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Non-Subordination
Katharine T. Bartlett and Angela Harris
Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine, Commentary, 487-488 (1998). |
| The nonsubordination perspective on
women and law shifts the focus of attention from gender-based
difference to the imbalance of power between women and men. This
perspective, also known as dominance theory, makes the relevant
inquiry not whether women are like, or unlike, men, but whether a
rule or practice serves to subordinate women to men. Accordingly,
similarities and differences between women and men are important
under this theory not as givens that produce certain expected,
rational consequences in the law, but as part of a larger system
of categories and concepts designed to make women's subordination
seem natural and legitimate. As developed by Catharine MacKinnon,
dominance theory offers a way of understanding not just the
situations of elite women, who are well represented in liberal
feminism, and not just women's situation as a function of class,
as presented by socialist feminism, but the situation of all
women -- hence the term "unmodified" or
"unqualified" feminism. See Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism Unqualified: Discourses on Life and Law 16 (1987).
This [unit] introduces nonsubordination theory by pairing John
Stuart Mill's description of women's nineteenth-century
"subjection" as a "solitary breach" in the
fundamental laws of modern civilization with Catharine
MacKinnon's identification of the epistemological premise of
women's legal subordination as the ability of those with power --
men -- to identify their own point of view as "point-of-viewlessness."
The remainder of the [unit] explores, primarily through legal
materials relating to sexual harassment, pornography, domestic
violence, and heterosexuality, non-subordination theory's claim
that the law defines sex and sexual difference in ways that mask
the universality of men's point of view and naturalize women's
relative powerlessness in this society.
It is no accident that most of the topics of this [unit]
relate to sexual behavior -- in and outside traditional families,
in the workplace, in educational institutions, in commerce, and
elsewhere. This is largely because it is in the sexual realm that
dominance theory has the most new and different to offer to an
analysis of the relationship between gender and law. With respect
to sex-based discrimination in hiring, promotion, and equal pay
in the workplace, in access to education and other public
benefits, traditional equality theory appears to have achieved
benefits for women which are desirable even from a dominance
theory perspective. MacKinnon's complaint with equality theory,
of whichever variety, is that while it is adequate to handle
certain marginal exceptions -- e.g., privileged women who fit the
male profile -- it is insufficient to address the central
inequalities faced by women -- sexual violence and abuse,
poverty, deprivation of control over reproductive decisions, and
so on. To get at these questions, MacKinnon moves beyond
questions of sameness and difference to the construction of
women's sexuality, which she finds to be at the core of the
processes through which these more central inequalities are
sustained. This construction is made visible in the sexual acts
of pornography, sexual harassment, domestic violence, and other
topics addressed in this [unit], but according to MacKinnon it
underlines women's subordination and devaluation more generally
in all spheres of women's lives. To test MacKinnon's theory, you
should not only compare her analysis of the topics in this [unit]
with the analyses produced by formal and substantive equality,
but also reconsider the issues discussed in [unit]s 2 and 3 in
light of dominance theory. What does dominance theory add to, and
how does it revise, the equality principles studied thus far? Is
there one theory that seems to you to be the most satisfactory on
all issues?
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