibited may be committed by any citizen of
the United States on board of any vessel, whether foreign or
American. Under Act May 15, 1820, § 4, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 422, it is an offense to receive negroes on board of a vessel
from persons who have seized them and brought them to the
vessel's side in violation of the law; and any person of the
vessel's company, on board of the vessel, who is competent to
commit a crime, commits such offense by voluntarily receiving, or
actually participating in the reception of, the negroes on the
vessel, with the intent to make them slaves.) |
| 1861
DCT |
U.S. v. the Augusta, 24 F.Cas.
892, No. 14,477(S.D.N.Y.,1861)(Where a libel in rem against a
pretended whaling vessel by the United States charges that she is
being fitted out with the intent to employ her in the slave
trade, a court of admiralty will take judicial notice of the fact
that the projected voyage would have exposed a whaler, but not a
slaver, to capture by Confederate cruisers. A vessel was
purchased and fitted out ostensibly for a short whaling voyage,
but her outfit, admitted to be nearly complete, was entirely
inadequate for such a voyage; her meat being deficient in
quantity, and a large part of it tainted. No adequate
preparations had been made for shipping such experienced officers
and crew as were indispensable for a whaling voyage. The whaling
business had ceased to be generally profitable, and her pretended
voyage would have exposed a whaler, but not a slaver, to capture
by Confederate cruisers. She had an immense quantity of salt, and
an excess of rice, corn, beans, and firewood for a whaling
voyage, with an unusual quantity of water, partly in oil casks,
all suitable for a slaver. Held, that she was fitted out with the
intent to employ her in the slave trade, within the meaning of
Act March 22, 1794, § 2, 1 Stat. 349, 18 U.S.C.A. § 430, and
Act April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(4), and must,
with her tackle and lading be declared forfeited to the United
States.) |
| 1862
DCT |
Ex parte U.S. ex rel.
Copeland, 25 F.Cas. 646, 2 Hay. & Haz. 402, No.
14865A(C.C.D.C.,1862)(The fugitive slave law of 1850 is as
applicable to the District of Columbia as to any of the states,
and as the circuit court of the District is a circuit court of
the United States, its authority to appoint commissioners under
that law is clear.) |
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