|
| |
|
Autonomy
Katharine T. Bartlett and Angela Harris
Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine, Commentary 803-804
(1998). |
| Many legal standards assume that
individuals are capable of having "intent," of
exercising "choice" or "consent," and of
acting and thinking like a "reasonable" person, and
require juries and judges to make findings accordingly. Women's
advocates make similar assumptions when they argue that women
should have greater personal autonomy, freedom to make their own
choices, and power to control their own lives.
A series of challenges to the law's assumption that
individuals act autonomously and to the law's ability to make
objective determinations about the individual's intent, consent,
and ability to make rational choices were stimulated by
intellectual currents in other disciplines known as
"postmodernism."(1) The
postmodern view of the individual or the "legal
subject" opposes the Enlightenment view of the stable,
coherent self, capable of reason and "privileged insight
into its own processes and into the 'laws of nature,'"(2)
with a more complicated view of the individual as one who is
constituted form multiple institutional and ideological forces
that, in various ways, overlap, intersect, and even contradict
each other. These structures produce "the subject's
experience of differentiated identity and . . . autonomy,"(3)
but a misleading one, for under the postmodern view this
experience of what is real, rational, or, in some transcendent
sense, true. Some of these and related themes were brought into
law in the 1970's through what became known as the critical legal
studies movement (CLS), a loose coalition of academic scholars
who worked on many theoretical fronts to challenge the law's
claim to neutrality, rationality, and objectivity, as well as the
hierarchical structures of democratic society and the poverty of
individualism. In some cases, CLS critiques led to paralysis an
inaction, for the assault on the objective foundations of liberal
legal thought seemed to undermine any foundations for an
alternative framework as well. If neutrality, and objectivity,
and even autonomy are impossible, it was hard to see how any
reforms of existing legal structures, however radical, could be
defended.
In the hands of scholars of gender and law, however,
postmodern insights have not ended efforts to enhance the
autonomy and freedom of women but rather have invigorated them.
Legal activists and scholars who have enlisted postmodern
critiques in the effort to end women's subordination have shown
that better understanding of the limits of individual
subjectivity and free choice can lead to better strategies for
maximizing autonomy. The proposition that autonomy is impossible
was restated by some scholars and women's advocates as a
practical observation that choice is a relative concept, and
that, in some matters at least, more is better than less. At the
same time, the meaning of autonomy has been expanding beyond the
right to be free from interference by others to include the
ability to flourish among and in relation to others. This [unit]
uses cases relating especially to rape, pregnancy, abortion, and
welfare to explore the potential for, and new meanings of,
autonomy.
|
| 1. In addition to the
legal themes associated with postmodernism that are
developed in this [unit], postmodernism has also been
associated with critiques of the law's rationality,
determinacy, and neutrality, which were developed in
[unit] 4, and anti-essentialism, which is examined in
[unit] 7.
2. Jane Flax, Postmodernism and
Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in
Feminism/Postmodernism 39, 41 (Linda J. Nicholson ed.,
1990).
3. Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for
Maneuver: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal
Studies, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 69, 85 (1989). |
|