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RACIST HEALTH CARE:
REFORMING AN UNJUST HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
TO MEET THE
NEEDS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS

Vernellia R. Randall(*)
3 Health Matrix 127-194 (Spring, 1993)
Copyright (c) 1993 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine; Vernellia R. Randall

IV.    HEALTH POLICY AND ELIMINATING THE HEALTH DISPARITY

This the American black man knows: his fight here is a fight to the finish. Either he dies or wins. If he wins, it will be by no subterfuge or evasion of amalgamation. He will enter modern civilization here in America as black man on terms of perfect and unlimited equality with any white man, or he will enter not at all. Either exterminate root and branch, or absolute equality. There can be no compromise. This is the last great battle of the West.(188) Institutional racism is a term that describes practices in the United States nearly as old as the nation itself. Institutional racism comprises those policies, practices, and activities which injure or damage an individual or group based on race. Like individual racism, the effects of institutional racism can derive from intentional or unintentional conduct. For African- Americans who face disproportionate morbidity and mortality, whether the conduct was intentional or not is irrelevant. When medical institutions' behavior sets up racial barriers to access and provides racially disparate treatment of African-Americans, and thereby injures those the institutions purport to help, the institutions are institutionally racist. 

African-Americans have not profited as much as European-Americans by the early advances of health care. In fact, the gap between African-American health and European-American health has widened over the last ten years. (189) Racism has adversely affected African-American health independently of other factors contributing to excess African-American morbidity and mortality. We have much to lose by its persistence. 

In 1992, the presence of institutional racism in a system dedicated to improving the life of all Americans is a powerful indictment of a system that offers part of its population what some consider the best health care in the world.(190)Despite having ultimate responsibility for providing health care for all Americans, despite a belief in this country that all persons have certain rights to life, liberty and health, the American health care institution has contributed to and perpetuated racism. 

What white Americans have never fully understood -- but what the Negro can never forget -- is that white society is deeply [racist]. White institutions created it, white institutions maintained it and white societies condone it.(191) For health care institutions to remove the blemish of racism, they must develop specific solutions. To bring African-American health on par with European-American health, we must design and implement a delivery system to effectively address the health issues of African-Americans. There are four policy/legislative positions that can be adopted (singly or in some combination).(192) First, the health care system, legislature or court can do nothing. The legislature (and courts) could continue to rely on the present system without specifically addressing issues relevant to African-American health. This position denies that the health care system perpetuates disparity among African-Americans and European-Americans. However, this position does provide a base measure against which other policy alternatives can be evaluated. Second, insurance coverage could be expanded. Expanding insurance coverage would theoretically remove economic barriers to health care. Third, based on those facts that suggest severe treatment disparity between African-Americans and European-Americans, special health services could be targeted to African- Americans. Finally, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act could be used to eliminate racist practices in health care delivery systems. 

Policy options are neither right nor wrong and can only be evaluated in the context of how well the policy satisfies other criteria. These policy alternatives can be evaluated using seven criteria: horizontal equity, vertical equity, economic efficiency, preference satisfaction, privacy, avoidance of stigma, and political feasibility. Horizontal equity seeks to treat equals as equals. For example, a policy proposal that targets services to all diabetic patients residing in the United States satisfies the criterion of horizontal equity, whereas a policy targeting all African-American diabetic patients does not.(193) Vertical equity is unequal treatment of unequals, trying to make them more equal. Vertical equity suggests that a good policy proposal is one that favors the have-nots over the haves in the distribution of benefits.(194) Economic efficiency is the use of resources to produce the maximum benefit for the smallest expenditure.(195)Preference satisfaction requires that a policy produce the most happiness for the greatest number of people, usually by creating options and allowing individuals to maximize their own preferences. Therefore, in selecting between alternate policy options, the policy which is consistent with people's preferences is favored.(196) One problem with preference measurement is that human preferences do change as a result of education and advertising. Therefore, weight given to preference satisfaction should be considered against the likelihood of the preference being changed. The privacy criterion stipulates that a policy should not allow intrusion into the life of the individual.(197)Avoidance of stigma means that individuals are not negatively labeled as different from other citizens not affected by the policy.(198) Political feasibility is the possibility that the particular alternatives have a chance of being adopted and implemented by the courts and legislature.(199)

 


A. "Do Nothing" Policy Option(200)
Horizontal Equity. In evaluating the different policy options, the "do nothing" option serves as a baseline. The existent system does not provide African-Americans who are ill with the same access as sick European- Americans; nor do African-Americans receive the same treatment once in the health care system. Consequently, sick African-Americans are not treated the same as sick European-Americans. The current system lacks horizontal equity. 

Vertical Equity. Doing nothing maintains the status quo and does not attempt to improve access or treatment services for African-Americans. African-American communities have fewer providers and medical institutions. African-Americans have disproportionate morbidity and mortality. Doing nothing does not address the unique needs of African-Americans. Doing nothing does not close the gap in health between African-Americans and European-Americans. Given the unequal access and unequal medical treatment, doing nothing makes no changes which, by treating African-Americans differently, would lead to equal health care. Therefore, vertical equity does not exist. 

Economic Efficiency. To the extent that the United States is already spending enough to bring every citizen high quality, high-technology care, economic efficiency is not met. Of the $817 billion that is spent each year on health care, it is estimated that $200 billion is spent on unnecessary medical care, overpriced procedures and inefficient administration.(201)Apparently, the current system is not economically efficient. Reforming the health care system to meet the needs of African-Americans will not be any more economically inefficient than the current system.(202) On the other hand, failure to reform the system will mean continued costs in African-American lives. This cost is one which will not only affect individual lives and the African-American community, but also the general society in lost productivity and additional health care expenses. 

Preference Satisfaction. Preference satisfaction requires that a policy produce the most happiness for the greatest number of people, usually by creating options and allowing individuals to maximize their own preferences. Whether preference satisfaction exists depends on whose perspective one considers. Certainly, for those who have access to the health care system and adequate treatment, doing nothing might allow them to maximize their own preferences. However, for African-Americans whose access to health care is limited and whose treatment is below standards, doing nothing would not create options or allow them to maximize their preferences. 

Privacy. The privacy criterion stipulates that a policy does not allow intrusion into the life of the individual. The current system maximizes an individual's privacy. Theoretically, the free-choice, fee-for-service, retrospective payment system currently serving much of the population, neither limits from whom an individual can seek services nor limits the services that a provider can render. Those enjoying limitless services are not required to disclose information to receive care. In this way, doing nothing maximizes the privacy of those with access to health care services; while those without access to services have no privacy issues, because they are excluded from participation. 

Stigma. Avoidance of stigma means that individuals are not negatively labeled as different from other citizens not affected by the policy. To the extent that doing nothing allows the gap in health between African-Americans and European-Americans to continue, it may cause some stigma. Individuals who believe that a major cause of illness and death is behavior may view reports of poorer health among African-Americans as evidence of poor health behavior. To some extent they are correct.(203)However, if European- Americans fail to acknowledge the role of the health care system, doing nothing results in a failure of the health care system to accept responsibility for its role in the health of African-Americans. It also leads to indirect blaming and negative labelling of African-Americans. 

Political Feasibility. Political feasibility is the possibility that the particular alternatives have a chance of being adopted and implemented by the courts and legislature. Maintaining the status quo is generally easier than making substantial changes. The likelihood that specific actions will be taken to improve the health of African-Americans seems slim, since little attention is being given the problem. 

Summary. The do nothing option allows for the social, economic, and health care disparity to continue to exist between African-Americans and European- Americans. Racial and economic barriers to access experienced by African- Americans would persist. Racial and economic barriers to entering the health care professions would remain. Doing nothing would be to insist on ignoring the racial disparities in medical treatment. This situation is untenable. The health of African-Americans clearly indicates that something needs to be done. 

 


B.    Expanded Insurance Coverage 
1.    Background
The United States and South Africa are the only major industrialized nations without a universal health insurance system that guarantees access to health care for all of their citizens. What the United States has instead of universal health care is a scheme of employer-financed insurance and government programs(204)that still leaves more than 37 million Americans without the financial resources to pay for health care.(205)The lack of health insurance is a particular issue for African-Americans who are less likely to have employer-financed insurance.(206) While public programs, such as Medicaid and Medicare, are important sources of health care coverage for many low-income and African-Americans, they do not reach all of the uninsured poor.(207) In fact, one-fourth (25%) of African-Americans have no source of health coverage.(208) Even more disturbing is that the number of uninsured African-Americans is increasing. In 1977, only 18% of African-Americans had no health coverage.(209) Furthermore, the gap between African-American uninsured and European-American uninsured is widening. For instance, while the proportion of uninsured non-elderly European-Americans increased only 3 percent from 1977 to 1987 (from 12% to 15%), the proportion of uninsured non-elderly African- Americans increased 7% (from 18% to 25%) during the same period.(210)Since private health insurance coverage is linked to employment, racial barriers to employment are one explanation for the significant difference in insurance coverage. For example, in 1990 the African-American unemployment rate was 240% more than the European-American unemployment rate.(211) Even where employed, the African-American is more likely to be in a lower paying job which does not provide employer-based health insurance.(212) Another factor affecting insurance coverage is the higher percentage of African-American families with only one adult.(213) Families with two working adults are more likely to have at least one adult with employer-based insurance.(214)However, while the absence of health insurance is much more likely with lower income, race is an independent factor affecting whether an individual will be insured. In fact, the racial difference in proportion of uninsured is most marked at higher incomes.(215) For example, poor/low income African- Americans are uninsured at about the same rate as poor/low income European- Americans; however, middle/high income African-Americans are almost twice as likely to be uninsured than higher income European-Americans.(216) Expanding insurance coverage so that everyone will have either employer-based or government-based insurance is one proposal for addressing the inequities in the health care system.(217)During the 102nd Congress, more than thirty proposals were introduced to expand insurance coverage and reform the health care system.(218) The proposals under consideration fell into five major categories: market-reform, employer mandate plus Medicaid, employer choice of Medicare or private, Medicare for all, comprehensive public plan. See, Table 11 below.  . Market-reform. Small group health insurance reform is a targeted approach to extend insurance to the working uninsured.(219) It proposes reforming the small group market to make coverage affordable and easier to purchase and to then sell private health insurance to small firms.(220)The reforms include: requiring private insurers to make coverage available to all firms, employees and dependents in the group, limiting pre-existing condition waiting periods for coverage, limiting variation of premiums based on group risk, limiting the extent to which premiums could be increased.(221)
  • . Employer-Mandated Basic Coverage plus Medicaid. Similar to market-reform, this proposal would require employers to offer coverage and to contribute at least 75 to 80 percent toward the premium cost.(222) In addition, Medicaid would be expanded to cover all poor persons not encompassed under an employer policy.(223)
  • . Employer Choice of Medicare or Private. The "play or pay" option would provide employers the alternative of acquiring private health insurance coverage for employees and dependents or contributing toward their coverage under a public plan similar to Medicare.(224) If a person is not covered under a private insurance plan, he or she would automatically be covered under the public plan and assessed a premium based on income.(225) 
  • . Medicare for All. This alternative would broaden the present Medicare program to the whole population. Employers would be required to contribute financially toward the coverage of their employees. States would also be required to contribute current Medicaid funding for acute care benefits to the poor.(226) 
  • . Comprehensive Public Plan. This option provides comprehensive health benefits to the entire United States population through a single public plan.(227) This plan would replace all private health insurance.(228)
TABLE 11: EXPANDED HEALTH INSURANCE OPTIONS(229)
2.      Policy Analysis(230)
Horizontal Equity. To the extent that expanded insurance coverage would provide economic access for all uninsured, it has horizontal equity. In essence, expanded insurance coverage treats equals (the uninsured) as equals. Therefore, options such as employer choice of Medicare or private insurance, Medicare for all, and comprehensive public plan, have horizontal equity. 

However, market-reform and employer-mandated plus Medicaid do not provide for coverage for all uninsured. For instance, market-reform options do not require the employer to contribute toward the premiums. Without employer contributions, many employees in low-paying jobs will not be able to afford the premiums. Furthermore, premiums may increase because of availability of coverage to high- risk, sick individuals who had been previously excluded by underwriting practices.(231) Therefore, under the market-reform option almost 40 millions persons will still be uninsured.(232)Similarly, employer mandate only covers two-thirds of the uninsured who are in families with a working adult. It excludes from coverage almost 7 million uninsured, such as part-time workers and older adults who are disabled or retire early and are not eligible for Medicare.(233) The groups (including those in low-paying jobs and/or part- time employment) that market-reform and employer mandate plus Medicaid will not cover would include high numbers of African-Americans. 

Vertical Equity. A system of universal insurance regardless of coverage fails to resolve the racial difference in access between African-Americans and European-Americans that is not related to insurance coverage. For example, European-Americans have better access to health care even when the insurance coverage is similar.(234)Expanding insurance would not increase community availability of either European-American institutions and providers or African-American institutions and providers. Nor does expanding insurance coverage address the issues of racially disparate treatment. In short, expanding insurance coverage does not address the issue of institutional racism. Consequently, expanding insurance coverage does not provide for vertical equity. 

Economic Efficiency. Whether expanding insurance coverage is economically efficient is highly debatable. Without cost controls, expanding insurance coverage could increase health care costs drastically. Historically, the existence of health insurance has played a significant role in increased health care costs. This is so because the insurer's method of reimbursing providers introduced into the health care system a "complex of irrational economic incentives".(235) In particular, the "fee-for-service basis"(236)system euphemistically called "the free lunch system," has delivered medical care without regard to cost containment, and sometimes without regard to medical necessity. Under fee- for-service, third-party payers pay health care providers for each discrete item of service. In 1980, 50% of active physicians were compensated by fee-for- service; approximately 20% were salaried and the other 30% received a mixed form of compensation.(237) Similarly, government programs (Medicaid and Medicare) reimbursed providers for most of their costs or charges incurred in treating covered patients.(238)Both reimbursement forms created powerful incentives to over-utilize the health care system.(239)In fact, no one had a rational incentive to economize. 

For example, a patient contracted for insurance through the employer for 80% of the usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) cost of "medically necessary care." Therefore, the patient lacked the incentive to economize because no matter the charges, the patient only paid 20% of the cost.(240)Because the insurance premium was shared with the employer, the patient generally was not directly concerned with future premium increases. Even so, her individual health care choices did not directly influence her insurance premium, since insurers did not typically base health care insurance premiums on "experience rating." In this way the patient did not realize the full financial impact of her health care treatment decisions. 

Nor were hospitals and physicians motivated to economize. Because most third- party payors guaranteed providers 80% of their customary charges, fee-for- service or cost-based charges had an opposite and "perverse influence" on health service delivery.(241) Under both reimbursement systems, providers made more when they treated more.(242) This phenomenon had two effects. First, physicians and hospitals tended to de-emphasize preventive care, which was not as lucrative as treatment services. Second, providers tended to place excessive reliance on the use of medical technology because third-party payors paid for discrete procedures, not time spent with patients.(243)From the patient's point of view, insurance removed the need to ration health care dollars, creating a "moral hazard problem."(244) And, from the insurer's point of view, a payment system that had worked well for auto and life insurance seemed to make sense. In these ways, health care insurance was designed and implemented on the basis of faulty assumptions by all parties.(245) Extending health care insurance to greater numbers of persons could result in over-utilization unless serious cost containment measures, such as utilization review(246) and financial risk-shifting,(247)are introduced into the health care system. 

Neither the market-reform option nor the employer-mandated option is likely to contain substantial cost containment provisions. Small firms and private plans do not typically offer managed care products which provide the mechanism for serious cost containment. While some larger employers may offer managed care products, they represent a relatively small proportion of the newly insured since most larger employers are already covering their employees. There is potential for cost containment with the expansion of Medicaid, since it would extend its tight provider payment limits to a larger number of persons. However, those same payment limits might also act as a deterrent to provider participation which would then limit the actual availability of service. Therefore, expanding insurance is only efficient if the health care system is reformed to eliminate unnecessary medical care, reduce overpriced procedures, and improve administration. 

Stigma. While expanding insurance coverage will not necessarily stigmatize, actions taken to make it workable, that is, cost containment efforts, might lead to stigmatization. The stigmatization may be a result of individuals being treated differently based on the type and amount of coverage they have. Historically, the type and extent of coverage varies among individuals and groups, based on whether it is government or employer-based insurance. 

Even among employers, insurance varied among large employers with unions (such as General Motors) and smaller employers without unions. Further, regardless of size of employer, individuals employed in minimum-wage positions often have no coverage or minimal coverage with large deductible amounts. 

Government programs (such as Medicaid and Medicare) have had lower provider payment schedules and treatment guidelines, which discourage provider participation. In fact, many providers have refused to accept payment from policies that either do not make full restitution or that place restriction on their practices. Individuals who have these policies are likely to be labeled negatively by providers and institutions. Given that many African-Americans are employed in minimum-wage positions (or are covered by government insurance) they are likely to be stigmatized more by providers' refusal to accept certain policies. 

Preference Satisfaction. There is no indication that a generalized insurance program will allow for preference satisfaction for all participants. Preference satisfaction implies the ability to exercise choice in providers and treatment. To make expanded insurance coverage workable, patient choice might be limited to control cost. For example, many employers may adopt managed care plans as a mechanism of controlling cost. Managed care plans(248) control cost by having physicians act as "gatekeepers", limiting a person's access to certain treatment and to specialist physicians.(249)While expanding insurance coverage in itself will not limit preference satisfaction, the gatekeeping aspects of cost containment programs will. These attempts to have the physician become the gatekeeper to medical care will ultimately change the entire structure of the American health care system(250) and not necessarily for the better. The least articulate, least educated, least financially well- off person will have the most limits imposed by cost containment efforts. If cost containment efforts result in injuries, the poor and minorities will have to bear the cost of restricted access to services. The cost containment efforts that will be associated with expanding insurance coverage could potentially result in greater health disparity between African-Americans and European-Americans. This is especially true given physicians' propensity to treat patients differently based on race. 

Privacy. Expanded insurance coverage does not necessarily affect privacy. However, as in preference satisfaction, steps taken to implement the option may negatively affect a person's privacy. In order for governments and third-party payers to carry out utilization review and financial risk-shifting, they must scrutinize the treatment of individual patients. In particular, utilization review examines appropriateness of medical services to detect variations from the norm that point to unnecessary or inappropriate care.(251)When the third-party payer detects variation, either it does not pay the claim (retrospective(252) or refuses to authorize the provision of the service (concurrent and prospective(253)Each form(254) requires varying degrees of information about the individual. The plan which will most invade an individual's privacy is the one that employs prospective or concurrent utilization review because it requires information about a current illness for the purpose of denying care. 

Political Feasibility. Almost certainly, within the next four years some bill will be passed expanding insurance coverage. The only real question is what shape the reform will take. As noted above, the 102nd Congress introduced more than thirty proposals which include market-reform, employer mandate plus Medicaid, employer choice of Medicare or private, Medicare for all, comprehensive public plan. Given the extensive insurance lobby, it is not likely that a comprehensive public plan or a Medicare-for-all plan will be adopted since both those options would nearly eliminate the role of private insurance. The market-reform option, while the least intrusive into the current system, would also leave many individuals uncovered. Given the pain and agony that many are undergoing to change the system, leaving large numbers uncovered would be political suicide. The most likely reform is some combination of employer mandate plus Medicaid and/or employer choice of Medicare and/or private. While this would leave some individuals uncovered, it would provide the most extensive coverage without radically changing the health care system. 

Summary. The lack of health insurance explains a significant part of the difference in the use of health care services between African-Americans and European-Americans. Expanding insurance coverage is certain to help to increase the use of health care services. For example, in 1977 uninsured African- Americans in the South saw physicians an average of 1.5 times, while insured African-Americans saw physicians an average of 2.8 times.(255)However, it is important to note that, while African-Americans' physician visits almost doubled for those with insurance, the racial differential between African- Americans and European-Americans remained steady.(256)That is, uninsured European-Americans had 150% more visits per year than uninsured African-Americans; insured European-Americans had 132% more visits per year than insured African-Americans.(257)It seems that expanded insurance coverage is a policy option which will remove major economic barriers to health care. However, this option is not a satisfactory replacement for removing race-related problems with access to health care. Furthermore, it increases access at the risk of increasing health care cost, decreasing preference satisfaction and interfering with an individual's privacy--all of which are areas in which African-Americans will be affected in greater proportion than European-Americans. 

Ultimately, the most significant problem with expanding insurance coverage, from the African-American perspective, is that expanding insurance coverage does little more than provide individuals with a piece of paper that says, in effect, that they may obtain health care, if they can find someone to accept the coverage. Expanding coverage does nothing to ensure that a provider in the community will furnish health care nor does it address the issues of disparate medical treatment. 

 


C. Targeting Health Care Services to African-Americans
1.      Background 
Targeting health care services to African-Americans would focus resources on the specific health problems confronting them. In particular, funds could be allocated to establish community clinics in African-American communities. Such targeting services to specific population groups is not new and has been implemented in other areas: Maternal-Child health, Family Planning and Handicapped Children. Community clinics have been used to serve low income communities. 

Congress passed the Disadvantaged Minority Health Improvement Act [hereinafter DMHIA], which was passed to improve the health status of individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds, including racial and ethnic minorities, and to increase the numbers of minorities in the health professions. This was to be accomplished by establishing within the Department of Health and Human Services an Office of Minority Health and by giving the office grant authority. (258) The DMIHA also established a program of primary health care services to residents of public housing.(259) It revived and extended the program of Centers for Excellence in Health Professions Education for Minorities.(260) The Act established programs of loans, scholarships, and loan repayment for individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds who are pursuing a degree in a health profession.(261) It revised and extended the authority for the National Center for Health Statistics, and it created a new program of grants for data studies on the health of ethnic and racial minorities(262). The DMHIA established a new program of grants for assisting communities in educating minorities to serve as health professionals in those communities.(263)It revised and extended the programs of Community and Migrant Health Centers(264)and created a program of grants for improving the health status of Pacific Islanders.(265)Furthermore, the Congress appropriated funding specifically directed to issues relevant to improving African-American health. 

States could take steps to target services toward African-Americans. In 1991- 92, only nineteen states had minority health entities. Seven states established the minority health entities by statute(266)four states established the minority health entities by executive order,(267)and eight states established the entities by the appointed health officer.(268)However, the budgets for these entities indicate that they may be little more than "advisors" on minority health rather than service providers. In 1991- 1992, only three states had budgets which exceeded $500,000(269)and eleven states had less than $100,000.(270)
2.      Policy Analysis(271)
Horizontal equity. Targeting health care services to African-Americans requires treating African-Americans differently than European-Americans even when both have similar health problems. Thus, this proposal fails to promote horizontal equity. 

Vertical Equity. To the extent that African-Americans and European-Americans are affected differently by health disorders, it does provide vertical equity. For instance, more African-Americans are affected by diabetes than European- Americans. Consequently, targeting services toward African-Americans would be treating unequal groups unequally to promote equality. 

Stigma. The very act of targeting African-Americans can result in significant stigma. Singling out African-Americans would lead to labeling the beneficiaries of the programs as different. This process could increase racial polarization. Providing greater services to African-Americans could arouse opposition from other groups who perceive their needs as great as African- Americans. 

Preference Satisfaction. Whether there would be preference satisfaction depends on how the services are delivered. If the services are delivered through private providers, then certainly there would be no more problems with preference satisfaction than any of the other insurance programs. On the other hand, if the services are delivered through programs that employ a specific staff, there would be limited preference satisfaction since the choice of providers for African-Americans using the services would be limited. 

Economic Efficiency. As in expanding insurance coverage, the cost of targeting services to African-Americans is significant. The government would need to allocate additional funds for the provision of the services. However, to the extent that targeting services to specific population attacks the problem directly, targeting services could be more efficient (and less costly) than a broader approach (i.e. primary care for all). 

Privacy. To the extent that African-Americans would need to be identified as having specific health issues in order to have their health care problems addressed, issues of privacy exist. Problems also exist if programs would need information from African-Americans to monitor the community health. 

Political Feasibility. This choice has limited political feasibility. Given the current deficit, Congress may have difficulty in justifying spending limited health care resources on a narrow population group. Other groups who view themselves as having similar or significant health problems could be angered if their population was not given similar treatment. In this age of racial tension and discord, in-fighting over limited resources is undesirable. 

Summary. Targeting services to African-Americans would address some access issues and treatment disparity problems since it would require availability of services in the African-American community. The treatment disparity between African-Americans and European-Americans is more likely to be addressed in this environment. However, a major drawback to targeting service is that it does not necessarily effect change in the overall system. Assuming that such an approach would be short term, the problems of racial barriers to access and racially disparate treatment would continue. Furthermore, African-Americans not served by the special programs could continue to face those same problems. Other major drawbacks are the significant stigma that might be associated with such programs and the political unpopularity of targeting health care services for a specific ethnic population group. 

 


D. Using Title VI to Eliminate Institutional Racism 
1.      Background 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the legal force for desegregation efforts in health care. Specifically, section 601 of Title VI provides: 

No person in the United States, shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.(272) In short, Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is delegated the responsibility of enforcing Title VI and the Department of Health Education and Welfare [now Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Department of Education] issued the first interpretive regulations.(273) Those regulations provide that:  A recipient . . . may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination of their race, color or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.(274) A recipient is any public or private entity or individual that receives federal financial assistance.(275) Federal financial assistance includes federal money awarded through grant, loan, or contract.(276) In light of these two definitions, Title VI, has the potential of having a broad range effect. Once a program(277) has been determined to violate Title VI, the program "must take affirmative action to over come the effects of prior discrimination."(278)
While the statute does not specifically define discrimination, it specifically requires HEW to define discrimination.(279)In particular, Title VI regulations prohibit: 

Title VI could be used to improve access of African-Americans to health care services. Title VI regulations clearly prohibit policies and practices which result in segregation within and between institutions.(285)Hospitals and nursing homes which engage in restrictive admission practices face discontinuation of their federal funds.(286) Communities can use Title VI to resist major changes in health care delivery that disadvantage African- Americans. For example, the closing of a predominantly African-American inner- city hospital and the expansion of another hospital serving primarily European- Americans could be attacked under Title VI.(287)Similarly, Medicaid and Medicare cutbacks which primarily affect African-Americans also violate Title VI.(288) Thus, Title VI has the potential of forcing health care institutions to evaluate their policies and practices which have a disparate impact on African-Americans. 

Title VI can also be used to correct problems of racially disparate health care. Under Title VI, institutions must assure that the quality and quantity of health care services offered to African-Americans are proportionate to their need. 
2.      Policy Analysis(289)
Horizontal Equity. Title VI focuses on assuring that African-Americans who have been treated differently than European-Americans are assured the same access and health care treatment. Using Title VI as a way to eliminate institutional racism would achieve horizontal equity since it would treat equals (sick individuals) as equals.(290)  Vertical Equity. Meeting vertical equity will depend largely on the types of policies and practices an institution adopts as part of Title VI compliance. Using Title VI to eliminate institutional racism in health care merely requires that African-Americans who are sick and in need of care be given the equal access to health care and be given appropriate medical treatment. However, to the extent that African-Americans now have less access and different treatment, it would require institutions to adopt policies and practices that would assure African-Americans increased access and better treatment. Those policies and practices might treat African-Americans and European-Americans differently. If so, vertical equity would be met. 

Stigma. Using Title VI may not remove the problem of stigma. Whether stigma persists will depend on how the institutions respond to the Title VI challenges and how the community responds to health care policy changes and costs necessitated by Title VI compliance. Individuals using any targeted services would certainly risk labeling. Title VI could generally raise racial hostility among the European-Americans (and other groups) that are experiencing different types of access problems. Such hostility could result in additional stigma on African-Americans. However, to the extent that Title VI compliance assures that no group is discriminated against based on race, Title VI compliance would improve access and treatment for other ethnic groups similarly situated to African-Americans. 

Preference Satisfaction. Unlike "targeting services," Title VI could have the advantage of allowing for preference satisfaction. As institutions do away with discriminatory practices which limit access and treatment options, individuals will have increased choice. On the other hand, unless existing facilities are made sufficiently attractive to competent providers, preference satisfaction still may be lacking. To some extent, it is a program's responsibility to expend the resources necessary to assure quality of services to the African- American community. Realistically, the courts are likely to allow programs to balance this goal against other goals. 

Economic Efficiency. If the current system is the most efficient for a significant segment of the population, efficiency may be lost if health care institutions reconsider their administrative policies and their evaluations of physicians to decide the disparate impact that their institution and policies will have on African-Americans. However, evidence indicates that this system is not the most economically efficient. More than $200 billion are wasted each year in unnecessary care and inefficient administration. That $200 billion is enough to assure adequate health care and changes in the health care system to eliminate institutional racism. 

Privacy. While the other options raised issues of patient privacy, this option raises issues of provider privacy. Title VI compliance will require evaluation of physician behavior. For example, treatment decisions must be scrutinized by health care institutions and licensing boards to identify and explain any racial disparity in treatment. Provider attitudinal study may require identification of patients themselves. Even if this latter step is eliminated, individual physician treatment choices and institutional records will be scrutinized in ways not presently undertaken. Thus, privacy criteria are not met. 

Political Feasibility. Title VI can be enforced through the administrative complaint process or through a private legal action. The political feasibility of using Title VI to eliminate racism depends in part on the forum chosen. 
a.         Administrative Complaint Process.
The administrative compliance mechanism authorizes the federal agencies that award federal financial assistance to take action against programs which violate Title VI.(291)The administrative process presents several problems. First, the victim of discrimination must file a complaint with the Office of Civil Rights within 180 days of the challenged discrimination.(292)A short time period is a particular handicap among the sick and individuals who may not be aware of their rights.(293) Unawareness of rights encompasses both ignorance of the statute and ignorance of medical procedures appropriate for treatment of a disease. This leaves the individual unaware both that a treatment did not meet the standard of care and that this difference was the result of racial discrimination. Thus, it becomes difficult to use Title VI if attorneys merely wait for the patient to complain, since the patient may be completely unaware of the injury and the remedy. 

Second, the lack of formal participation of complainants in the administrative process(294)leaves the victims with little control over the remedies to be tailored. Third, the process can be unusually long. It is not unusual for the entire process to take over a year.(295) Finally, if the patient later decides to sue, there is the potential that the administrative complaint process will hold up the process of litigation.(296)Despite these problems, an administrative complaint presents several advantages. First, it can provide important leverage in negotiations with health facilities.(297) Second, the Office of Civil Rights (hereinafter OCR) can command institutions to retain racecoded statistics which will be crucial to proving discrimination.(298) Third, OCR can collect the facts saving legal services considerable time and expense.(299) Finally, under the OCR guidelines, investigated institutions have the burden of persuasion in responding to a prima facie case of discrimination.(300)This is a significant advantage since the OCR approach to discriminatory effect has been more procomplainant than the courts. 
b. Private Law Suit.
The other approach to enforcing Title VI is through a civil suit. No complaint with OCR is required before an individual files a private action under Title VI. An individual can sue to enforce both the statute and its implementing regulations.(301)One obvious drawback to litigating Title VI is that gathering and analyzing relevant statistics can be extremely time-consuming as well as expensive. However, the biggest drawback to litigating Title VI is the lack of meaningful evidentiary burdens on the defendant. 

The evidentiary burden that a defendant bears depends on the categorization of the allegations of discrimination: disparate treatment versus disproportionate adverse impact. Disparate treatment discrimination pertains to intentional discrimination. The plaintiff is charged with the burden of proving discriminatory motive. Disproportionate adverse impact involves practices which may appear racially neutral but which have a more significant negative impact on minorities. Most of the practices involved in institutional racism (admission requirements, Medicaid/Medicare cutbacks, hospital relocations, medical treatment disparity) involve disproportionate adverse impact discrimination. 

Disproportionate adverse impact analysis requires (1) the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, (2) the defendant to establish a business justification, and (3) the plaintiff rebutting the defendant's business justification by showing less discriminatory alternatives.(302)The evidentiary burden placed on the defendant's establishment of a business justification is the most significant roadblock to establishing a Title VI violation. 

The principal evidentiary problem with Title VI disproportionate adverse impact litigations is confusion with Title VII.(303)Historically, in Title VII cases, the defendant bore the burden of not only coming forth with evidence of business justification but also the burden of proof.(304) In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court eliminated the requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proof. Under Wards Cove, a defendant need only introduce some evidence of business justification. There is no longer a requirement that the defendant prove business necessity, that the policy foster safety and efficiency, or be essential to the goal of promoting safety and efficiency.(305)However, the requirement of discriminatory intent has been rejected by the Congress in its employment discrimination legislation.(306) While this is an important development in employment law, it is an open question as to whether the courts will change their focus on Title VI cases. 

In the few Title VI health cases which exist, the burden of proof on the defendant to justify a disproportionate adverse impact policy seems to have been lessened even further. Defendants have successfully justified a policy with disproportionate adverse impact by demonstrating that the policy is rationally related to a legitimate need.(307) This standard makes it difficult to challenge racist policies and practices in the health care area. Cost containment is a legitimate goal, and courts are likely to find that any relationship between the policy or practice and cost containment will suffice. 

It is through litigation that Title VI will be unhitched from Title VII.(308) The federal government has every right to impose a burden on the acceptance of taxpayer monies. Allowing defendants to overcome the burden with a mere rationally related justification nullifies the purpose of Title VI. Since defendants do not have to accept federal funds they should be held to a "precise compliance with [the] spending power" of Title VI.(309) Courts have mistakenly turned to Title VII principles as the starting point for fashioning evidentiary burdens in Title VI cases involving challenges to facially neutral policies that have the effect of excluding minority patients. Title VII regulates purely private employment decisions . . . Title VI is a spending power statute. It does not regulate but places condition on the expenditure of federal money.(310) Summary. Hospitals, nursing homes, health care institutions, and health care providers who receive federal funds should bear the burden to justify policies which have the effect of discriminating against African-Americans. If the courts (or the legislators) can be made to see that under Title VI the government has every right to demand that its money be spent in a non- discriminating way, then Title VI has the potential of being a powerful tool to end institutional racism. Unfortunately, the combination of an increased desire to control health costs and the political climate with recent Reagan and Bush appointees to the federal court may mean that getting the courts to hold health care providers to the fire may not be politically feasible now. It remains to be seen what impact the Clinton administration will have on courts. Nevertheless, the Title VI administrative process and threatened litigation could be a powerful tool in getting health care institutions to comply voluntarily. 

 


V.      CONCLUSION 

Health care institutions have a social responsibility to identify and delineate all causes of disease and disability in a population and then to mobilize the medical resources necessary to attack those causes.(311)Since it has been shown that the health of African-Americans is markedly lower than European-American, it necessarily follows that "this situation would have to be called, in part, a racist consequence of the actions and structure of those health institutions".(312)Getting rid of the effects of institutional racism is a task for which European-American institutions must accept the responsibility, along with the burden of identifying effecting solutions. Doing nothing is an unacceptable option. It would allow the continuation of economic and social apartheid based on race. Reform efforts which call for expanded insurance coverage are inadequate not only because it is possible that only a small minority of African-Americans will continue to be uncovered; more importantly, it does nothing to relieve racial barriers to access based on the availability of culturally relevant services in the community or medical treatment disparities. While special health services could be targeted to African-Americans, fiscally and politically this alternative is very unlikely. Furthermore, it still fails to deal with the inadequacy of the system in dealing with racism. Finally, litigators could use Title VI to eliminate racist practices in health care delivery and health care education. This would do little to assure economic access. But more importantly, the courts have adopted a position which makes the use of Title VI politically difficult. However, as the courts' composition changes over the next several years this option may become more viable. 

No single approach will adequately address the multi-faceted problem of improving the health care status of African-Americans. It is also clear that the health care system is undergoing enormous changes designed to make it more just. If that reform is to include better health care for African-Americans it will need to do more than assure economic access through expanding insurance. It will need increased availability of providers through Title VI and decreased treatment disparity through Title VI. Strengthening Title VI such that it becomes politically feasible to use through both the administrative and civil process should be the quid pro quo for accepting cost containment restrictions. No system can be just so long as vestiges of racism remain. Strengthening Title VI is the only mechanism available to assure that health care in America is no longer racist.  [Racism remains a] prime cause of the unequal and racially discriminatory provision of funds for health services; of the over-crowding of the ill- equipped black hospitals and the underutilization of white hospitals; of miserable housing, gross pollution, poor sanitation, and lack of health care . . . . 

[Racism] in consequence, is the underlying structure causing the dreadful burden of excess morbidity and mortality, much of it preventable, that is borne by the black population. These health-specific effects are superimposed on the more general consequences of [racism] which bars the majority of [African-american] citizens from participating in decisions on the allocation of resources for health or other needs. 

We believe that the . . . [American] health care system is, in consequence, fundamentally flawed. Fragmentation and duplication of services . . . . is costly and inefficient. . . . 

For the majority of the black population, the whole spectrum of health services (but most urgently, primary care) is inadequate. Entire generations suffer through much of their life-times. . . . 

Even if. . . [racism] ended tomorrow, their effects on health would persist for years, in part because of the health consequences of the profound poverty . . . that [racism] itself has engendered and in part because widespread attitudes that encourage racism, elitism, sexism, a colonialist mentality, and prejudice against the poor take time and commitment to change. . . 

Clearly, . . . [America] has the ability to reduce markedly, if not eliminate, the serious health problems that exist among the black population. It can, if it chooses, eliminate the institutionalized system of racism and discrimination that have made the country, for decades, a symbol of human rights violations. The task facing. . . [us] is to continue to extend the process that [civil rights reforms] have begun, until profound and lasting improvements in health care . . . are a reality.(313)

Endnotes
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton, School of Law, B.S.N. 1971 University of Texas, M.S.N. 1978 University of Washington, J.D. 1987 Lewis and Clark College Northwestern School of Law. 

Nothing is ever done in isolation. The success of this project is due in large measure to the unwavering support of many individuals. I am thankful to Maxwell J. Mehlman, Director, Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and Dean Francis Conte, University of Dayton for financial support needed to complete this project. I am grateful to my colleagues Professors Vincene Verdun, Patrica Rousseau, Sean Murray and Teri Geiger for their thoughtful comments on a draft manuscript. I especially want to acknowledge the prompt and untiring research, comments, and help of research assistants Joy Walker and Lisa Feelings. I must acknowledge my sons, Tshaka Civunje and Issa Lateef, whose support and confidence kept me going. Finally, I must recognize the editorial assistance of Elizabeth S. Gioiosa and the editorial staff of Health Matrix, Journal of Law-Medicine. ).

188. FN187. W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 703 (1962). 

189. FN188. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Secretary's Taskforce Report on Minority Health. 

190. FN189. Scott, Lawmakers Differ on Measures to Reform Health care, MEMPHIS BUS. J., June 1, 1992, 41 (stating that lawmakers agree America has the best health care service in the world); Storer H. Rowley, Prescription from Canada: Would Universal Health Care Work in the Country?, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1992 (reporting that "[m]any Americans still boast that they have the best health care money can buy and that it's there on demand, without Canada's occasionally lengthy waiting lines"); Joel Havemann, A Safety Net Snags on Its Cost; Western Europe's Prized Welfare Programs Follow Citizens From Cradle to Grave. But Tax Rates are Astronomical by U.S. Standards, and Critics Are Gingerly Making Changes, Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1992, at A1 (reporting that "[t]he U.S. medical profession insists that it delivers the best health care in the world, that most medical breakthroughs bear a Made-in-the-USA label"); John Lucadamo, Porter, Sullivan Clash at Debate Over Everything But Pensions, CHI. TRIB., March 10, 1992 (reporting that "Porter said the United States has the best health care in the world 'for those in the system'); George Will, Revision of Our Health-Care System Should be High on Nation's Agenda, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 9, 1992 (stating that "America can provide the world's best health care - if you can afford it"); President George Bush, Remarks of President Bush to the San Diego Rotary Club (Feb. 7, 1992) FED. NEWS SERV., (reporting that "[t]his country has the best health care system in the world -- the best. And the quality of health care in America is unrivaled"). 

191. FN190. Tom Wicker, Introduction to REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, at vii (1968). 

192. FN191. Dorothy Howze, Closing the Gap Between Black and White Infant Mortality Rates: An Analysis of Policy Options, in HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA: POLICIES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Woodrow Jones, Jr. & Mitchell F. Rice eds., 1987). 

193. FN192. Duncan MacRae, Jr. & Ron Haskins, Combining the Roles of Scholar and Citizen, in MODELS FOR ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICY 119-22 (Ron Haskins & James J. Gallagher eds., 1981). 

194. FN193. Id. 

195. FN194. Ron Haskins, Social Policy Analysis: A Partial Agenda, in MODELS FOR ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICY 204 (Ron Haskins & James J. Gallagher eds., 1981). 

196. FN195. Duncan MacRae, Jr. & Ron Haskins, Models for Policy Analysis, in MODELS FOR ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICY 19-20 (Ron Haskins & James J. Gallagher eds., 1981). 

197. FN196. Robert M. Moroney, Policy Analysis within a Value Theoretical Framework, in MODELS FOR ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICY 87-88 (Ron Haskins & James J. Gallagher eds., 1981). 

198. FN197. MacRae, supra note 192, at 121-23. The debate that has raged around the stigma that can attached to selective program is centered in the idea that poor are responsible for their situation. 

199. FN198. MacRae & Haskins, supra note 195, at 2. 

200. FN199. The chart below is a visual representation of how well the "Doing Nothing" meets the various criteria. A minus sign (-) means that the criteria is not met. A plus sign (+) means that the criteria is met. A question mark (?) means that it is uncertain as to how well the criteria will be met. 

[Note: The following TABLE/FORM is too wide to be displayed on one screen. 

You must print it for a meaningful review of its contents. The table has been 

divided into multiple pieces with each piece containing information to help you 

assemble a printout of the table. The information for each piece includes: (1) 

a three line message preceding the tabular data showing by line # and 

character # the position of the upper left-hand corner of the piece and the 

position of the piece within the entire table; and (2) a numeric scale 

following the tabular data displaying the character positions.] 
 

******** This is piece 1. -- It begins at character 1 of table line 1. ********
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201. FN200. Wasted Health Care Dollars, 57(7) CONSUMERS REPS 435 (1992); See generally, George Lundberg, National Health Care Reform: The Aura of Inevitability Intensifies, 267 JAMA 2521-24 (1992) (The costs of malpractice coverage and defensive medicine are unknown but very large -- perhaps in excess of $20 billion per year. Defensive medicine probably benefits no one except these with the health care jobs that are generated. . . The current system is rife with administrative waste, inefficiency, and a ubiquitous "hassle factor."); D.U. Himmelstein & S. Woolhandler, Cost Without Benefit: Administrative Waste in U.S. Health Care, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 441-45 (1986) ("With the institution of a national health plan, $30 billion in administrative costs could be saved."); Jasjit Ahluwalis, Health Care in the United States: Our Dynamic Jigsaw Puzzle, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 256, 256-258 (1990) ("Up to 20% of every dollar spent on the administrative aspects of health care is wasted. If the system were streamlined, then $15 billion of the $78 billion spent in administration could be saved."); Eli Ginzberg, Commentary: US Health Policy -- Expectations and Realities, 260 JAMA 3647, 3647-3650 (1988) ("The 'waste' in the system of medical care exemplified in physicians' doing too much and, worse still, often performing diagnostic and therapeutic procedures that are contraindicated"); cf., State of North Carolina ex rel Rufus L. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc, 740 F.2d 274 (1984) (indicating that the legislative histories of both the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974 and of the 1979 amendments and North Carolina's certificate of need legislation show that Congress and the North Carolina legislature were concerned about "the unrelenting rise in the cost of health care, and about wasteful, duplicative major acquisitions by health care providers"); Alabama Renal Stone Institute, Inc. v. State Health Planning Agency, 594 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (explaining that to allow the hospitals to use the Medstone device to perform kidney lithotripsy without first obtaining a certificate of need would be contrary to the intent of the legislature to avoid oversupply and the substantial waste that will occur); But see, Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778 (1985/611986) (stating that the high cost of health care has led to proposals to reduce wasteful medical technology under Medicare and other payment systems. Achieving this objective is problematic because of the difficulties of defining, detecting and eliminating technology waste). 

202. FN201. There is no system imaginable "that's more dysfunction[al] than the one we have now, more expensive, not doing the job with more waste." Wasted Health Care Dollars, supra note 200 (quoting Dr. Philip Caper, an internist and medical policy analyst at Dartmouth Medical School). 

203. FN202. See, supra text accompanying notes 82-86; See generally, E. Richard Brown, Health USA; A National Health Program for the United States, 267 JAMA 552, 552-58 (1992) (explaining that state programs must designate funds for a prevention account, to be used for community-based disease prevention and health promotion programs targeted to population groups with the greatest unmet needs); Harold Freeman, Race, Poverty, and Cancer, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 526, 526-27 (1991) (showing that shared elements lead to common lifestyle, attitudes, and behavior. Such cultural factors deeply influence health, and any successful intervention must necessarily take these powerful cultural realities into account.); Antonia C. Novello et al., Hispanic Health: Time for Data, Time for Action, 265 JAMA 235, 253-55 (1991) (explaining that differences in health behaviors and health exist between U.S.-born and foreign-born members of the same ancestral group; in general, recent arrivals tend to be of better health.); J. Michael McGinnis, Communication for Better Health, 105 PUB. HEALTH REP. 217-18 (1990) (stating that better control of behavioral risk factors alone could prevent between 40% and 70% of premature deaths); Council on Scientific Affairs, Education for Health; A Role for Physicians and the Efficacy of Health Education Efforts, 263 JAMA 1816, 1816-19 (1990) (suggesting that many health problems are caused or exacerbated by individuals' life-styles, and that a result has been efforts to avert health problems of all kinds leading to the development of programs designed to promote healthful behavior and improve health). 

204. FN203. In 1965, Congress responded to the medical insurance problems by creating Medicare and Medicaid. Congress established Medicare to provide medical care to the elderly. Their ability to pay was irrelevant. See generally, Social Security Amendments of 1965, PUB. L. NO. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Medicaid, a cooperative state-federal program, provides health insurance to eligible individuals and families. 42 U.S.C. s 1396 (1992). 

Since 1965, Medicare and Medicaid have grown significantly. Medicare currently accounts for approximately 35% of national health care expenditures and 40% of hospital revenues. See generally, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND COSTS OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 45-61 (1984) (hereinafter OTA MEDICARE). Medical Technology Assessment: Hearings on H.R. 5496 before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 5496] (statement of Raymond Dross, M.D., on behalf of Health Insurance Association of America). 

Yet, Medicare's impact extends well beyond the program. For example, other institutional purchasers of health care, such as private insurers, typically follow Medicare's lead with regard to medical technology and payment schedules. OTA MEDICARE, supra note 203, at 23. 

205. FN204. Pamela Short et al., Health Insurance of Minorities in the United States 1(2) J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 9-24 (1990). 

206. FN205. In 1985 only 47% of African-Americans had employment related insurance compared to 62% of non-African-Americans. Stephen Long, Public Versus Employment-related Health Insurance: Experience and Implications for Black and NonBlack Americans, in HEALTH POLICIES AND BLACK AMERICANS 200-12, at 203 (David P. Willis ed., 1989); see also, Davis, supra note 170. 

207. FN206. Only 28% of African-Americans had public insurance.; Long, supra note 205, at 203; see also Davis, supra note 63, at 1. 

208. FN207. Short et al., supra, note 204; See also, Long, supra note 205, at 203; Davis, supra note 170, at 1. 

209. FN208. Short et al., supra note 204. 

210. FN209. Id.; Davis, supra note 170, at 3-6. 

211. FN210. Davis, supra note 170, at 5. 

212. FN211. Id. (reporting that as of 1988, the mean earnings for European-American males was 36% higher than African-American males). 

213. FN212. In 1990, 61% of African-American families with children under the age of 18 were single caregivers, (i.e. single parent, single foster parent, single relative, single grandparent) compared to 23% of similar European-American families. Davis, supra note 170, at 5. 

214. FN213. Id. at 6. 

215. FN214. Davis, supra note 170, at 28; Short et al., supra note 204. 

216. FN215. Short et al., supra note 204; Davis, supra, note 170, at 28. Of poor individuals, 36% of European-Americns are uninsured compared to 35% of African- Americans. Of low-income individuals, 31% of European-Americans are uninsured compared to 30% of African-Americans. Finally, of middle/high income individuals, 9% of European-Americans are uninsured compared to 16% of African- Americans. Id. 

African-Americans are more likely to be uninsured because they are more likely to be unemployed or employed in low paying positions which do not provide health care benefits. For instance, in 1989, 30.7 percent of African- Americans were poor, compared with 12.8 percent of European-Americans. In 1990, the African-American unemployment rate (11.3 percent) was 140% more than European-Americans (4.7 percent). Finally, the mean earnings of European- American males was 36 percent higher than African-American males. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1991. Green Book, Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 7 (1991). 

217. FN216. Numerous policy responses has been suggested for increasing insurance coverage. The three main proposals are employer mandate coverage which require all employers to provide health insurance, expansion of Medicaid coverage or a combination of employer mandated and expansion of Medicaid. Long, supra note 168, at 200-12. It is estimated that even with a combined employer mandate and medicaid expansion some 2.1 million African-Americans will remain uninsured. Id. at 211. Thus, a fourth proposal, universal health insurance, has been suggested. 

218. FN217. This Week with David Brinkley, (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1992). 

219. FN218. Davis, supra note 170, at 11-12. 

220. FN219. Id. at 11. 

221. FN220. Id. at 11-13. 

222. FN221. Id. at 13. 

223. FN222. Id. 

224. FN223. Id. at 15-18. 

225. FN224. Id. Acute benefits for low income families would no longer be covered under Medicaid. Instead, states would contribute toward the new public plan coverage of acute care benefits. Id. However, Medicaid would continue to provide supplemental benefits and long-term care. Id. 

226. FN225. Id. at 18-20. 

227. FN226. Id. at 20-21. 

228. FN227. Id. 

229. FN228. Id. app. (chart 2). 

230. FN229. The chart below is a visual representation of how well "Expanding Insurance Coverage" meets the various criteria. A minus sign (-) means that the criteria is not met. A plus sign (+) means that the criteria is met. A question mark (?) means that it is uncertain as to how well the criteria will be met. 

[Note: The following TABLE/FORM is too wide to be displayed on one screen. 

You must print it for a meaningful review of its contents. The table has been 

divided into multiple pieces with each piece containing information to help you 

assemble a printout of the table. The information for each piece includes: (1) 

a three line message preceding the tabular data showing by line # and 

character # the position of the upper left-hand corner of the piece and the 

position of the piece within the entire table; and (2) a numeric scale 

following the tabular data displaying the character positions.] 

******** This is piece 1. -- It begins at character 1 of table line 1. ******** ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Horizontal Vertical Economic Preference Privacy Stigma 

Equity Equity Efficiency Satisfaction 

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? - ? - ? ? 

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1...+...10....+...20....+...30....+...40....+...50....+...60....+...70... 
******* This is piece 2. -- It begins at character 74 of table line 1. ******** 

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74...80....+. 

231. FN230. Id. at 12; See generally Paul Cotton, Insurance Loss Threatens Medical Gain, 266 JAMA 2185 (1991) (explaining that healthy people are increasingly unable to get what health care they do need due to severe medical underwriting practices by health insurance companies); Limits on Medical Coverage May Affect 1 of 3 under 65, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 19, 1991, at B3 (detailing how an underwriting guide from an insurer contained 84 conditions - from acne to varicose veins - that it permanently excluded from health insurance coverage); Private System Places Millions at Risk, Citizen Action Report Says, 18 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (June 24, 1991) (discussing how private health insurance policies have lifetime limits on coverage, routinely deny coverage for any treatment or device that they do not recognize as accepted medical practice, exclude from underwriting such conditions as allergies or mild headaches be permanently excluded and deny coverage for pregnancy and cancer). 

232. FN231. Davis, supra note 170, at 12. 

233. FN232. Id. at 13-14. 

234. FN233. See supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text. 

235. FN234. Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708 (1986). 

236. FN235. Yoder, Physicians Payment Methods: Forms and Levels of Physicians' Compensation, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REFORMING PHYSICIAN PAYMENT: REPORT OF A CONFERENCE 87, 88 (1984). 

237. FN236. Id. 

238. FN237. See supra text and notes accompanying footnote 200. 

239. FN238. Capron, supra note 234, at 708. In particular, the payors' methods of calculating fees to be paid further complicated the picture. The practice of covering "usual, customary and reasonable (UCR) cost" allowed the provider to charge whatever the market would bear -- and they usually did. 

When the maximum payments available under usual and customary became public knowledge, there was a natural tendency on the part of physicians. . . to move to the maximum available. . . . Once that was done, the whole concept of usual and customary, based on physicians' pricing as an independent entity unaffected by their peers or others in the community, was gone. The whole program changed its nature both as to Medicare and as to private, usual and customary. . . . Prices rose dramatically. . . . The doctor could find [the maximum UCR] out very readily by simply testing the system by raising his fees until he hit the upper limit, and they did. 

Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (citing Transcript at 27-98-99 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 734 (D. Mass. 1984) (testimony of John Larkin Thompson, president of Blue Shield of Massachusetts)). 

240. FN239. When insurance induces a person to use more medical care than he or she would use if paying for the services directly, then the insurance is a "moral hazard" with respect to the person's indifference to cost. MARK HALL & IRA ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 8 (1989). 

241. FN240. Capron, supra note 234, at 709. 

242. FN241. W.G. Manning et al., A Controlled Trial on the Effect of a Prepaid Group Practice on Use of Services, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1505-10 (1984). 

243. FN242. Hall & Ellman, supra note 239, at 11 (1990). 

244. FN243. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 

245. FN244. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 

246. FN245. Utilization review is the process by which an organization determines if medical services are appropriate and necessary. In the managed care product, this involves examining providers' authorization and furnishing services to detect variations from the norm that may point to unnecessary or inappropriate care. Pamela S. Bouey, Peer Review In Managed Care Setting, in COM. LAW AND PRAC. COURSE AND HANDBOOK SERIES, MANAGED CARE 1988: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL HEALTH CLASSES (1988). When the third-party payer detects variation, either it does not pay the claim [retrospective utilization management programs analyze data on hospital admissions, patterns of treatment and utilization of certain procedures or refuses to authorize the provision of the service (concurrent and prospective)]. Under a prospective review system, most non-emergency hospital admissions must receive prior approval and an initial approved length of stay is assigned. Richard Hinden & Douglas Elden, Liability Issues for Managed Care Entities, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 52 (1990). 

247. FN246. If payers did not combine utilization review with financial risk shifting, the review process alone would have limited effectiveness in controlling costs. Consequently, payers use various financial risk-shifting mechanisms. These mechanisms cause the provider (physician) to change his or her pattern of practice from over-utilization to "appropriate utilization" at best and "under-utilization" at worst. 

Financial risk shifting can arise in a variety of arrangements: ownership interest, joint-venture, or a "bonus" arrangement in which the third-party payer shares the surplus from "cost-effective" care with the physician. See generally, Paul M. Elwood, Jr., When MDs Meet DRGs, 57 HOSP., Dec. 16, 1983, at 62-63; E. Haavi Morreim, The MD and the DRG, 15 HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1985, at 30, 34-35; Capron, supra note 234, at 725-29. While the form may vary, the penalties have similar effects. For instance, payers indirectly penalize physicians by giving them less profits or directly penalize them by reducing capitation payments each time they make "inappropriate referrals." However, not all risk shifting mechanisms have the same impact. Some have a greater potential than others for causing the physician to act in a way that is not consistent with the patient's best interests. For instance, because mechanisms, like physician diagnostic-related groups and capitation, require the physicians to bear individual loss, they have the greatest risk. 

248. FN247. With the stabilization of HMOs as a cost control mechanism, payers were pushed to find more efficient cost control methods or plans. The push resulted in the proliferation of other managed care arrangements, most notably preferred provider organizations (PPOs). PPOs contract directly with an employer through its health benefits department or indirectly through an insurance carrier. Typically, while the choice of providers is limited, the overall expense to the patient is lower than with traditional insurance. Physicians contracting with PPOs agree to accept both utilization review controls and financial risk- shifting structures. Payers give consumers economic incentives to use the PPOs' physicians. National Health Lawyers Association, Introduction To Alternative Delivery Mechanisms: HMOs, PPOs & CMPs 11 (Jeanie M. Johnson ed., 1986). Greg de Lissovoy, et. al., Preferred Provider Organizations: Today's Models and Tomorrow's Prospects, 23 INQUIRY 7, 7-8 (1986). 

Monetary incentives focused on the patient effectively obviate freedom of choice. If a patient is unable to pay the difference, he or she will have no choice but to utilize the preferred provider. Approximately 20 states have attempted to resolve this issue by passing laws which limit the reimbursement differential between PPO and non-PPO utilization. It is unclear whether such limitations protect "freedom of choice" since to do so would limit the effectiveness of managed care products. Daniel Forbes, Cut Health Care Costs, Get Sued?, DUN'S BUS. MONTH, July 1986, at 39; See also, Edward J. Hopkins & Gary Davis, Restricted Choice--A Liability of Alternative Delivery Systems, 58 FLA. B. J. 145, 145-46 (1984); Dr. Norman Payson, A Physician's Viewpoint on PRO's, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 699-05 (1984). 

249. FN248. Current cost-containment efforts shift the risk of financial loss for health care in whole or in part to the providers of that care. Galen D. Powers, Allocation of Risk in Managed Care Programs, in MANAGED HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES FACING PROVIDERS, INSURERS, AND EMPLOYERS 279 (1986) [hereinafter Allocation of Risk]. Physicians are offered economic incentives to act as the third-party payer's agent-the "gatekeeper" to health care services. Carolyn M. Clancy & Bruce E. Hillner, Physicians as Gatekeepers: the Impact of Financial Incentives, 149 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 917, 917-20 (1989). This change shifts the focus of the health care system from the doctor-patient relationship to the doctor-payer relationship. Ultimately, the doctor and payer will determine the quality of care received by the patient and the patient's access to that care. The gatekeeping role is not new to physicians. They have used their position in several ways. For instance, physicians have used their authority as health care gatekeepers to resist hospitals' and insurers' efforts to influence medical treatment. Furthermore, they have generally used their role to obtain more services for the patient, not less. Now, however, they use their position to "save" money for third party payers by ordering fewer services. See, Robert Scheier, Twin City MDs Fight IPA Hospital Contracts, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 28, 1986. 

250. FN249. No matter how one looks at gatekeeping schemes they will eventually alter the perceptions and expectations of society, physicians, patients and third-party payers. How these parties will feel about what is owed to whom, what treatments are appropriate in what circumstances, and even what qualifies as a disease will be altered. Capron, supra note 234, at 730-33. These changes run the risk of injuring individuals merely because they cannot get access to the treatment that they need. When this failure to obtain appropriate medical care is due to cost containment efforts, who shall bear the cost? If cost containment is an important societal goal, then the cost of injuries should be spread throughout the society. Soon payers will routinely withhold (or decline to pay for) certain interventions that might benefit certain patients but that simply cost too much because it is the collective societal attitude not to "check on physicians' temptation to place their own interest ahead of their patient's interests. Instead society [attempts] to use physicians' selfish motivation to restrain full pursuit of patients' interest." Capron, supra note 234, at 749. "By asserting incentives that result in the physicians' having their own finances at risk, the new methods of physician reimbursement turn physicians into gatekeepers for [third-party payers]. Their decisions would no longer be based on medical criteria alone (i.e., does this medicine have something to offer this patient?) but would take into account the financial risk if they admit patients into the system whose care costs more than insurance will pay." Capron, supra note 234, at 753. 

251. FN250. Bouey, supra note 245, at 1. 

252. FN251. "Retrospective utilization management programs analyze data on hospital admissions, patterns of treatment and utilization of certain procedures." Hinden & Elden, supra note 245, at 52. 

253. FN252. "Under a prospective review system, most non-emergency hospital admissions must receive prior approval and an initial approved length of stay is assigned." Hinden & Elden, supra note 245, at 52. 

254. FN253. Utilization review may take several forms: 

Pre-admission review for scheduled hospitalization which determines the medical necessity of a scheduled inpatient admission, of expensive procedures, or of outpatient procedures. Initial determination is made by a nurse review coordinator using established criteria. Almost all managed care products use pre-admission certifications. Bouey, supra note 207, at 11. A registered nurse usually conducts off-site pre-admission certification. If there is a scheduled admission prior to hospitalization, the patient's physician completes a review form. She describes the patient's medical condition, and the treatment plan, and forwards the form to the nurse review coordinator. The nurse notifies the physician, patient and hospital of the decision regarding the appropriateness of admission and length of stay. Harold Bischoff, Utilization Review and Health Maintenance Organizations, 13-14 (1989) (fellowship thesis, American Hospital Association). There is, of course, an appeal process that is conducted by a physician. 

Admission review for unscheduled hospitalization determines the medical necessity of unscheduled in-patient admissions or other admissions not covered by pre-admission review. Most managed care products use concurrent review. The primary exception is hospitals that are paid based upon diagnostic-related groups. Bouey, supra note 245, at 10. 

Second opinions for elective surgery. Bouey, supra note 245 at 11; 

Concurrent review (or, length of stay ["LOS"] certification) determines the medical necessity of a continued hospital stay. When the LOS certificate expires either the patient or the provider may request extension. Bouey, supra note 245, at 12; Hinden & Elden, supra note 245, at 52. A concurrent review is conducted by a nurse reviewing the patient's treatment plan. The nurse conducts the review at the hospital using established medical criteria. If the nurse judges the treatment plan to be appropriate, s/he approves the stay until the next review cycle or the patient is discharged. If s/he does not approve the treatment plan, the nurse refers the case to a physician advisor who either confirms the need for continued treatment or suggests alternate treatment. Bischoff, supra note 253, at 11. 

Gate-keeping by primary physician determines, in a variety of ways, whether or not a patient should be seen. Bouey, supra note 245, at 14. 

Retrospective claims review disallows payments of claims for utilization abuses. Since it is not as effective as prospective or concurrent review, use of retrospective claims review is declining. Bouey, supra note 245, at 14. However, it is useful as a tool to research provider claims. For example, it would be useful in determining whether the objective laboratory data (biopsy) and subjective data (surgeon notes) coincide with the length of stay or the length of surgery. Bischoff, supra note 253, at 15. Consequently, retrospective review can be a very important tool in a managed care agency such as an HMO. 

255. FN254. Karen Davis & Diane Rowland, Uninsured and Undeserved: Inequalities in Health Care in the United States 61 Milbank Memorial Fund Q. 149, 155-58 (1983). 

256. FN255. Davis, supra note 170, at 9. 

257. FN256. Id. 

258. FN257. See Disadvantaged Minority Health Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-527, 104 Stat. 2311. The establishment of the Office of Minority Health within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health in the Department of Health & Human Services was codified in Title XVII of the Public Health Service Act. The Disadvantaged Minority Health Improvement Act [hereinafter DMHIA] provided for a broad range of activities relating to improving the health status of African-Americans and other minorities. For instance, the Office of Minority Health [hereinafter OMH] is required to establish objectives and to coordinate all activities within the Department of Health & Human Services related to minority health, including disease prevention, health promotion, service delivery, and research. Furthermore, OMH is required to enter into interagency agreements with public health service agencies to increase the participation of minorities in the service and its promotion programs. 

259. FN258. Id. at s 3. 

260. FN259. Id. at s 4. 

261. FN260. Id. at s 5. 

262. FN261. Id. at s 6. 

263. FN262. Id. at s 8. 

264. FN263. Id. at s 9. 

265. FN264. Id. at s 10. 

266. FN265. Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Texas. Ohio Office of Minority Health, Characteristics of Minority Health Entities by State (Table 1) (Unpublished information on file at Case Western Reserve Health Matrix Journal of Law-Medicine office). 

267. FN266. Delaware, Michigan, Mississippi and New Jersey. Id. 

268. FN267. Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, South Carolina and Virginia. Id. 

269. FN268. Michigan ($900,000), New Jersey ($500,000), Ohio ($1,600,000) and Oregon ($1,838,241). 

270. FN269. Id. 

271. FN270. The chart below is a visual representation of how well "Targeting Services" meets the various criteria. A minus sign (-) means that the criteria is not met. A plus sign (+) means that the criteria is met. A question mark (?) means that it is uncertain as to how well the criteria will be met. 

[Note: The following TABLE/FORM is too wide to be displayed on one screen. 

You must print it for a meaningful review of its contents. The table has been 

divided into multiple pieces with each piece containing information to help you 

assemble a printout of the table. The information for each piece includes: (1) 

a three line message preceding the tabular data showing by line # and 

character # the position of the upper left-hand corner of the piece and the 

position of the piece within the entire table; and (2) a numeric scale 

following the tabular data displaying the character positions.] 
 

******** This is piece 1. -- It begins at character 1 of table line 1. ******** 
 

------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Horizontal Vertical Economic Preference Privacy Stigma 

Equity Equity Efficiency Satisfaction 

------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

- + ? ? - - 

------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

1...+...10....+...20....+...30....+...40....+...50....+...60....+...70... 

******* This is piece 2. -- It begins at character 74 of table line 1. ******** 

------------- 

Political 

Feasibility 

------------- 

------------- 

74...80....+. 

272. FN271. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 99-352, 378 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. ss 2000d-200d-4 (1982). 

273. FN272. See, H.R. DOC. NO. 318, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See generally, Mitchell Rice & Woodrow Jones, Jr., Public Policy Compliance/Enforcement and Black American Health: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA: POLICIES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 100-17 (Woodrow Jones, Jr. & Mitchell F. Rice eds., 1987); Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 439- 40 (interperpreting the Title VI regulations); Sidney Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn't Be So Easy?, 58 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 939, 943-48 (1990). 

274. FN273. 45 C.F.R. s 80.3(b)(2) (1991) (emphasis added). 

275. FN274. 45 C.F.R. s 80.13(i) (1991). DHHS provides federal assistance "to more than 6,800 hospitals, 13,700 out-patient and primary care facilities, various state and local public health agencies, 8,000 day care centers and 37,000 local services agencies. . . . [T]here are more than 43,000 DHHS recipients serving more than 93 million beneficiaries." Rice and Jones, supra note 236, at 100. 

276. FN275. Although it does not include federal contracts of insurance or guaranty 42 U.S.C.A. s 2000d-1 (1981); 42 U.S.C.A. s 2000d-4 (1981), it does include: Medicare and Medicaid constitute federal financial assistance. See United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1984) cert. denied 469 U.S. 1189 (1985) (Comprehensive Citations); Supplemental Security Income Payments are not federal financial assistance. See Sobral-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38-41 (2d Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984); Health planning grants 45 C.F.R. s 80 app. A, pt. 1, at 92; Loans and loan guarantees for hospitals and other medical facilities, 45 C.F.R. s 80 app. A., pt. 1, at 109 (1991) and Maternal and Child Health Grants and Crippled Children Services grants 45 C.F.R. s 80 app A., pt 1 (1991). 

277. FN276. The program includes an entire agency or institution if any part receives federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. ss 2000d, 2000d-4a (1982); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, 28-29. See O'Conner v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 639-42 (8th Cir. 1986). 

278. FN277. 45 C.F.R. s 80.3(b) (6) (i) (1991). 

279. FN278. 42 U.S.C. s 2000d-1 (1982). 

280. FN279. Cf., 45 C.F.R. s 80.3(B)(1)(vii)(2) (1991) (Health Education and Welfare); 15 C.F.R. s 8.4(b)(2) (1991) (Commerce). 

281. FN280. Cf, 45 C.F.R. s 80.3(B)(1)(vii)(2) (1991) (Health Education and Welfare) 15 C.F.R. s 8.4(b)(2) (1991) (Commerce). 

282. FN281. 45 C.F.R. s 80.3(b)(1)(i) (1991). 

283. FN282. 45 C.F.R. s 80.3(b)(1)-(3) (1991). 

284. FN283. Id. 

285. FN284. For example, referral of white mental patients to individual counseling and blacks to group counseling; or the dumping of indigent emergency room patients from private, largely "white" hospitals to public hospitals would be prohibited under Title VI. Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 440-41. 

286. FN285. Restricted admission practices which have a discriminatory effect include: not having physicians on staff or otherwise available who accept Medicaid patients; or requiring preadmission deposits as a condition of obtaining care. Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 441. 

287. FN286. Id. 

288. FN287. Id. 

289. FN288. The chart below is a visual representation of how well the "Eliminating Discrimination" meets the various criteria. A minus sign (-) means that the criteria is not met. A plus sign (+) means that the criteria is met. A question mark (?) means that it is uncertain as to how well the criteria will be met. 

[Note: The following TABLE/FORM is too wide to be displayed on one screen. 

You must print it for a meaningful review of its contents. The table has been 

divided into multiple pieces with each piece containing information to help you 

assemble a printout of the table. The information for each piece includes: (1) 

a three line message preceding the tabular data showing by line # and 

character # the position of the upper left-hand corner of the piece and the 

position of the piece within the entire table; and (2) a numeric scale 

following the tabular data displaying the character positions.] 
 

******** This is piece 1. -- It begins at character 1 of table line 1. ******** 

------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Horizontal Vertical Economic Preference Privacy Stigma 

Equity Equity Efficiency Satisfaction 

------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

+ + ? + - ? 

------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

1...+...10....+...20....+...30....+...40....+...50....+...60....+...70... 

******* This is piece 2. -- It begins at character 74 of table line 1. ******** 

------------- 

Political 

Feasibility 

------------- 

------------- 

74...80....+. 

290. FN289. Although, Title VI does have affirmative action provisions and rules. 

291. FN290. Agencies may refuse to grant funds or terminate funding to any recipient found in violation of the Title VI regulations. The termination is limited to the particular program or part of program. While no court order is necessary, judicial review is available at the request of the fund recipient. See 45 C.F.R. s 80.8 (1991); See generally Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 442-44. 

292. FN291. 45 C.F.R. s 80.7(b) (1991). 

293. FN292. One solution to the issue of ignorance of rights may be to require hospitals to give notice to patients that they have the right to file a complaint with Office of Civil Rights if they feel that they have been denied services or that the quality of services has been affected because of race. 

294. FN293. 45 C.F.R. s 81.23 (1991). 

295. FN294. Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 444. 

296. FN295. See Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 738 (1983) (holding that a study of action was appropriate as some of the problems could be more readily obtained through flexibility of the ongoing administrative process); see generally Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 444. 

297. FN296. Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 444. 

298. FN297. Id. 

299. FN298. Id. 

300. FN299. Dorn et al., supra note 100, at 444-46. 

301. FN300. See, Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1983); Consolidated Rail Corp v. Darrone, 104 S.Ct. 1248, 1252-53 & n.9 (1984). Plaintiff may recover equitable retrospective and prospective relief. 463 U.S. at 602-03. Court not yet addressing whether plaintiff may recover damages. 463 U.S. at 630. 

302. FN301. See e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2124-27 (1989) (providing general reference to burdens of proof; International Bd. of Teamster v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); See also, Watson, supra note 272, at 958-59. 

303. FN302. Watson, supra note 237 at, 971-75. 

304. FN303. Id. at 959-60. 

305. FN304. Id. at 960 (quoting United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418,451 (5th Cir. 1971) quoted in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). 

306. FN305. See, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (Nov. 21, 1991), 105 Stat. 1071, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (codifying interpretation of Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, which had been enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and repudiated in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 

307. FN306. Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 619-20 (1980) (holding that Title VI does not implicitly require a recipient to consider alternatives to proposed placement of closing of a public facility); NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334-37 (3rd Cir. 1981). 

308. FN307. Watson, supra note 272, at 971-75 

309. FN308. Id. at 973.

310. FN309. Id. at 978. 

311. FN310. See, KNOWLES & PREWITT, supra note 15, at 96 (placing burden of mobilizing medical resources on health institutions due to their relationship with medical community and patients). 

312. FN311. Id. 

313. FN312. This quote is taken from an article about South Africa with merely name changes from South Africa to the U.S. and Apartheid to Racism, it is equally true about the United States of America. Elena Nightingale, et al., Apartheid Medicine: Health and Human Rights in South Africa, 264 JAMA 2097, 2102 (1990

   
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Professor Vernellia R. Randall
Institute on Race, Health Care and the Law
The University of Dayton School of Law
300 College Park 
Dayton, OH 45469-2772
Email: randall@udayton.edu

 

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