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Nicomachean Ethics

Book 1, Chapter 1

EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly = every action=20 and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the = good has=20 rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain=20 difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products = apart=20 from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from = the=20 actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the = activities. Now,=20 as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; = the end=20 of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of = strategy=20 victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a = single=20 capacity -- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the = equipment of=20 horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action = under=20 strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others -- in all of = these=20 the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate = ends; for=20 it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes = no=20 difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the = actions, or=20 something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences = just=20 mentioned.

Book 1, Chapter 2

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for = its own=20 sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do = not=20 choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the = process=20 would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), = clearly=20 this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, = then,=20 have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a = mark to=20 aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in = outline=20 at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or = capacities it=20 is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and = that=20 which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this = nature;=20 for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a = state,=20 and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they = should=20 learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to = fall under=20 this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the = rest of=20 the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do = and what=20 we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of = the=20 others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end = is the=20 same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all = events=20 something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; = though it=20 is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and = more=20 godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are = the ends=20 at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense = of that=20 term.

Book 1, Chapter 3

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the=20 subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in = all=20 discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine = and just=20 actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and = fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by = convention,=20 and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation = because=20 they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by = reason of=20 their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, = then,=20 in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the = truth=20 roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for = the most=20 part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that = are no=20 better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be=20 received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in = each=20 class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is = evidently=20 equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to = demand=20 from a rhetorician scientific proofs.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a = good=20 judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge = of that=20 subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good = judge in=20 general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on = political=20 science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but = its=20 discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he = tends=20 to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because = the end=20 aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether = he is=20 young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on = time, but=20 on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. = For to=20 such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to = those=20 who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge = about such=20 matters will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be = expected, and=20 the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

Book 1, Chapter 4

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all = knowledge=20 and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political = science=20 aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. = Verbally=20 there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and = people of=20 superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well = and doing=20 well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, = and the=20 many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it = is some=20 plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour; they differ, = however,=20 from one another -- and often even the same man identifies it with = different=20 things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, = conscious=20 of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that = is=20 above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many = goods=20 there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all = these=20 as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps = somewhat=20 fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem = to be=20 arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference = between=20 arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was = right in=20 raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are we on the way = from or=20 to the first principles?' There is a difference, as there is in a = race-course=20 between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way = back. For,=20 while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge = in two=20 senses -- some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we = must=20 begin with things known to us. Hence any one who is to listen = intelligently to=20 lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects = of=20 political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact = is the=20 starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at = the=20 start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up = has or=20 can easily get starting points. And as for him who neither has nor can = get them,=20 let him hear the words of Hesiod:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that = hearkens when=20 men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to = heart
Another's=20 wisdom, is a useless wight.

Book 1, Chapter 5

Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we = digressed.=20 To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most = vulgar=20 type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, = with=20 pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For = there=20 are, we may say, three prominent types of life -- that just mentioned, = the=20 political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind = are=20 evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to = beasts,=20 but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those = in high=20 places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the = prominent types=20 of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active = disposition=20 identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end = of the=20 political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking = for,=20 since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on = him who=20 receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and = not=20 easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that = they may=20 be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom = that=20 they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the = ground of=20 their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is = better.=20 And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honour, the = end of=20 the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for = possession of=20 virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong = inactivity,=20 and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man = who was=20 living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis = at all=20 costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated = even in=20 the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we = shall=20 consider later.

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and = wealth is=20 evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for = the sake=20 of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects = to be=20 ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even = these=20 are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. = Let us=20 leave this subject, then.

Book 1, Chapter 6

We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss = thoroughly what=20 is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the = fact that=20 the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would = perhaps be=20 thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining = the=20 truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are = philosophers=20 or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to = honour truth=20 above our friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes = within=20 which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why = they=20 did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers); but = the term=20 'good' is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality = and in=20 that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in = nature=20 to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of = being); so=20 that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods. Further, = since=20 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both in the = category=20 of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the = virtues, and=20 in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of = the=20 useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. = of the=20 right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally = present=20 in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in = all the=20 categories but in one only. Further, since of the things answering to = one Idea=20 there is one science, there would have been one science of all the = goods; but as=20 it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one = category,=20 e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and = in=20 disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and = in=20 exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, = what in=20 the world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is the case) in 'man = himself'=20 and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in = so far as=20 they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither = will=20 'good itself' and particular goods, in so far as they are good. But = again it=20 will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts = long is=20 no whiter than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to = give a=20 more plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the = column of=20 goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.

But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we = have=20 said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not = been=20 speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and loved = for=20 themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while those = which tend=20 to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries = are=20 called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, = then, goods=20 must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the = others=20 by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves = from things=20 useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to = a single=20 Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those = that are=20 pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and = certain=20 pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake = of=20 something else, yet one would place them among things good in = themselves. Or is=20 nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the = Form will=20 be empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in = themselves,=20 the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in = them all,=20 as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of = honour,=20 wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts = are=20 distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element = answering=20 to one Idea.

But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the = things that=20 only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived = from=20 one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by = analogy?=20 Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on = in other=20 cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the = present; for=20 perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch = of=20 philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some = one=20 good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate = and=20 independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by = man; but=20 we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one = might think=20 it worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that are = attainable=20 and achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know = better the=20 goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them. This = argument=20 has some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the = sciences;=20 for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the = deficiency=20 of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the = exponents=20 of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an = aid is=20 not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will = be=20 benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good itself', or = how the=20 man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general = thereby.=20 For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the health = of man,=20 or perhaps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals that = he is=20 healing. But enough of these topics.

Book 1, Chapter 7

Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can = be. It=20 seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in = medicine, in=20 strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? = Surely=20 that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, = in=20 strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something = else,=20 and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this = that all=20 men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that = we do,=20 this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than = one,=20 these will be the goods achievable by action.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but = we must=20 try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than = one=20 end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general=20 instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are = final=20 ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if = there is=20 only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are = more than=20 one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call = that which=20 is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of = pursuit=20 for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for = the sake=20 of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in=20 themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call = final=20 without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never = for the=20 sake of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this = we choose=20 always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, = pleasure,=20 reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing = resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose = them also=20 for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be = happy.=20 Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, = in=20 general, for anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to = follow;=20 for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by = self-sufficient we=20 do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who = lives a=20 solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for = his=20 friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some = limit=20 must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and=20 descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let = us=20 examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient = we now=20 define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in = nothing;=20 and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most = desirable of all=20 things, without being counted as one good thing among others -- if it = were so=20 counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even = the=20 least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and = of goods=20 the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something = final and=20 self-sufficient, and is the end of action.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a=20 platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might = perhaps=20 be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as = for a=20 flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things = that=20 have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to = reside in the=20 function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the = carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has = man=20 none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in = general each=20 of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man = similarly=20 has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems = to be=20 common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let = us=20 exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would = be a life=20 of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, = and=20 every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that = has a=20 rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense = of being=20 obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising = thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, = we must=20 state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems = to be=20 the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an = activity of=20 soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say = 'so-and-so-and=20 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a = lyre, and a=20 good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in = respect=20 of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of = a=20 lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do = so=20 well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a = certain=20 kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying = a=20 rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and = noble=20 performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is = performed=20 in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, = human good=20 turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there = are=20 more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a = summer,=20 nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a = man=20 blessed and happy.

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably = first sketch=20 it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that = any one=20 is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well = outlined, and=20 that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts = the=20 advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And = we must=20 also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in = all=20 things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with = the=20 subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a = carpenter=20 and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former = does so=20 in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter = inquires=20 what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the = truth. We=20 must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our = main task=20 may not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause = in all=20 matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well = established, as=20 in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or = first=20 principle. Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by = perception,=20 some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each = set of=20 principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must = take pains=20 to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what = follows. For=20 the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of = the=20 questions we ask are cleared up by it.

Book 1, Chapter 8

We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion = and our=20 premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true = view all=20 the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goods = have=20 been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, = others as=20 relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most = properly and=20 truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating = to soul.=20 Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, = which is=20 an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we = identify=20 the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among = goods of=20 the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes = with our=20 account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have = practically=20 defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The = characteristics=20 that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to = what we=20 have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with = virtue, some=20 with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others = with=20 these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; = while=20 others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have = been held=20 by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is = not=20 probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather = that they=20 should be right in at least some one respect or even in most = respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our = account=20 is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, = perhaps,=20 no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in = use, in=20 state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without = producing=20 any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite = inactive,=20 but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity = be=20 acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most=20 beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for = it is=20 some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly = win, the=20 noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of = soul, and=20 to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not = only is=20 a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of = sights,=20 but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice = and in=20 general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their = pleasures=20 are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature = pleasant, but=20 the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature=20 pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for = such men=20 as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further = need of=20 pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in = itself. For,=20 besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions = is not=20 even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting = justly,=20 nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in = all=20 other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves = pleasant. But=20 they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the = highest=20 degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his = judgement is=20 such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most = pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in = the=20 inscription at Delos --

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;
But = pleasantest=20 is it to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or = one --=20 the best -- of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for = it is=20 impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. = In many=20 actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; = and there=20 are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as = good=20 birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in = appearance or=20 ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and = perhaps a=20 man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or = friends or=20 had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness = seems to=20 need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify = happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.

Book 1, Chapter 9

For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to = be=20 acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, = or comes=20 in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is = any gift=20 of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, = and=20 most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. = But this=20 question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness = seems,=20 however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and = some=20 process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; = for that=20 which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the = world,=20 and something godlike and blessed.

It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are = not=20 maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain = kind of=20 study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, it = is=20 reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that depends on = the=20 action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly = everything=20 that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it depends = on the=20 best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble = would=20 be a very defective arrangement.

The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the = definition of=20 happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a = certain=20 kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as = conditions of=20 happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as = instruments. And=20 this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we = stated the=20 end of political science to be the best end, and political science = spends most=20 of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character, viz. = good and=20 capable of noble acts.

It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other = of the=20 animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity. = For this=20 reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, = owing to=20 his age; and boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason = of the=20 hopes we have for them. For there is required, as we said, not only = complete=20 virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and = all=20 manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great = misfortunes in=20 old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has = experienced=20 such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.

Book 1, Chapter 10

Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as = Solon=20 says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it also = the case=20 that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, = especially for=20 us who say that happiness is an activity? But if we do not call the dead = man=20 happy, and if Solon does not mean this, but that one can then safely = call a man=20 blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords = matter=20 for discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead = man, as=20 much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honours and = dishonours=20 and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. = And this=20 also presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old = age and=20 has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his = descendants --=20 some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with = others the=20 opposite may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of relationship = between=20 them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd, then, = if the=20 dead man were to share in these changes and become at one time happy, at = another=20 wretched; while it would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants = did not=20 for some time have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.

But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a = consideration of=20 it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and = only then=20 call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so before, = surely this=20 is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is = not to=20 be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men = happy, on=20 account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have assumed = happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changed, = while a=20 single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For clearly if we = were to=20 keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and = again=20 wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon and insecurely based. = Or is=20 this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in = life does=20 not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere = additions,=20 while virtuous activities or their opposites are what constitute = happiness or=20 the reverse.

The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no = function=20 of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought = to be=20 more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these = themselves the=20 most valuable are more durable because those who are happy spend their = life most=20 readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason = why we=20 do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the = happy=20 man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by = preference to=20 everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and = contemplation, and he=20 will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if = he is=20 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.

Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; = small=20 pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the = scales=20 of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they = turn out=20 well will make life happier (for not only are they themselves such as to = add=20 beauty to life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and = good), while=20 if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for they both bring = pain=20 with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines = through,=20 when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not through=20 insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.

If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no = happy man=20 can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and = mean.=20 For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances = life=20 becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general = makes=20 the best military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker = makes the=20 best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other = craftsmen.=20 And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable; = though he=20 will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of = Priam.

Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will he = be moved=20 from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures, but only = by many=20 great ones, nor, if he has had many great misadventures, will he recover = his=20 happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in a long and complete = one in=20 which he has attained many splendid successes.

When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in = accordance with=20 complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not = for some=20 chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add 'and who is = destined to live thus and die as befits his life'? Certainly the future = is=20 obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in = every way=20 final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these=20 conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled -- but happy men. So much for = these=20 questions.

Book 1, Chapter 11

That the fortunes of descendants and of all a man's friends should = not affect=20 his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doctrine, and one opposed = to the=20 opinions men hold; but since the events that happen are numerous and = admit of=20 all sorts of difference, and some come more near to us and others less = so, it=20 seems a long -- nay, an infinite -- task to discuss each in detail; a = general=20 outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as some of a man's own = misadventures=20 have a certain weight and influence on life while others are, as it = were,=20 lighter, so too there are differences among the misadventures of our = friends=20 taken as a whole, and it makes a difference whether the various = suffering befall=20 the living or the dead (much more even than whether lawless and terrible = deeds=20 are presupposed in a tragedy or done on the stage), this difference also = must be=20 taken into account; or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt = whether the=20 dead share in any good or evil. For it seems, from these considerations, = that=20 even if anything whether good or evil penetrates to them, it must be = something=20 weak and negligible, either in itself or for them, or if not, at least = it must=20 be such in degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy = nor to=20 take away their blessedness from those who are. The good or bad fortunes = of=20 friends, then, seem to have some effects on the dead, but effects of = such a kind=20 and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy nor to produce any other = change=20 of the kind.

Book 1, Chapter 12

These questions having been definitely answered, let us consider = whether=20 happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among the = things that=20 are prized; for clearly it is not to be placed among potentialities. = Everything=20 that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain kind and = is=20 related somehow to something else; for we praise the just or brave man = and in=20 general both the good man and virtue itself because of the actions and = functions=20 involved, and we praise the strong man, the good runner, and so on, = because he=20 is of a certain kind and is related in a certain way to something good = and=20 important. This is clear also from the praises of the gods; for it seems = absurd=20 that the gods should be referred to our standard, but this is done = because=20 praise involves a reference, to something else. But if if praise is for = things=20 such as we have described, clearly what applies to the best things is = not=20 praise, but something greater and better, as is indeed obvious; for what = we do=20 to the gods and the most godlike of men is to call them blessed and = happy. And=20 so too with good things; no one praises happiness as he does justice, = but rather=20 calls it blessed, as being something more divine and better.

Eudoxus also seems to have been right in his method of advocating the = supremacy of pleasure; he thought that the fact that, though a good, it = is not=20 praised indicated it to be better than the things that are praised, and = that=20 this is what God and the good are; for by reference to these all other = things=20 are judged. Praise is appropriate to virtue, for as a result of virtue = men tend=20 to do noble deeds, but encomia are bestowed on acts, whether of the body = or of=20 the soul. But perhaps nicety in these matters is more proper to those = who have=20 made a study of encomia; to us it is clear from what has been said that=20 happiness is among the things that are prized and perfect. It seems to = be so=20 also from the fact that it is a first principle; for it is for the sake = of this=20 that we all do all that we do, and the first principle and cause of = goods is, we=20 claim, something prized and divine.

Book 1, Chapter 13

Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect = virtue, we=20 must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better = the=20 nature of happiness. The true student of politics, too, is thought to = have=20 studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow = citizens good=20 and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have the lawgivers of = the=20 Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of the kind that there may have = been.=20 And if this inquiry belongs to political science, clearly the pursuit of = it will=20 be in accordance with our original plan. But clearly the virtue we must = study is=20 human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the = happiness=20 human happiness. By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that = of the=20 soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, = clearly=20 the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the = man who=20 is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or = the body;=20 and all the more since politics is more prized and better than medicine; = but=20 even among doctors the best educated spend much labour on acquiring = knowledge of=20 the body. The student of politics, then, must study the soul, and must = study it=20 with these objects in view, and do so just to the extent which is = sufficient for=20 the questions we are discussing; for further precision is perhaps = something more=20 laborious than our purposes require.

Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the = discussions=20 outside our school, and we must use these; e.g. that one element in the = soul is=20 irrational and one has a rational principle. Whether these are separated = as the=20 parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are distinct by = definition=20 but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference = of a=20 circle, does not affect the present question.

Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely = distributed, and=20 vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and growth; = for it=20 is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings = and to=20 embryos, and this same power to fullgrown creatures; this is more = reasonable=20 than to assign some different power to them. Now the excellence of this = seems to=20 be common to all species and not specifically human; for this part or = faculty=20 seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and badness are least = manifest=20 in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than = the=20 wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since = sleep is=20 an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or = bad),=20 unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually = penetrate to the=20 soul, and in this respect the dreams of good men are better than those = of=20 ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however; let us leave the = nutritive=20 faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human = excellence.

There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul -- one = which in=20 a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the = rational=20 principle of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of = their=20 soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright and towards = the best=20 objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally = opposed to=20 the rational principle, which fights against and resists that principle. = For=20 exactly as paralysed limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn = on the=20 contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of = incontinent people=20 move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which = moves=20 astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none the less = suppose=20 that in the soul too there is something contrary to the rational = principle,=20 resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other = elements=20 does not concern us. Now even this seems to have a share in a rational=20 principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the = rational=20 principle and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more = obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as = the=20 rational principle.

Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For the = vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the = appetitive=20 and in general the desiring element in a sense shares in it, in so far = as it=20 listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of 'taking = account'=20 of one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of = 'accounting for=20 a mathematical property. That the irrational element is in some sense = persuaded=20 by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by = all=20 reproof and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have a = rational principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that = which=20 has not) will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense = and in=20 itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's = father.

Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this = difference;=20 for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral,=20 philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being = intellectual,=20 liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man's character = we do=20 not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is = good-tempered or=20 temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of = mind;=20 and of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues.

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