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Reading: Assignment
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 | Unit Seven:
Anti-
essentialism |
 | Bartlett, 1007-1108 (reread) |
 | Bartlett, 1108-1137 |
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| Reflection Paper: |
 | Economic Autonomy (Required) |
 | Reconceiving Autonomy (Extra
Credit) |
 | Problem, 7-1 (oral reflection
and report, paper due - Last day of
final exams, typed 5-8 pages Reflection) |
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Lesson Outline1
 | Unmasking Privilege |
 | Crossing Lines of Power |
 | Building Coalitions |
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Lesson Outline1
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Feminism: Our
Categories, Ourselves

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| Female Genital Surgeries

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| Male Genital Circumcision

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| Cultural Defense

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Indian Tribal Law
and Gender
 | Elmer R. Rusco, Civil Liberties
Guarantees under Tribal Law: a Survey of Civil
Rights Provisions in Tribal Constitutions ,
14 Am. Indian L. Rev. 269 (1990) ( Examples of Indian
Constitution and Gender: Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun
Indians, Hopi Tribe of Arizona, Kiahlagee Tribal Town,
Laguna Pueblo, Crow Tribe) |
 | Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp 5 (1975)
reversed and remanded, 540 F2d 1039 (10th Cir 1976,
reversed Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct.
1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (U.S.N.M., May 15, 1978) |
 | Who's
a real Indian? Seeking self-definition, tribes find
conflict |

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| Teenage Pregnancy

Multiple Oppressions:
Gender, Race and Class

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| Websites
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| Fishbeck v. State of N.D., 115 F.3d 580
(8th Cir.(N.D.), Jun 03, 1997) (NO. 96-4038)(alleging that
statute criminalizing female, but not male, circumcision violated
equal protection clause. The District Court dismissed action and
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs
did not have standing to challenge statute. |
| In re Oluloro, No. A72 147 491 (Wash.
EOIR Immigr. Ct. Mar. 23, 1994) (unpublished transcript of oral
decision, on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). "On
March 23, 1994, in In re Oluloro, Immigration Judge Kendall
Warren handed down a decision which indicates that, in
immigration proceedings, the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) should consider human rights abuses
directed at women. The overriding concern in the case confronting
Judge Warren was the possibility that two young U.S. girls
would suffer female genital mutilation (FGM) if the INS deported
their mother to Nigeria. In reaching the decision to suspend the
mother's deportation, Judge Warren condemned FGM as "cruel
and serv[ing] no known medical purpose." Thus, Judge
Warren ruled that the practice presented an extreme hardship for
the girls. Unfortunately, the court's ruling has no precedential
value because the INS chose not to appeal the decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)." Patricia Dysart Rudloff, In Re
Oluloro: Risk of Female Genital Mutilation as
"Extreme Hardship" in Immigration Proceedings, 26 St.
Mary's L.J. 877, 877-878 (1995). |
| THE FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION ACT OF 1993, H.R.
3247
(a) IN GENERAL. -- Chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
"s 116. Female genital mutilation
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly
circumcises, excises, or infibulates the
whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris
of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
"(b) A surgical operation is not a violation of this section
if the operation is --
"(1) necessary to the health of the person on whom it is
performed, and is performed by a person
licensed in the place of its performance as a medical
practitioner; or
"(2) performed on a person in labor or who has just given
birth and is performed for medical purposes
connected with that labor or birth by a person licensed in the
place it is performed as a medical
practitioner, midwife, or person in training to become such a
practitioner or midwife.
"(c) In applying subsection (b) (1), no account shall be
taken of the effect on the person on whom the
operation is to be performed of any belief on the part of that or
any other person that the operation is
required as a matter of custom or ritual.
"(d) Whoever knowingly denies to any person medical care or
services or otherwise discriminates
against any person in the provision of medical care or services,
because --
"(1) that person has undergone female circumcision,
excision, or infibulation; or
"(2) that person has requested that female circumcision,
excision, or infibulation be performed on any
person;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both."
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT. -- The table of sections at the beginning
of chapter 7 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
item:
"116. Female genital mutilation. . ." |
| Elmer R. Rusco, Civil Liberties
Guarantees under Tribal Law: a Survey of Civil Rights
Provisions in Tribal Constitutions , 14 Am. Indian L. Rev.
269, 284-285 (1990)
"Four tribal constitutions discriminate by gender in
establishing membership in the tribe. The constitution of the
Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians provides that: [i]f a
female member marries a non-Indian, she will automatically lose
her membership and will be required to leave the Community within
ninety days after written notice has been served upon her by the
Business Committee; Provided, That this provision shall not apply
in the case of any marriages consummated prior to the approval of
this Constitution and By-Laws. The governing document of the Hopi
Tribe of Arizona provides that members shall be those on a tribal
roll taken in 1937, those born of mothers and fathers who were on
this roll, and "[a]ll children born after December 31, 1937,
whose mother is a member of the Hopi Tribe, and whose father is a
member of some other tribe."' The constitution of the
Kiahlagee Tribal Town provides that "[a]ll adult offspring
of a marriage between a male member of the Kiahlagee Tribal Town
or Tribe may become members of the Town by applying for
admission, when accepted and approved by a majority vote of the
members present at any regular Kiahlagee Tribal Town membership
meeting."' One of the categories of possible
membership in Laguna Pueblo, as stated in its constitution, is,
"All persons of one-half or more Laguna Indian blood born
after approval of this revised Constitution (1) whose mother is a
member of the Pueblo of Laguna; or (2) whose father is a member
of the Pueblo of Laguna, provided the child is born in
wedlock."' Two constitutions discriminate by gender in
setting minimum ages for voting in tribal elections. The
Crow Tribe's constitution states that "[a]ny duly enrolled
member of the Crow Tribe, except as herein provided, shall be
entitled to engage in the deliberations
and voting of the council, provided the females are 18 years old
and the males 21 years."' A resolution of the Quapaw
Tribe adopted in 1956, which functions as its constitution,
states that it is the desire of the individual male
members, 21 years of age and over, and female members, 18 years
of age and over, to establish a responsible administrative body
to represent, speak and act for the individual members of the
Quapaw Tribe on matters affecting the properties and general
business of the Tribe. Presumably this language specifies the
voting rules for the Tribe." |
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