Application of Halko, 246 Cal.App.2d 553, 54 Cal.Rptr.
661 (Nov. 18, 1966)
**662 This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus by
which petitioner, Eric Halko, seeks release from the Mira Loma Hospital,
security side.
Petitioner has a diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis, minimal active.
On July 1, 1964, he was served with a quarantine order of isolation
confining him to Mira Loma Hospital. He deserted that institution on
August 1, 1964, and was subsequently arrested, tried and convicted of
violating section 3351of the Health and Safety Code of California.
On August 20, 1964, he was sentenced to 180 days in jail by the judge of
the municipal court, Antelope Judicial District. The sentence was
suspended, and the petitioner was placed on probation for 3 years on
condition he serve the first 179 days in jail. Prior
to serving the jail sentence the petitioner was served with an order of
isolation because of his tubercular condition and returned to the Mira
Loma Hospital, security side. Thereafter, except for one interlude not
pertinent to a determination of this case, a public health officer of
this county served Halko with successive orders of isolation at Mira
Loma Hospital for periods of approximately 6 months each. These orders
are dated January, June, and December of 1965 and March 1966. The
petitioner on May 5, 1966, sought a writ of habeas corpus from
Department 70 of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. At the
conclusion of the hearing in that court the application for writ of
habeas corpus was denied.
Petitioner contends the right of the health officer to issue
consecutive certificates of
quarantine and isolation for periods of six months each, 'without means
of questioning and judicially determining' the conclusion of the health
officer, results in 'continually depriving one of his liberty.'
Therefore, section 3285 'is unconstitutional in that it deprives this
petitioner of his liberty without due process of law.'
*555 We disagree with the petitioner's interpretation of the
law and his assertion that section 3285 is unconstitutional.
Chapter 5 of the Health and Safety Code (sections 3279--3310) deals
extensively with tuberculosis. Pulmonary tuberculosis is declared to be
an infectious and communicable disease, dangerous to public health. Each
city, county, or group of counties may establish and maintain
tuberculosis wards, hospitals and sanitariums for the treatment of
persons suffering from the tuberculosis. Each person being cared for at
public expense in a public or private hospital or sanitarium is
subsidized by an allocation from state funds to the city, county or
group of counties affected.
Section 3285 of the Health and Safety Code sets forth with some
particularity the duties and powers of the public health officer in
treating with the control of tuberculosis by inspection, examination,
quarantine, or isolation. Each health officer is directed to use every
available means to ascertain the existence of, and immediately to
investigate, all reported or suspected cases of tuberculosis in the
infectious stage within his jurisdiction and
to ascertain the sources of such infection. In carrying out such
investigations each health officer is invested with full powers of
inspection, examination, and quarantine or isolation of all persons
known to be infected with tuberculosis in an infectious stage.
The section also contains the following provisions:
(1) Whenever the health officer shall determine on reasonable grounds
that an examination of any person is necessary for the preservation and
protection of the public health, he shall make an examination order in
writing, setting forth the name of **663 the person to be
examined, the time and place of the examination, and such other terms
and conditions as may be necessary to protect the public health. Any
person served with an examination order may have such examination made
by a physician of his own choice under such terms and conditions as the
health officer shall determine on reasonable grounds to be necessary to
protect the public health. (3285(c).)
(2) The health officer may make an isolation or quarantine order
whenever he shall determine in a particular case thatquarantine or
isolation is necessary for the protection of the public health. The
isolation or quarantine order shall be in writing, setting forth the
name of the person to be isolated, The period of time during which the
order shall remain effective, the place of isolation or quarantine, and
such other terms and *556 conditions as may be necessary to
protect the public health. (3285(d).)
Any person who, after service
upon him of an order of a health officer directing his isolation or
examination as provided in 3285, violates or fails to comply with said
order is guilty of a misdemeanor. (3351) The violator shall be
prosecuted by the district attorney of the county in which the violation
was committed upon the request of a health officer as provided in
section 3355.
The duty of the state to protect the public from the danger of
tuberculosis is prescribed by the Supreme Court of this state in the
following statement: 'It is a well-recognized principle that it is one
of the first duties of a state to take all necessary steps for the
promotion and protection of the health and comfort of its inhabitants.
The preservation of the public health is universally conceded to be one
of the duties devolving upon the state as a sovereignty, and whatever
reasonably tends to preserve the public health is a subject upon which
the Legislature, within its police power, may take action. That
tuberculosis is a dangerous and infectious disease which attacks both
human beings and domestic animals, that it is prevalent throughout the
state among both human beings and domestic animals, and that it is
communicated to human beings, especially to children, by milk and other
food products from infected animals, stand undisputed. * * * In other
words, health regulations enacted by the state under its police power
and providing even drastic measures for the elimination of disease,
whether in human beings, crops or cattle, in a general
way are not affected by constitutional provisions, either of the state
or national government. Lausen v. Board of Supervisors, 204 Iowa, 30,
33, 214 N.W. 682, 684.
'* * * In construing such an act, the courts must presume that the
Legislature has carefully investigated and has properly determined that
the interests of the public require legislation that will insure the
public safety and the public health against threatened danger from
diseased animals * * *' and human beings. 'The determination of that
fact is the province of the Legislature, and not of the courts. It is
also the province of the Legislature, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, to determine what measures are necessary for the protection
of such interests. (Citations.)' (Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal. 350, 354,
356, 287 P. 455, 456--457.)
'The determination by the legislative body that a particular
regulation is necessary for the protection or preservation of *557
health is conclusive on the courts except only to the limitation that it
must be a reasonable determination, not an abuse of discretion, and must
not infringe rights secured by the Constitution. (Citations.)' (De Aryan
v. Butler, 119 Cal.App.2d 674, 682, 260 P.2d 98, 102.)
[1][2]
The legislature is vested with broad discretion in determining what are
contagious and infectious diseases and in adopting means for preventing
the spread thereof. (In re Johnson, 40 Cal.App. 242, 180 P. 644;
Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 24 P. 383.) In order to accomplish the
purpose for which this law was enacted, the court should give it a broad
and liberal **664 construction. (39 C.J.S. Health s 2, p. 811.)
[3] The act here in question was
obviously passed by the legislature for a public purpose. It is a law
for the suppression of a contagious disease and the promotion of the
public health. The provisions of section 3285 of the Health and Safety
Code seem reasonable and necessary for the protection and preservation
of the public health. It does not appear to us that the legislature has
abused its discretion or violated the terms of the federal or state
constitution by enactment of section 3285.
We now turn to the question of the public health officer's right to
restrict the liberty of petitioner to the Mira Loma Hospital by
successive isolation or quarantine orders. Petitioner does not dispute
the finding of the health officer that he was, when subjected to
quarantine regulations, and is now afflicted and suffering from
pulmonary tuberculosis which is declared by section 3285 to be an
infectious and communicable disease and dangerous to the public health.
The petition filed here does not allege that he is free of the disease.
Subdivision (d) of section 3285 directs the health officer to make an
isolation or quarantine order in writing, specifying the place of
quarantine and other appropriate terms. In re Culver, 187 Cal. 437, 442,
202 P. 661, 664, states that the
verb 'quarantine' means 'to keep persons, when suspected of having
contracted or been exposed to an infectious disease, out of a community,
or to confine them to a given place therein, and to prevent intercourse
between them and the people generally of such community.'
Under former Political Code section 2979a and former Health &
Safety Code section 2554 health
officers were given the power to quarantine persons found to have a
veneral disease.
*558 [4] Persons who were
confined in county hospitals or jails pursuant to quarantine orders
issued by health officers under those statutes have been denied release
on habeas corpus, where the evidence showed reasonable cause to believe
that the person was infected. (In re Martin, 83 Cal.App.2d 164, 188 P.2d
287; In re King, 128 Cal.App. 27, 16 P.2d 694; In re Fisher, 74 Cal.App.
225, 239 P. 1100; In re Travers, 48 Cal.App. 764, 192 P. 454.)
On the other hand, a person quarantined without reasonable grounds is
entitled to relief by habeas corpus. (In re Arata, 52 Cal.App. 380, 198
P. 814.) But in the case the court was careful to point out that the
issue is a factual one. The opinion states at page 383, 198 P. at page
816:
'That the health authorities possess the power to place under
quarantine restrictions persons
whom they have reasonable cause to believe are afflicted with
infectious or contagious diseases coming within the definition set
forth in Political Code, s 2979a, as a general right, may not be
questioned. It is equally true that in the exercise of this unusual
power, which infringes upon the right of liberty of the individual,
personal restraint can only be imposed where, under the facts as
brought within the knowledge of the health authorities, Reasonable
ground exists to support the belief that the person is afflicted as
claimed; and as to whether such order is justified will depend upon
the facts of each individual case.'
[5] Section 3285 does not contain any
limitation or prohibition respecting the period of quarantine or the
power of the health officer to issue consecutive certificates of
isolation. The law reasonably assumes that consecutive orders for
quarantine may issue so long as any person continues to be infected with
tuberculosis and on reasonable grounds is believed by the health officer
to be dangerous to the public health. (In re King, 128 Cal.App. 27, 16
P.2d 694.)
There is nothing in this record to indicate the health officer issued
any of the **665 respective quarantine orders without probable
cause or that petitioner does not at this time have an infectious and
communicable disease which is dangerous to the public health.
The writ is denied. FILES, P.J., and JEFFERSON, J., concur
