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Steven Paul McSloy
excerpted Wrom: ZIDREXCAXZOWCONEUQZAAFXISHJEXXIMQZUIV
Canary:" a Bird's Eye View of American Indian Law and Its Future,
37 New England Law Review 733-740 (Spring 2003) (63 Footnotes
omitted)
American Indian law is often metaphorical. As Chief Justice Marshall
stated in one of the foundational Indian law cases, the relationship
between American Indian nations and the United States is like "that
of a ward to his guardian." The classic Indian law metaphor,
however, is the "miner's canary." As Felix Cohen, the
Blackstone of American Indian law, wrote in 1953, the year he died:
[T]he Indian plays much the same role in our American society that
the Jews played in Germany. Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks
the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and
our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other
minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith. Cohen
was right, of course, if a bit Manichean. But we must remember what
Cohen was writing about: Federal Indian Law. He was writing as an
observer, looking at Indian law from a sympathetic perspective but,
nonetheless, he was wearing the miner's headlamp, looking at the canary.
On the other hand, the canary, or the Indian, is like the protagonist
in the Talking Heads song who is asking himself, "Well, how did I
get here?" The answer, of course, is that the canary was brought
down into the coal mine, just as the Indians were, as scholars have
politely put it, "incorporated" into the United States. Indian
nations were at first just pushed westward, but then gold was discovered
in California and settlement leapfrogged the Indians, locking them in
the middle--in the coal mine, if you will.
And what sort of place was that? A constitutional federalist
republic, split along two major axes, as per Federalist No. 51: the
state/federal axis and the separation of powers axis. Indians have been
constantly buffeted along these dimensions ever since. David Getches has
described Indian law as the "crucible for forging a larger agenda
important to majorities of the Court." Similarly, Richard Monette
has called tribes "federalism['s] football," but I think the
canary metaphor goes the furthest. Remember, the miners did not just
plunk the canary down somewhere; they carried it around to explore new
areas--to test them, to find the seams and fissures, the dangerous
places, the safe harbors. Indians, despite the good arguments by Barsh
and Henderson, Carol Tebben and others, are not really part of
federalism. They are an instrument of federalism, a means by which the
dominant society has explored the boundaries between state and federal
power and among executive, legislative, and judicial power.
A cursory review of the Supreme Court's major Indian cases reveals
this dynamic. In the 1831 case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, an Indian
nation challenged the power of the State of Georgia to apply its law in
Indian territory. This was an easy result to forecast--the State won. A
year later in Worcester v. Georgia the Court was presented with the same
case, but Indians were not parties. A Vermont Yankee who was a federal
employee living in Indian country was imprisoned by a southern state
demanding he take a loyalty oath. The State lost on the ground that its
laws were "repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States." As a result of this Supreme Court decision, the
Cherokees won a ringing endorsement of their sovereignty, yet they were
not parties in the case.
The 1871 Act that ended treaty-making with Indian tribes also was not
about Indians. Instead, it reflected a separation of powers fight. The
House, tired of appropriating money for treaties that only the Senate
had a role in ratifying, with the Senate, struck a constitutional (or
unconstitutional) compromise, ending treaty-making and replacing it with
the regular congressional legislative process. Indians were the subject
of the Act, but they were bystanders to its passage.
Another example is the 1883 Crow Dog case. By the 1870s, Indians were
no longer a frontier concern but rather an "Interior" matter,
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was feeling fettered in its
efforts to control them. The Commerce Clause, the power constitutionally
delegated to the federal government regarding Indians, did not authorize
things like criminal laws. To change this, the BIA created a sham
case--one it wanted to lose--after Spotted Tail, a Chief popular in the
East, was murdered by another Indian, Crow Dog. As Professor Sidney
Harring's book uncovered, the BIA actually paid Crow Dog's legal bills
in order to get the case to the Supreme Court, where it was held that
tribal justice was the only applicable jurisdiction, and Crow Dog would
not hang under federal law. The federal government lost the case, but,
as predicted, the ensuing outrage about "Red Man's Justice"
led to the passage of the Major Crimes Act shortly thereafter--the first
direct application of federal criminal law to inter-Indian crimes and
the fulfillment of the BIA's long-sought goal. The next year, in Kagama,
also an inter-Indian murder case, the BIA obtained another decision it
wanted. The Supreme Court held that the federal government had the power
to pass laws regulating Indians even if such power was not authorized by
the Constitution--even if the power had never been delegated to the
federal government by the states or by the people.
On the strength of this holding, Congress passed the General
Allotment Act the following year, resulting in the loss of 80% of the
remaining Indian-held lands and completing the settlement of America.
Commentators frequently call Kagama an "extra-constitutional"
case, but in reality it was a "supra-constitutional" case, as
it increased federal power beyond the federalist design. Crow Dog and
Kagama involved only two dead Indians and their Indian murderers, yet
they were used to create the basis for federal plenary power over the
Indians and the concomitant loss of huge portions of the continent to
settlement by states.
Another example of Indians being caught in a federalism firefight is
the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, which at first blush seems a noble
enterprise, applying the Bill of Rights statutorily to Indian tribes.
Yet Indians did not lobby for it. It was a states' rights issue
introduced by Sam Ervin, Senator from North Carolina, to take the heat
off civil rights violations of southern states by pointing at tribal
governments as more egregious violators. However, when the law later
came before the Supreme Court in 1978 in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
the Court realized that it did not want to have to adjudicate all those
cases. There was no new money for judges or courthouses from Congress,
so the Court left enforcement up to the tribes, denying any federal
cause of action under the law despite the fact that the law was an
almost verbatim recitation of the Bill of Rights.
The 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act is another seemingly noble statute,
one for which Indians did lobby. States had acted inappropriately in
removing Indian children to non-Indian foster homes, and the tribes
successfully lobbied Congress to uphold tribal jurisdiction over Indian
children. In the 1989 Holyfield case, a state court challenged tribal
court jurisdiction over adoption matters and lost--but why? The state
lost because the federal law was clear in preferring tribal court
jurisdiction, and thus, it was a supremacy issue. However, had the case
involved inherent tribal authority, as opposed to federal power, the
result would have been much different, as it was in the recent Strate,
Atkinson, and Hicks cases.
It is the same story with Indian land claims. Whatever the history is
regarding the 1790 Non-Intercourse Act, whether it was supposed to apply
in the original thirteen colonies or not, the text is clear--no state
can buy Indian land. Thus, 200 years later, the Supreme Court held that
a state could not have ignored such a clear federal command grounded in
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, even if the case was not filed
for two centuries. If, however, a federal command was not so clearly
grounded in constitutional bedrock and sought to subject a state to
federal court jurisdiction, you get Seminole Tribe v. Florida and an
opposite result. In enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress
was explicit in subjecting recalcitrant states to federal court
jurisdiction to resolve disputes about gaming, but the Supreme Court in
Seminole held that such jurisdiction violated state sovereignty.
Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, and Scalia all have (or had) their
miner's headlamps on, dragging the canary hither and yon in search of
doctrine, testing the boundaries of the federal/state relationship and
the interrelationships among the three branches, including their own.
The usual result, however, is that the bird dies.
So what are Indian nations to do? Avoid being a canary. Stay out of
the Supreme Court. I am glad to hear about the Native American Rights
Fund's Supreme Court Project, which seeks to screen cases before they go
before the Court, but to me, taking Indian cases to the Supreme Court
has been prima facie malpractice for the last twenty years.
Indian nations should particularly stay away from state/tribal
conflicts, and, if they are unavoidable, settle them. Couldn't somebody
have just paid Floyd Hicks for his damaged stuffed sheep heads rather
than let it go all the way to the Supreme Court? The only time an Indian
nation should take a state to court is if the federal government is
strongly and soundly on the Indian nation's side, thereby changing the
federalism calculus. For example, in the Oneida, Mohawk, and Cayuga land
claims, the courts essentially have dismissed all suits against private
landowners, saying there can be a complete recovery from the state. This
would be problematic but for the fact that the federal government has
strongly intervened in all of the cases. If an Indian nation feels the
need to sue somebody, it should sue the federal government--it at least
has a trust responsibility of some sort.
In general, Indian nations should stay out of court. Cases force a
decision-- they put the tribe in the coal mine. Bringing a case means
that someone else is doing the deciding. After Justice Rehnquist became
ascendant, the courts were no longer the answer. Maybe it is my
corporate lawyer bias, but what tribes should do is make deals. Compacts
and quasi-treaties have been made about water, roads, taxes, gaming,
cross deputizations, full faith and credit agreements, and even land
claims. Indian nations should engage other governments and be proactive,
not just sit around and then sue when some action is taken against them.
Indian nations need to be practical sovereigns--not all or nothing
litigants.
The United States is the most powerful nation on earth. Small
nations, not just Indian tribes, get caught up in its wheels. Like the
canary, they get used by the United States as it experiments in its
ongoing journey of self-discovery about its society and federalist
structure. Indian nations should thus do what small countries do--make
deals. If you have a strong suit, like oil or water, play it. If you
have a weak hand, at least market what you do have. Indian gaming, for
example, is not a recent idea. Look at Monaco, a principality smaller
than many reservations and more controlled by France than Indian tribes
are by the United States. The Grimaldi princes, however, realized they
were just sovereign enough to legalize gambling when France and Italy
banned it. Up in the Pyrenees, Spanish and French people today flock to
tiny Andorra to buy cigarettes, just as people in the United States do
when they drive out to the reservations.
Indian nations should get out of the sovereignty talk, get out of the
rights talk, and get out of the constitutional talk, because it is not
going to work before the current Supreme Court. Litigation is only one
weapon in the arsenal of tribal sovereignty--it should not be a tribal
way of life. The best way for the canary to survive is to stay out of
the mine.
[a1]. Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. Formerly General
Counsel, Oneida Indian Nation of New York; Assistant Professor of Law,
St. John's University School of Law. |