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Web Editor |
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Vernellia R. Randall
Professor of Law
The University of Dayton |
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| 1835
DCT |
Brent v. Armfield, 4 F.Cas. 60, 4
Cranch C.C. 579, 4 D.C. 579, No. 1833 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(In
order to protect the title of the sojourner to his slave, brought
into the county of Washington, D. C., under Acts Md.1796, c. 67,
§ 4, it is not necessary that he should bring the slave with
him. The title to a slave brought into the county of Washington,
D. C., under Acts Md.1796, c. 67, § 4, is not protected, if the
owner suffer the slave to remain two years after he himself has
returned.) |
| 1835
Sct |
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| 1835
DCT |
Fenwick v. Tooker, 8 F.Cas. 1146,
4 Cranch C.C. 641, 4 D.C. 641, No. 4735 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(The
right to remove slaves from one county to another in the District
of Columbia, under the ninth section of the act of the 24th of
June, 1812 (2 Stat. 755), is confined to the inhabitants of the
county from which the slaves are to be removed.) |
| 1835
DCT |
In re Martin, 16 F.Cas. 881, 2 Paine
348, No. 9154 (C.C.N.Y.,1835)(The act of congress passed in 1793,
1 Stat. 302, providing a mode for recovering fugitive slaves, is
constitutional. Where an alleged fugitive from labor is brought
before a magistrate under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, the
latter acquires jurisdiction of the case and authority to proceed
with the inquiry, irrespective of the question whether the person
seized as a fugitive and brought before the magistrate does,
under the laws of the state from which he fled, owe service or
labor to the person claiming him. Under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1
Stat. 302, which empowers persons claiming the services of a
fugitive slave to seize or arrest him and take him before a
magistrate, no process for the purpose of authorizing such arrest
is necessary. (While an examination of a fugitive from labor,
seized under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, is pending, the
alleged fugitive is in the custody of the law, and the magistrate
has authority to imprison him; and process will not be granted by
the federal court to take such fugitive from the custody of the
state officer. The writ de homine replegiando is a common-law
proceeding, and adapted to try the question of slavery, and
though nearly obsolete, this court cannot deny to the party the
right of resorting to it; but it is not applicable to the case of
a fugitive slave arrested under Act 1793, 1 Stat. 302. When an
alleged fugitive from service is brought before a magistrate,
under the law of 1793, 1 Stat. 302, he acquires jurisdiction of
the case, and while examination is pending, the alleged fugitive
is in the custody of the law, and the magistrate may imprison him
for safe-keeping. Thus situated, process issuing from the circuit
court, directing a United States officer to take the fugitive
from the state officer, would be illegal.) |
| 1835
DCT |
Lee v. Lee, 15 F.Cas. 209, 4 Cranch C.C.
643, 4 D.C. 643, No. 8194 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(A temporary hiring
of Virginia slaves in the county of Alexandria, D. C., with
intent to evade the law in the county of Washington against the
importation of slaves into that county, will not authorize the
owner, residing in Washington, to bring them into the county of
Washington to reside therein. The ninth section of Act June 24,
1812 (2 Stat. 755), does not authorize an inhabitant of
Washington, owning slaves in Alexandria, to remove them to
Washington.) |
| 1835
DCT |
Taylor v. Buckner, 23 F.Cas. 737,
4 Cranch C.C. 540, 4 D.C. 540, No. 13,782 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(An
importation of slaves by a person who has only a life estate in
them is an importation within Acts. Md.1796, c. 67, § 1 (1
Dor.Laws Md.1796, p. 334), and the consent of the reversioner to
the importation is not necessary to give freedom to the slaves
thus imported. Upon a petition for freedom, where the petitioners
claim freedom by reason of their importation, contrary to Acts
Md.1796, c. 67, the question of the intent with which the
importation is made is for the jury.) |
| 1835
DCT |
U S v. Sims, 27 F.Cas. 1080, 4 Cranch
C.C. 618, 4 D.C. 618, No. 16,290 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(The circuit
court for the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction of larceny
by a slave. The jurisdiction to try such offense is vested in the
justices of the peace.) |
| 1835
DCT |
U.S. v. Cross, 25 F.Cas. 705, 4 Cranch
C.C. 603, 4 D.C. 603, No. 14,894 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(It is an
indictable offense to cruelly beat the slave of another, in the
public highway, and leave her there, exposed to public view.) |
| 1835
DCT |
U.S. v. Frye, 25 F.Cas. 1222, 4 Cranch
C.C. 539, 4 D.C. 539, No. 15,173 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(A slave
convicted of manslaughter is, by the law of Virginia and of the
District of Columbia, to be burnt in the left hand and publicly
whipped.) |
| 1835
DCT |
U.S. v. Henning, 26 F.Cas. 265,
4 Cranch C.C. 608, 4 D.C. 608, No. 15,348 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1835)(To
attempt to sell a free mulatto as a slave for life is not an
indictable offense at common law in the District of Columbia.) |
| 1836
DCT |
Harris v. Firth, 11 F.Cas. 625, 4
Cranch C.C. 710, 4 D.C. 710, No. 6120 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1836)(If a
person comes into Washington county, D. C., as a sojourner, and
brings with him his slave, and dies in such county, and his
executor has been prevented, by the institution of a suit for
freedom, from carrying the slave out of the District, the slave
is not, by such importation, entitled to freedom under Acts
Md.1796, c. 67.) |
| 1836
DCT |
U S v. Vinsent, 28 F.Cas. 379, 5
Cranch C.C. 38, 5 D.C. 38, No. 16,623 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1836)(A
certificate of freedom is not such a "pass" as is
contemplated by Acts Md.1796, c. 67, § 19.) |
| 1836
DCT |
U S v. West, 28 F.Cas. 529, 5 Cranch
C.C. 35, 5 D.C. 35, No. 16,667 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1836)(Evidence that
a colored person has resided in the county and city of
Washington, D. C., for a year and more, going at large as a free
person, and claiming to be free, in the absence of all
contradictory evidence, except color, is sufficient to rebut the
presumption of slavery arising from color.) |
| 1836
DCT |
U.S. v. Carter, 25 F.Cas. 314, 4
Cranch C.C. 732, 4 D.C. 732, No. 14,741 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1836)(An
indictment at common law, in the county of Alexandria, will lie
against a free negro or mulatto for assault and battery on a
white man, notwithstanding Act Dec. 17, 1792, § 17.) |
| 1836
DCT |
U.S. v. Henning, 26 F.Cas. 267,
4 Cranch C.C. 645, 4 D.C. 645, No. 15,349 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1836)(Act
March 2, 1831, § 17 (4 Stat. 450), known as the
"Penitentiary Act for the District of Columbia," which
punishes any person who shall unlawfully, by force and violence,
carry away any free negro or mulatto with the intention of having
him detained as a slave, does not apply to a case where negroes
are kidnapped out of the District and brought within it.) |
| 1837
DCT |
Bank of U.S. v. Lee, 2 F.Cas.
702, 5 Cranch C.C. 319, 5 D.C. 319, No. 922 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1837)(A
deed of conveyance of slaves in Virginia, for the separate use of
the wife, loses nothing of its validity by the removal of the
parties to the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia;
and it is not necessary that it should be there recorded.) |
| 1837
DCT |
In re Richardson's Case, 20
F.Cas. 703, 5 Cranch C.C. 338, 5 D.C. 338, No. 11,778 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1837)(A
warrant of commitment of a person as a runaway is not sufficient
unless it states on its face that the party has been convicted of
being a runaway servant or slave. It is not sufficient to state
in the warrant that the party is "charged with being a
runaway.") |
| 1837
DCT |
Moody v. Fuller, 17 F.Cas. 658, 5
Cranch C.C. 303, 5 D.C. 303, No. 9746 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1837)(An
officer of the United States being the bona fide owner of a slave
in Fortress Munroe, a place within the United States, but not
within the jurisdiction of any one of the states, and removing
thence with his family to the city of Washington, in the District
of Columbia, to reside therein, and bringing his slave with him,
cannot lawfully sell such slave within three years after such
removal and importation; and such slave, by such importation and
sale, becomes free.) |
| 1837
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| 1838
DCT |
Bell v. McCormick, 3 F.Cas. 107, 5
Cranch C.C. 398, 5 D.C. 398, No. 1255 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1838)(No
implied emancipation arises from a legacy of $25 bequeathed to
slaves who are ordered by the will to be sold.) |
| 1838
DCT |
Coots v. Morton's
Executor, 6 F.Cas. 496, 5 Cranch C.C. 409, 5 D.C. 409, No. 3205 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1838)(Where
freedom was granted a slave, provided "he behaves well until
the year 1837, and continues to hire for good wages," it may
be shown that he did not behave well, but ran away.) |
| 1839
DCT |
Corcoran's Ex'rs v. Jones,
6 F.Cas. 544, 5 Cranch C.C. 607, 5 D.C. 607, No. 3229 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1839)(No
action lies for breach of a contract on a sale of slaves that the
purchaser would not sell them out of the district, where it was
stipulated that such slaves should be immediately entitled to
freedom on such sale.) |
| 1839
DCT |
Kennedy v. Purnell, 14 F.Cas.
318, 5 Cranch C.C. 552, 5 D.C. 552, No. 7704 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1839)(If
a Maryland slave, with his consent, be carried to Virginia and
kept there more than a year by the person to whom he was hired or
loaned in Maryland, without the consent of the owner of such
slave, no time is limited within which the owner must use
coercive measures for the recovery of the slave, and the omission
to use such measures does not give him any title to his freedom,
but the owner may reclaim the slave at any time. If a Maryland
slave, hired or loaned in Maryland to a resident in Maryland, be
carried, by the person to whom he is so hired or loaned, into
Virginia, with a view to temporary residence only, and for
necessary attendance, and to make a transient stay, and the
slave, at the end of such transient stay, be carried or sent out
of the state of Virginia again, the slave does not thereby become
entitled to freedom, though all these acts were done with the
consent of the owner.) |
| 1839
DCT |
U.S. v. Davis, 25 F.Cas. 775, 5 Cranch
C.C. 622, 5 D.C. 622, No. 14,926 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1839)(Where
slaves claim to be free, and file their petitions for freedom,
the persons claiming them as slaves will be required to give
security for their forthcoming to prosecute their claim for
freedom; and where they fail to give such security the court will
order the slaves to be taken into the custody of the marshal for
safe-keeping until their trial or the further order of the
court.) |
| 1840
DCT |
Ash v. Williams, 2 F.Cas. 7, 5
Cranch C.C. 674, 5 D.C. 674, No. 573 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1840)(A slave
is entitled to his freedom where sold by one who obtained title
as devisee under a bequest of slaves which provided that he
should "not carry them out of the state of Maryland, or sell
them to any one; in either of which events I will and desire the
said negroes to be free for life.") |
| 1840
DCT |
Graham v. Alexander, 10 F.Cas.
916, 5 Cranch C.C. 663, 5 D.C. 663, No. 5662 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1840)(If
a female slave be sold in Alexandria county, D. C., "she to
be free at 31, and her children then born, and those afterwards
to be born, at the same age," a child afterwards born of
such slave, before her age of 31, is entitled to freedom when
arrived at the age of 31 years.) |
| 1840
DCT |
Strohm v. U.S., 23 F.Cas. 240, Taney
413, No. 13,539 (C.C.Md.,1840)(Under Act April 20, 1818, c. 91, 3
Stat. 450, in relation to the forfeiture of a vessel fitted for
the slave trade, in order to work a forfeiture a criminal intent
must exist in the mind of the party who is lawfully entitled to
direct the employment of the vessel; if the owner places the
vessel under the control of a factor or master, who builds or
equips her with that unlawful intention, having at the time
authority from the owner to direct the employment of the vessel,
the offense described by the law is committed, and the vessel is
liable to the penalty. The appellant built and fitted out two
vessels at Baltimore for a Portuguese merchant, member of a
mercantile house at Bahia, and residing in Cuba; they were built
under the superintendence of two men sent to Baltimore for that
purpose from Havana, and who were to have command of the two
vessels when built; the merchant placed $14,000 in the hands of
the appellant, his factor, in Baltimore, to be applied towards
the construction of the vessels, and offered to pay any further
sum that might be required. When the first of these vessels was
ready for sea, she was registered as the appellant's own
property, and the usual oath of ownership taken by him at the
custom house; as soon as she was so registered, she was seized by
the collector, and proceedings were instituted against her in the
federal district court, under Act April 20, 1818, c. 91, § 2, 3
Stat. 451, on the ground that she was fitted out for the slave
trade and the appellant appeared to these proceedings as her
claimant; it was proved on the trial that she was built and
fitted out for the slave trade, and that the appellant knew she
was intended to be so employed. Held, that as the contracts for
building the vessels were made with the appellant, and the bills
and expenses paid by him as factor for such merchant, the vessels
must be regarded as built, fitted out, and equipped by him as
factor for the merchant, in the sense in which those words are
used in the act of congress. Upon a proceeding for the forfeiture
of a vessel under Act April 20, 1818, c. 91, § 2, 3 Stat. 451,
on the ground that the vessel was fitted out for the slave trade,
if it appears that the guilty purpose was entertained by the
owner for whom the vessel was built or equipped, it is immaterial
whether the person who builds her or equips her as factor or
master was apprised of it or not. As the factor or master derives
his authority over the vessel from the owner, she is in their
hands responsible as fully for any violation of law as if the
owner were present and directed it.) |
| 1840
DCT |
The Catharine, 25 F.Cas. 332, 2 Paine
721, 3 Law Rep. 255, No. 14,755 (C.C.N.Y.,1840)(As respects slave
trade, to be employed in anything, means not only the act of
doing it, but also to be engaged to do it, to be under contract
or orders to do. Where a voyage to the coast of Africa is
commenced and prosecuted under strongly suspicious circumstances,
accompanied with preparations and a cargo taken, such as are
usually employed in voyages in the slave trade, it is incumbent
on the claimant to explain and remove such suspicious
circumstances by clear, explicit and unequivocal proofs. A bona
fide sale of a vessel, to be delivered at any given place on the
coast of Africa, unconnected with the ulterior employment of the
vessel, and not in aid of an employment in the transportation of
slaves, would not subject her to forfeiture within the act of
congress. Confiscation for slave trade is not limited to the
American interest held in the vessel at the time she is engaged
in the actual transportation of slaves. It is not the true
construction of the act that the whole adventure must be
performed whilst the vessel retains her American character and
ownership. The penalty is incurred and the forfeiture attaches
from the very inception of the voyage. The vessel becomes tainted
with the offence wherever she may go, or into whatever hands she
may fall, and the forfeiture attaches upon all interests
concerned. If the outward voyage of vessel claimed to be engaged
in slave trade under the American character and ownership be
planned and undertaken with a view and under an arrangement that
the ownership and national character are to be changed on the
arrival of the vessel on the coast of Africa, and that she is
then to be employed in the transportation of slaves, she comes
clearly within the mischief and within the true intent and
meaning of the act of congress. An American vessel, on her
outward voyage to the coast of Africa, for the purpose of taking
on board a cargo of slaves, is, before any slaves are received on
board, "employed or made use of," within the act of
congress of May 10th, 1800, 2 Stat. 70, "in the
transportation or carrying of slaves from one foreign country or
place to another." The confiscation is not limited to the
American interest at the time the vessel is engaged in the actual
transportation of slaves. The whole voyage must be taken to be
one continuous enterprise A vessel, being on her outward voyage
to the coast of Africa for the purpose of taking on board a cargo
of slaves, is "employed or made use of" for the
transporting or carrying of slaves before any slaves are received
on board, within the meaning of act May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. 70. And
if the outward voyage was planned and undertaken with a view and
under an arrangement that the ownership and character were to be
changed on the arrival of the vessel on the coast of Africa, and
there to be employed in the transportation of slaves, such vessel
would clearly come within the mischief and true intent of the
act.) |
| 1840
DCT |
The L'Amistad, 10 F.Cas. 141, Betts
Scr.Bk. 121, No. 5294A (Negroes imported into Cuba in violation
of the Spanish law,)(which declares such negroes to be free, were
sold at Havana, to Spanish citizens, and shipped, under a false
pass, as Ladinos, on board a Spanish coasting vessel for another
port of Cuba. After a few days out, they killed the master and
cook, imprisoned their owners, and assumed command of the vessel,
and after many days were found in distress, seized, and taken
into port by a United States naval vessel. Held, that as, under
the Spanish law, there could be no title to such negroes, they
should not be delivered up as property of Spanish subjects,
although the custom in Cuba is opposed to the law; but that such
negroes, under Act March 3, 1819, 3 Stat. 532, 36 U.S.C.A. §
1357 et seq., should be ordered delivered up to the president of
the United States to be transported to Africa.) |
| 1840
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| 1841
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| 1841
Sct |
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| 1842
DCT |
Bell v. Rhodes, 3 F.Cas. 120, 1 Hay.
& Haz. 103, No. 1264 (C.C.D.C.,1842)(The District of Columbia
being still governed by the laws of Maryland and Virginia, which
were in force anterior to the cession, it is not lawful for an
inhabitant of Washington county to purchase a slave in Alexandria
county and bring him into Washington county for sale.) |
| 1843
DCT |
Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 F.Cas.
1047, 2 McLean 611, 1 West.L.J. 56, No. 7502
(C.C.Ohio,1843)(Under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, in regard
to fugitives from labor, which gives the claimant a right of
action against a person interfering with the recovery of the
fugitive, any overt act which intentionally places a fugitive
beyond the reach of his master, or is calculated to have such an
effect, is a harboring of the fugitive, within the meaning of the
law. In an action by a claimant of a fugitive from labor against
a person harboring such fugitive, where it appears that the
plaintiff was subjected to the payment of a reward under a state
law for the return of his slave, and it further appears that the
defendant was the cause of his liability, the jury may consider
the fact that such payment was made in estimating the damages.(In
an action by a master of a fugitive slave against one who has
harbored the slave, where it appears that the defendant has been
the means of the entire loss of the slave, evidence may be
received of the value by showing what the services of the slave
are worth, and, as tending to show that fact, for what sum he
might have been sold. Under the act of congress against harboring
and concealing slaves, the notice required is notice in fact, and
not a formal notice, either verbal or written, from the claimant
or his agent.(In order to make a person liable for trespass in
hindering the recovery of a fugitive from labor, under Act Feb.
12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, notice that a colored person harbored or
concealed is a fugitive from labor need not be in writing by the
claimant or his agent, and it need not be given by either of them
verbally. Notice under the act means knowledge; and if there be
evidence conducing to show such notice or knowledge, it will be
left to the jury to decide. In an action for harboring a fugitive
slave, an averment that the defendant harbored and concealed the
negroes after notice that they were the slaves of the plaintiff,
and were fugitives from labor, is sufficient. Although the word
"escaped" is used in Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 662, 663, any word of equal import will be
sufficient. The act of congress against harboring and concealing
fugitives from labor is constitutional.) |
| 1843
DCT |
Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F.Cas.
1040, 2 McLean 596, 1 West.L.J. 2, 2 Ohio F.Dec. 220, No. 7501
(C.C.Ohio,1843)(Damages for harboring or concealing a slave in a
free state are recoverable only by virtue of the constitution and
laws of the United States. Such a suit could not be maintained at
common law. Under the act of congress against harboring and
concealing slaves, the notice required is notice in fact, and not
a formal notice, either verbal or written, from the claimant or
his agent. In order to make a person liable for trespass in
hindering the recovery of a fugitive from labor, under Act Feb.
12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, notice that a colored person harbored or
concealed is a fugitive from labor need not be in writing by the
claimant or his agent, and it need not be given by either of them
verbally. Notice under the act means knowledge; and if there be
evidence conducing to show such notice or knowledge, it will be
left to the jury to decide. Slavery exists only by virtue of the
laws of the states where it is sanctioned; and if a slave escape
from such state to a free state, he is free according to the
principles of the common law, and recaption in a free state is
authorized only by the constitution and act of congress. There is
no general principle in the law of nations which requires such
surrender.) |
| 1843
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| 1844
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| 1844
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| 1845
CirCt |
Driskill v. Parrish, 7
F.Cas. 1100, 3 McLean 631, 5 West.L.J. 25, No. 4089
(C.C.Ohio,1845)(The penalty prescribed by Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1
Stat. 302, for hindering, etc., the arrest of a fugitive from
labor, is not incurred if the arrest was made by persons who had
no authority to make . Under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, but
one penalty can be recovered for obstructing the arrest of, or of
harboring at the same time, one or many fugitives. Upon the
question as to whether a party is liable for hindering or
obstructing the arrest of a fugitive from labor, the rule is the
same, whether the agent makes the arrest with a view of taking
the fugitives before a judicial officer, or to take them out of
the state. To harbor fugitives within Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat.
302, it must be done with a view to elude the pursuit or claim of
the master. An open and fair action, with an intent to procure a
fair legal hearing for the fugitive, is no violation of the act.
Where the agent of the claimant of fugitives from labor acts
under a written power of attorney, in a suit for hindering the
arrest, under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, the power must be
given in evidence, or, if it be lost, the contents must be
proved. No one incurs the penalty under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1
Stat. 302, for hindering or obstructing the arrest, who does not
act "knowingly." He must have notice that the colored
persons are fugitives from labor, and that the agent has
authority to arrest them.) |
| 1845
DCT |
Vaughan v. Williams, 28 F.Cas.
1115, 75, No. 16,903, 3 McLean 530, 3 West.L.J. 65, 1 Ohio
Dec.Rep. 160, 8 Law Rep. (C.C.Ind.,1845)(The provision in the
constitution of the United States, and in the act of congress of
1793, 1 Stat. 302, in regard to the surrender of a fugitive from
labor, is binding on the state of Indiana and its citizens the
same as on the other states. And the laws of Missouri,
sanctioning slaves, must be respected, and rights under them
enforced, when a citizen of that state claims a fugitive. In an
action by an owner of a fugitive slave, under Act Feb. 12, 1793,
1 Stat. 302, the defendant is liable, though it appears that he
did not, by word or action, contribute to the rescue of the
fugitives at the time it took place, where it further appears
that he countenanced and encouraged, from time to time, the
movements of the crowd which resulted in the rescue, or where it
appears that he was present and sanctioned it in any form. An
individual is liable to the penalty for a rescue if he be present
and encourage it. It is not necessary that he should put forth
his hand to do the act. Slaves were brought by their master to
the state of Illinois, which prohibited slavery, from the state
of Kentucky, and kept at labor for six months under a declaration
of the master that he intended to become a citizen of Illinois,
and who actually exercised the right of a citizen by voting.
Held, that the slaves were thereby made free, and that the
master, on subsequently removing to Missouri, could not reclaim
them as slaves.) |
| 1846
DCT |
.S. v. Libby, 26 F.Cas. 928, 1 Woodb.
& M. 221, No. 15,597 (C.C.Me.,1846)(Whenever an American
citizen carries only merchandise in his vessel, but co- operates
with others who carry slaves in different vessels with the intent
to make them slaves, and is transporting the merchandise as a
participator in the slave trade and its gains, he is liable to
capital punishment under Act May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600.) |
| 1846
DCT |
Merrill v. Dawson, 17 F.Cas. 86,
Hempst. 563, No. 9469 (C.C.Ark.,1846)(Offspring of slaves belong
to the owner of the mother.) |
| 1846
DCT |
U.S. v. Libby, 26 F.Cas. 928, 1 Woodb.
& M. 221, No. 15,597 (C.C.Me.,1846)(The offense, under Act
May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600, which makes it a capital offense to
kidnap, etc., persons on foreign shore with intent to make them
slaves, is committed, though the person so kidnapped is not a
free person, where he is seized with an intent to perpetuate his
condition as a slave. Where a person is not interested in slaves
and has not kidnapped or taken them on board with intent to make
them slaves, but merely carries them from one foreign port to
another for others for ordinary hire, he is not guilty of a
capital offense under Act May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600, in relation
to the slave trade. History of the legislation prohibiting the
slave trade. Where an American citizen is neither interested in
the slaves themselves nor engaged personally in making others
slaves, nor employed in carrying them, knowing them to be slaves,
but transports merchandise as a carrier of goods for others, such
citizen is not guilty of an offense by any act of congress,
irrespective of his knowledge of the purpose for which such
merchandise is to be used.In order to constitute a capital crime
under Act May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600, in relation to slave trade,
both the intention to make persons slaves and such acts as either
kidnapping them or receiving them on board of vessels with such
views are required.)) |
| 1847
DCT |
Driskell v. Parish, 7 F.Cas.
1093, 5 West.L.J. 206, 10 Law Rep. 395, No. 4087
(C.C.Ohio,1847)(Where a party charged with obstructing the
claimant of fugitive slaves is proved to have driven the slaves
into a house, the door of which he closed against the claimant,
it is incompetent for the counsel for the claimant to inquire
where the slaves had been since the door was closed. The alleged
act of obstruction was the closing of the door, the effect of the
obstruction formed no part of the cause of action.(In an action
under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, containing separate counts
for harboring slaves and obstructing claimants, several penalties
cannot be recovered for the same act, whatever may be the number
of persons affected by the course of the defendant, nor can the
same act be separated into district charges.)) |
| 1847
Sct |
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| 1847
Sct |
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| 1848
DCT |
Giltner v. Gorham, 10 F.Cas. 424,
4 McLean 402, 6 West.L.J. 49, No. 5453 (C.C.Mich.,1848)(When a
rescue of fugitive slaves has been effected by the continued
action of a number of persons participating at different times,
those who took part in such action at different times are joint
trespassers, and may be proceeded against as such in an action,
brought under the act of Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, to recover
the value of such slaves. There is no abandonment of a cause of
action for trespass for hindering the agent of the plaintiff in
recovering fugitives from labor, where it appears that such agent
stated that he should not pursue the slaves. To make a person
liable to the owner of a slave, under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat.
302, for rescuing a fugitive from labor, for the purpose of
obstructing the master in capturing the fugitive, the person
rescuing must act knowingly and willingly; but the knowledge that
a colored person is a fugitive from labor may be inferred from
circumstances. Where an agent of the owner of a fugitive from
labor is attempting to seize the fugitive by virtue of Act Feb.
12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, it is not necessary that the agent should
state to every one who mingles with the crowd on what authority
he proceeds, but it is enough that he states it generally; and
one of a crowd who interposes by manual force, or by encouraging
others by words, to rescue a fugitive, is liable to the master in
an action of trespass, providing, however, that it does not
appear that the defendant interposed to allay the excitement and
prevent a breach of the peace. Under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat.
302, respecting fugitives from labor, which provides that, where
any person held to labor shall escape into another state, the
person to whom such labor is due as agent or attorney may seize
or arrest any such fugitive, etc., a parol authority by the
master to his agent is sufficient to authorize a seizure of the
fugitive. It is under the constitution of the United States and
the legislation of congress only that the owner of a slave has a
right to reclaim him in a state where slavery does not exist.
There is no principle in the common law, in the law of nations,
or of nature, which authorizes such right to reclaim. No warrant
is necessary in order to give an agent power, under Act Feb. 12,
1793, 1 Stat. 302, to seize a fugitive from labor.) |
| 1848
Sct |
|
| 1849
DCT |
Daggs v. Frazer, 6 F.Cas. 1112, 6
West.L.J. 555, 2 Am. Law J. (N.S.) 73, No. 3538
(D.C.Iowa,1849)(Trover will not lie in Iowa to recover the value
of slaves.) |
| 1849
DCT |
Drayton v. U.S., 7 F.Cas. 1063, 1
Hay. & Haz. 369, No. 4074 (C.C.D.C.,1849)(Color is a prima
facie evidence of slavery, but it is a presumption that may be
overcome by proof to the contrary. Inducing slaves to go aboard a
vessel under a promise to be transported into a free state is not
larceny, under an indictment charging defendant with stealing,
taking, and carrying away slaves under Acts Md.1737, c. 2, § 4.) |
| 1849
DCT |
Driskell v. Parish, 7 F.Cas.
1095, 5 McLean 64, 7 West.L.J. 222, No. 4088 (C.C.Ohio,1849)(The
penalty of Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, in relation to
fugitives from labor, may be incurred, without a resort to
violence, in hindering or obstructing an arrest. Any act done
with the intention of defeating the arrest, and which tends to
that result, is a violation of the act. Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1
Stat. 302, in relation to fugitives from labor, imposes no
obligation on any one to aid in the recaption; and its penalties
are not incurred by one who is merely passive in the attempt of
the owner or his agent to reclaim the alleged fugitive. Neither
are they incurred by an inquiry, made in good faith, as to the
authority to make the arrest; nor by insisting that the alleged
fugitive shall have a fair trial on the question whether he owes
labor or service to the claimant. If, after knowledge that a
person is a fugitive, a demand of permission to arrest him on the
premises of another is made and refused, such refusal subjects
the party to legal liability, under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat.
302; and the removal or withdrawal of the person of the alleged
fugitive, by the direction of another, so as to prevent an
arrest, is a hindrance and obstruction. To support a count for
harboring or concealing a fugitive, under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1
Stat. 302, the harboring or concealing must be done with the view
to elude the claim of the master. If, from motives or humanity, a
person permits a fugitive to remain with him for a few days,
after notice of his real character, without any design to elude
the claim of the owner, it is not a harboring or concealing
within the meaning of Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302. To sustain
the allegation of hindering or obstructing the arrest of a
fugitive from labor, under Act Cong. Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302,
some act of interference on the part of the defendant must be
proved, tending to impair the right of recaption, secured by the
statute. An action brought to recover the value of fugitive
slaves against one who is alleged to have harbored or concealed
them, whereby their services were lost, is founded on
U.S.C.A.Const. art. 4, § 2, and Act 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 302.) In
an action, brought under the act of 1793, 1 Stat. 302, for the
value of slaves harbored or secreted by the defendant, such
harboring or secretion having been proved, the only question for
the jury, in assessing damages, is the value of the services of
the slaves. A removal of slaves from the place where they had
been secreted with the view of returning them to their master so
that they were enabled to escape from the pursuit of the master,
is a harboring and secreting of the slave, within the meaning of
Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, and the master is entitled to
damages. In an action under Act Feb. 12, 1793, 1 Stat. 302, for
harboring and secreting fugitive slaves, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the ownership of the slave and that they
escaped from his service.) |
| 1849
CirCt |
The Malaga, 16 F.Cas. 535, 2 Am. Law J. (N.S.)
97, 4 Pa. L.J. 339, No. 8985 (E.D.Pa.,1849)(Where a vessel has
been seized for engaging in the slave trade, if there is
reasonable ground for a seizure, it is a defense to a libel for
damages against the commander of the seizing vessel. Where a
libel against a vessel for a violation of the laws prohibiting
the slave trade is, on motion of the district attorney,
discontinued, and the vessel is delivered up to and accepted by
the captain, it amounts to a mutual release, and is a bar to a
subsequent action by the owners of the vessel for damages against
her captors. An officer of the government, making an arrest on
the high seas, is not liable in damages, if the seizure
afterwards proved to have been tortious, unless there has been a
want of probable cause. Nor is it material that all the
circumstances of suspicion subsequently shown were not present to
his mind at the time.) |
| 1849
DCT |
The Ohio, 27 F.Cas. 218, 1 Newb.Adm. 409,
No. 15,914 (E.D.La.,1849)(The language of the statute of March
20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, in prohibition of the slave trade, cannot
be applied to persons of color who were domiciled in the United
States and brought back to the United States after a temporary
absence. Act April 20, 1818, § 1, 3 Stat. 450, punishing as an
offense the bringing of a colored person into the United States,
does not apply to a case of a colored person, born and reared
within the United States, sailing to a foreign port or place on
an American ship, and returning to a port of the United States.) |
| 1849
DCT |
Toby v. Randon, 23 F.Cas. 1349, 6
West.L.J. 218, No. 14,071 (D.C.Tex.,1849)(A note given for slaves
taken to Texas in 1835 in violation of the laws of Mexico is
invalid.) |
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