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Federal Laws
1787 |
Constitution apportioned direct or capitation
taxes and membership in the House of Representatives in
accordance with population, but counted a slave as only
three-fifths of a person. (Article
1 Section 2, Clause 3) |
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Constitution required that escaped slaves be
returned to their owners (Article
4, Section 2) . |
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Constitution forbade Congress from making slavery
illegal until 1808 (Article
1, Section 9, Clause 1) |
1709 -98 |
Naturalization Laws that applied to free whites
only |
1790 |
Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 Dall. 55, 2 U.S. 55, 1
L.Ed. 287 ( Sct Pa.,1790)(The price of the slave is the
proper measure of damages in a suit on a bond of sureties
for the safe keeping of a negro slave. Such a result by a
jury has the consequence of emancipating the slave) |
1793 |
Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, §§ 3,4, 1 Stat.
302, repealed
by Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200. |
1793 |
Fugitive Slave Law Act, February 12 1793, c. 7,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 305 (Provided that any person who should
harbor or conceal a fugitive after notice that he was
a fugitive from labor should forfeit and pay to the claimant
the sum of $500, to be recovered by action of debt, saving
also to the claimant his right of action for any damages
sustained) |
1794 |
Slave Trade Act 1794, 1 Stat. 347 (the forfeiture
attaches, where the original voyage is commenced in the
United States, whether the vessel belong to citizens or
foreigners, and whether the act is done suo jure, or by an
agent, for the benefit of another person who is not a
citizen or resident of the United States.) |
1794 |
Act March 22, 1794, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1351 et seq.,
which prohibits any citizen or resident of the United States
from equipping vessels within the United States to carry on
trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country |
1796 |
St.1796, c. 67, § 13 (providing for manumission
of slaves by will, made to take effect at the death of
testator, the right to freedom may be tried at law in a suit
against the executor at the instance of the manumitted
slaves) |
1799 |
Act March 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 696 |
1800 |
Act May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. 70 (prohibits the
voluntary service of an American citizen on board of an
American or foreign vessel on a voyage commenced with the
intent of carrying slaves from one foreign country to
another, though no slaves have been received on board.) |
1801 |
Sylvia v. Coryell,
23 F.Cas. 591, 1 Cranch C.C. 32, 1 D.C. 32, No. 13,713 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1801);
The plaintiff [Negro Sylvia] petition for freedom under Act
Va. Dec. 17, 1792. In 1779, Negro Sylvia was
born a slave in Virginia and she became the property of the
defendant [George Coryell], a citizen of Virginia. In June,
1789, the defendant sent her to New Jersey, where she
remained three years in the service of the defendant's
mother, but continued all that time the property of the
defendant. At the end of the three years, the plaintiff
returned to Virginia, to the service of the defendant, and
has so remained until the time of bringing her action. HELD:
It is not such a bringing into the commonwealth as entitles
the slave to freedom, under Act Va. Dec. 17 1792. |
1802 |
Acts May 3, 1802, 2 Stat. 194 |
1803 |
U.S. v. Wright, 28 F.Cas. 790, 1 Cranch C.C. 123,
1 D.C. 123, No. 16,771 (C.C.Dist.Col.,1803)(Betty Wright, a
slave in Alexandria, VA,., may be tried for larceny in the
circuit court of the District of Columbia, though under the
law of Virginia she would have been tried by five justices
of the county court, without a jury. After consideration she
was tried by a jury. VERDICT: guilty. Judgment, 20 lashes, 1
cent find.) |
1805 |
The Sally, 2 Cranch 406, 6 U.S. 406, 2 L.Ed. 320
(U.S.Md.,1805)(A libel for a forfeiture under the slave
trade act of March 22, 1794, 1 Stat. 347, is a cause of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction) |
1806 |
Scott v. Negro London, 3 Cranch 324, 7 U.S. 324,
2 L.Ed. 455 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1806)(A slave was brought into
Virginia by a person who claimed and exercised the right of
ownership over him, though he did not take the oath
prescribed by the law. Eleven months after, the real owner
of the slave came into the state, and within the 60 days
took the oath prescribed. Held, that the slave was not
entitled to his freedom) |
1807 |
Act March 2, 1807, 2 Stat. 429(An act to prohibit
the importation of slaves into any port or place within the
jurisdiction of the United States; prohibiting the
importation of slaves into any port or place within the
jurisdiction etc., is not that of importing or bringing
persons to hold as slaves, but of hovering on the coast with
such intent; and though it forfeits the vessel, it is
silent as to disposing of the colored people on board, any
further than handing them over to the proper
authorities)Slave Trade was legally ended BUT illegal trade
began |
1808 |
Spiers v. Willison, 4 Cranch 398, 8 U.S. 398, 2
L.Ed. 659(U.S.Ky.,1808)(Rebecca Willison, claimed title to
the slaves under her grandmother, and at the trial offered
parol proof that the grandmother, while Kentucky was a part
of Virginia, had given them to her by a deed, which
was lost. By the Virginia act of assembly, no gift of a
slave was valid unless in writing and recorded. Court
Held: parol evidence may be given of the existence of
a deed of gift to show the nature of possession which
accompanied the deed.) |
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Ramsay v. Lee, 4Cranch 401 (Mem), 8 U.S.
401, 2 L.Ed. 660 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1808) In Virginia, in 1784,
no gift of a slave was valid unless in writing and recorded,
although possession accompanied the gift. |
1810 |
Scott v. Ben, 6 Cranch 3, 10 U.S. 3, 3 L.Ed. 135
(U.S.Dist.Col.,1810)(The right of freedom under Act Md.1783,
which prohibits the bringing of slaves into that state, is
not acquired by the neglect of the master "to prove, to
the satisfaction of the naval officer or collector of the
tax, that such slave had resided three years in the United
States," though such proof is required by the act) |
1812 |
Act June 24, 1812, 2 Stat. 755 |
1816 |
Davis v. Wood, 14 U.S. 6, 4 L.Ed. 22, 1 Wheat. 6
(U.S.,1816)(Evidence by hearsay and reputation is admissible
only as to pedigree, but not to establish the freedom of a
petitioner's ancestor, and thence to deduce his or her own) |
1817 |
Beverly v. Brooke, 15 U.S. 100, 4 L.Ed. 194, 2
Wheat. 100 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1817)(Where the owner of slaves
and part owner of a vessel hired the slaves to the master of
the vessel, as mariners for a voyage, without a special
contract, the master was not responsible for the escape of
the slaves at a foreign port, which was one of the
contingent termini of the voyage, if he acted with good
faith, though it was doubtful if he had strictly pursued his
orders in going to such port.) |
1818 |
Slave Trade Act of April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450
(An act to prohibit the introduction of slaves into any port
or place within the jurisdiction of the United States; The
object of the statute prohibiting the importation of salves
was to put an end to the slave trade and to prevent the
introduction of slaves into the United States from other
countries.) |
1819 |
Act March 3, 1819, 3 Stat. 532 |
1820 |
The Missouri Compromise Act., March 6,
1820, 3 Stat. 545 (Provision prohibiting the holding and
ownership of slaves in the territory of the United States
north of the line) |
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Act May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1585; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3238 |
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The Josefa
Segunda, 18 U.S. 338, 5 L.Ed. 104, 5 Wheat. 338 ( U.S.La.,1820)(Necessity,
having been pleaded in justification of a violation of the
law forbidding the importation of slaves, must, if real, and
it can be fully and easily established, be proved by the
most convincing and conclusive testimony. Evidence sustained
decree against claimants to vessel which was sought to be
forfeited for violation of Act of March 3, 1807, 2 Stat.
426, relating to importation of slaves into the United
States, in view of lack of convincing conclusive testimony
that violation of the law was necessary because perilous
situation of the vessel and famishing condition of the
people on board required vessel, which contained cargo of
slaves, to enter the United States. In the execution of laws
relating to the importation of slaves, restitution of
property condemned by the United States ought never to be
made except in cases which are purged of every intentional
violation of the law by proofs of the most clear and most
explicit and unequivocal nature.) |
1822 |
Hill v. Low, 12 F.Cas.
172, 4 Wash.C.C. 327, No. 6494 (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1822)(Under Act
February 12, 1793, c. 152, 1 Stat. 305, if the defendant
knowingly obstructs the owner or his agent in seizing the
fugitive, he cannot excuse himself against the penalty by
pleading ignorance of the law, or an honest belief that the
person was not a fugitive from service or labor. Mere
obstruction, hindrance, or interruption is no offense, under
Act February 12, 1793, c. 152, 1 Stat. 305, unless it be
interposed to prevent a seizure in the first instance, or a
recapture in case the fugitive, after seizure, should
escape; and the offense in such case would be complete,
although the owner should ultimately succeed in making the
arrest.) |
1823 |
The Mary Ann, 21 U.S. 380 5 L.Ed. 641, 8Wheat.
380 (U.S.La.,1823) A libel for forfeiture of a vessel which
allegedly sailed from port of New York and Perth Amboy
without delivering manifests to collectors or surveyors of
ports of New York and Perth Amboy was defective in view of
fact that law requires delivery of manifest to collector or
surveyor of one port only or was defective for vagueness in
not alleging with precision the port where offense was
committed. Act March 2, 1807, c. 22, 2 Stat. 426. Statute
requiring captain of any vessel of the burden of 40 tons or
more, sailing coastwise, and having on board any negro, to
make out and deliver duplicate manifests and requiring
forfeiture of any ship departing without manifests having
been executed comprehends forfeiture only of vessels
of 40 tons or more. Act March 2, 1807, c. 22, § 9, 2
Stat. 429. |
1824 |
The Emily, 22 U.S. 381, 6
L.Ed. 116, 9 Wheat. 381(U.S.S.C.,1824)A seizure may be made,
under Slave Trade Act 1794, 1 St. at Large, p. 347, § 1, 46
U.S.C.A. 1351, before the vessel proceeds to sea, so soon as
the intention of "preparing," etc., or of
"causing to sail," etc., is manifest) |
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The Merino, 22 U.S. 391,
6 L.Ed. 118, 9 Wheat. 391 (U.S.Ala.,1824)(Under Act May 10,
1800, c. 205, § 4, the owner of the slaves transported
contrary to the provisions of that act cannot claim the same
in a court of the United States, though they may be held to
servitude according to the laws of his own country. But if,
at the time of the capture by a commissioned vessel, the
offending ship was in possession of a noncommissioned
captor, who had made a seizure for the same offense, the
owner of the slaves may claim them; the section only
applying to persons interested in the enterprise or voyage
in which the ship was employed at the time of such capture.
The prohibitions in the slave trade acts of May 10, 1800,
and April 20, 1818, extend to the carrying of slaves on
freight as well as to cases where slaves belonging to
citizens of the United States are transported, and to the
carrying them from one port to another of the same foreign
country as well as from one foreign country to another. In
proceeding to forfeit vessel and cargo for carrying on slave
trade, objections to irregularity with which proceedings
were conducted were waived by appearance of parties and
filing of claims to property seized. The acts of congress of
1800, 2 Stat. 70, and 1818, 3 Stat. 450, forbidding the
employment of vessel belonging to citizens of United States
in carrying slaves from one foreign country or place to
another or taking on board or transporting from Africa or
from any foreign country any negro for the purpose of
holding or disposing of such person as a slave manifests
intent of congress to prevent citizens of or residents
within United States from affording any facilities to the
slave trade although they should have no interest or
property in the slaves themselves and although they should
not be immediately instrumental to the transportation of
them from their native country. In proceeding for forfeiture
of vessels and their cargoes under information alleging that
citizens of the United States who took slaves on board did
so for purpose of holding them as slaves decree of
forfeiture was required to be reversed where evidence showed
that slaves were taken on board merely as passengers to be
delivered to their owners or to those to whom they were
consigned. Under act declaring forfeiture of any vessel
belonging to citizen of United States employed in
transporting slaves from one foreign country to another and
providing that vessel may be libeled and condemned for the
use of person who shall sue for it, the right to seize the
vessel and slaves on board is a necessary consequence of the
right to enforce forfeiture) |
1825 |
The Josefa
Segunda, 23 U.S. 312, 6 L.Ed. 320, 10 Wheat. 312 (U.S.La.,1825)(To
constitute a valid seizure, so as to entitle the party to
the proceeds of a forfeiture, there must be open visible
possession claimed, and authority exercised under the
seizure. A seizure not followed by prosecution or by a claim
in the district court before a hearing on the merits,
insisting on the benefit of the seizure, becomes a nullity.
A seizure under the slave trade act once voluntarily
abandoned becomes a mere nullity; The abandonment of a
seizure or capture without the influence of superior force
leaves the property open to the next occupant; An inspector
rightfully on board vessel in pursuance of his ordinary duty
did not make "seizure" of vessel for violation of
slave act where inspector gave no notice of seizure to
persons on board, exercised no authority and claimed no
possession and had no force adequate to compel submission;
In proceedings for condemnation of vessel and cargo for
violation of slave act parties intending to insist on right
as seizors had duty to interfere in court before hearing on
merits; Under act providing for forfeiture of vessels
engaged in slave trade "to the use of the United
States" and providing that proceeds of vessels when
condemned shall be divided equally between the United States
and officers and men who shall make such seizure whether
service be made by armed vessel of United States or revenue
cutters thereof surveyor and naval officer of port of New
Orleans were not entitled to share in proceeds of vessel
seized by him and condemned for engaging in slave trade) |
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The Plattsburgh, 23
U.S. 133, 6 L.Ed. 284, 10 Wheat. 133 (1825)(Under Slave
Trade Act 1794, c. 11, 18 U.S.C.A. § 429, the forfeiture
attaches, where the original voyage is commenced in the
United States, whether the vessel belong to citizens or
foreigners, and whether the act is done suo jure, or by an
agent, for the benefit of another person who is not a
citizen or resident of the United States; It is not
necessary, to incur the forfeiture under the slave trade
acts, that the equipments for the voyage should be
completed. It is sufficient if any preparations are made for
the unlawful purpose; Circumstances of a pretended transfer
to a Spanish subject, and the commencement of a new voyage
in a Spanish port, are not sufficient to break the
continuity of an original venture and to avoid the
forfeiture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade, under Act
1794, c. 11, 1 Stat. 347; Evidence justified decree
condemning vessel for participation in slave trade on ground
that voyage was originally undertaken from the United States
and not by Spanish claimant who was resident of Cuba after
bona fide purchase made by him disconnected from original
enterprise) |
1827 |
Mason v. Matilda,
25 U.S. 590, 6 L.Ed. 738, 12 Wheat.
590(U.S.Dist.Col.,1827)(The fact of the oath, required by
statute of Virginia to be made by the owner of slaves
brought into that state in 1792 on removing them, having
been taken in accordance with the statute, may be presumed
after the lapse of 20 years, accompanied by possession). |
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The Antelope, 25 U.S.
546, 6 L.Ed. 723, 12 Wheat. 546 (U.S.Ga.,1827)(Evidence
warranted restoration to Spanish claimants of certain
Africans out of large group captured under Slave Trade Act
on ground that such Africans were sufficiently identified as
belonging to Spanish claimants; In making restitution of
African slaves who were taken from Spanish vessel by
privateers and who were brought into ports of United States
along with other Africans taken by privateer from other
vessels, by a United States revenue cutter for adjudication
under suspicion that slaves were to be smuggled in United
States, Africans to be delivered to Spaniards must be
designated by proof and not by lot; The slave trade is not
piracy, unless made so by the treaties or statutes of the
nation to whom the party belongs; The slave trade is not
contrary to the law of nations; The right of visitation and
search does not exist in time of peace. A vessel engaged in
the slave trade, even if prohibited by the laws of the
country to which it belongs, cannot, for that cause alone,
be seized on the high seas, and brought in for adjudication,
in time of peace, in the courts of another country. But if
the laws of that other country be violated, or the
proceeding be authorized by treaty, the act of capture is
not, in that case, unlawful; Africans who are first captured
by a belligerent privateer fitted out in violation of our
neutrality, or by a pirate, and then recaptured and brought
into the ports of the United States under a reasonable
suspicion that a violation of the slave trade acts was
intended, are not to be restored without full proof of the
proprietary interest; for, in such a case, the capture is
lawful; Africans who were first captured by belligerent
privateer fitted out in violation of neutrality of United
States or by a pirate and then recaptured and brought into
the ports of the United States under reasonable suspicion
that violation of slave trade act was intended would be
delivered up to the United States to be disposed of
according to law where no sufficient proof was made of the
title of the real proprietor) |
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U.S. v. Gooding, 25
U.S. 460, 6 L.Ed. 693, 12 Wheat. 460(U.S.Md.,1827)(It is
sufficient to sustain an indictment, under the slave trade
act of 1818, 3 Stat. 450, if the vessel be fitted out with
the intent to be employed in the illegal voyage, though no
equipments for a slave voyage be actually on board. An
averment in an indictment under the slave trade act of 1818,
3 Stat. 450, of the offense "with the intent that the
vessel should be employed," is defective and fatal; the
words of the statute being "with intent to employ the
vessel."--Id. Evidence that the owner commanded,
authorized, and superintended the fitment, through his
agent, without his personal presence, will support a count,
in an indictment under the slave trade act of 1818, 3 Stat.
450, that "he did fit out for himself, as owner,"
etc.) |
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Williamson v.
Daniel, 25 U.S. 568, 6 L.Ed. 731, 12 Wheat. 568 (U.S.Ga.,1827)(The
issue follows the mother, unless they be separated from each
other by the terms of the instrument which disposed of the
mother). |
1829 |
Le Grand v.
Darnall, 2 Pet. 664, 27 U.S. 664, 7 L.Ed. 555( U.S.Md.,1829)(The
grandmother and mother of petitioner were slaves of M., and
they and their descendants were at large, acting as free,
from the year 1797 to 1832. They were permitted to own
property, contract debts, rent farms, and support themselves
and children until the death of M., in 1805, living during
that time within three miles of his residence. He bequeathed
all his property to his wife for life, remainder to his
children, but neither she nor her children after her death
asserted a claim to petitioner or her mother. Held, that the
circumstances would justify the jury in presuming a deed of
manumission; Where the exercise of freedom by persons of
color by going at large may have had a lawful commencement,
as by deed of manumission, or may have been an offense,
under the act of 1787, which would subject the owner to a
prosecution, in the absence of all evidence the presumption
will be that the exercise of acts of freedom were of right;
In Maryland, by statute of 1796, the owner of slaves was
authorized to manumit them by will, provided that no such
manumission should be effectual if the same should prejudice
the creditors of the owner, "nor unless the slave or
slaves shall be under the age of 45 years, and able to work
and gain a sufficient maintenance and livelihood at the time
the freedom given shall commence." Held, that the
manumission of a slave, to take effect when he was 11 years
old, was valid; A devise of property, real or personal by a
master to his slave, entitles the slave to his freedom by
necessary implication) |
1830 |
U.S. v. Preston, 3
Pet. 57, 28 U.S. 57, 7 L.Ed. 601 (U.S.La.,1830)( The
offense, under Act Cong. March 2, 1807, § 7, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1587; 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1355, 1357, 1358, prohibiting the
importation of slaves into any port or place within the
jurisdiction etc., is not that of importing or bringing
persons to hold as slaves, but of hovering on the coast with
such intent; and though it forfeits the vessel, it is silent
as to disposing of the colored people on board, any further
than handing them over to the proper authorities). |
1831 |
Menard v. Aspasia,
5 Pet. 505, 30 U.S. 505, 8 L.Ed. 207 (U.S.Mo.,1831)( The
mother of A. was born a slave in Illinois prior to 1787,
before that country belonged to Virginia. A., born after
1787, was sent as a slave to Missouri, where she claimed her
liberty under the ordinance of 1787. The court declared her
free, and, on a writ of error, under Act 1789, § 25, 1
Stat. 85, to reverse the judgment, the case was held not to
be within that section) |
1833 |
Johnson v.
Tompkins, 13 F.Cas. 840, Baldw. 571, No. 7416 (C.C.E.D.Pa.,1833)(
On questions of slavery or freedom, the same rules of
evidence prevail as in other cases concerning the right of
property. A citizen of another state, whose slave absconds
from him into Pennsylvania, may pursue and take him without
warrant, using as much force as is necessarry to carry him
back to his residence. And such proceeding is no offense
against the laws of the state of Pennsylvania. If such
opposition is made, or such order attempted to be executed,
the master may use force in repelling it, and the officer
who gives such order, and all concerned in its execution,
are trespassers. No person has a right to oppose the master
in reclaiming his slave, or to demand proof of his property.
This right of the master to reclaim his fugitive slave
results from his ownership, and right to the custody and
service of his slave by the common law and by the laws of
the state; and the constitution of the United States does
not confer but secures this right.) |
1834 |
McCutchen v.
Marshall, 8 Pet. 220, 33 U.S. 220, 8 L.Ed. 923 (U.S.Tenn.,1834)(Two
slaves were ordered by the will of their master to be
manumitted at the death of his widow, or on reaching the age
of 21. It was held that the children of the slaves, born
after the death of their master, followed the condition of
their parents; It is admitted to be a settled rule, in
Tennessee, that the issue of a female slave follows the
condition of the mother; So, where a testator, in Tennessee,
bequeaths a female slave to one until the slave shall arrive
at the age of 21 years, and then the slave to be free, and
after the death of the testator, and before the slave
arrives at that age, she has children, such children are
absolute slaves, and will not be entitled to their freedom
on their arriving at the age of 21 years, according to the
decisions of the courts of that state; A declaration by a
testator in his will that his slaves, after a certain time
should be liberated from slavery, is an emancipation of such
slaves, authorized by the laws of Tennessee as they were in
1810, when the will was made; Under Act of Tennessee of
1801, c. 27, § 1, an executor is authorized to petition the
court for manumission of slaves directed by the testator to
be set free; Consideration of policy with respect to slaves
may justify legislative regulations as to the guards and
checks under which manumission shall take place, especially
so as to provide against the public's becoming chargeable
for the maintenance of slaves so manumitted) |
1835 |
Fenwick v.
Chapman, 9 Pet. 461 34 U.S. 461, 9 L.Ed. 193 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1835)(Under
St.1796, c. 67, § 13, providing for manumission of slaves
by will, made to take effect at the death of testator, the
right to freedom may be tried at law in a suit against the
executor at the instance of the manumitted slaves) |
1837 |
The Garonne, 11 Pet.
73, 36 U.S. 73, 9 L.Ed. 637 (U.S.La.,1837)(The object of the
statute prohibiting the importation of salves was to put an
end to the slave trade and to prevent the introduction of
slaves into the United States from other countries. Act of
April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1582, 1584,
1585, 3283; 28 U.S.C.A. § 2462; 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1351,
1353; Under Act April 18, 1818, a vessel is not liable to
condemnation for transporting slaves from the United States
to Europe, and bringing them back to the United States,
where they were again held in bondage; The statute
prohibiting importation of slaves did not prevent a resident
from going abroad and sojourning for a time in a foreign
country, taking with her one of her slaves as an attendant
and later bringing or sending the slave back home with
intent to hold the slave as before in her service. Act of
April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1582, 1584,
3283; 28 U.S.C.A. § 2462; 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1351, 1353) |
1840 |
U S v. Morris, 14
Pet. 464,39 U.S. 464, 10 L.Ed. 543 (U.S.N.Y.,1840)(Act May
10, 1800, 2 Stat. 70, is penal, and prohibits the voluntary
service of an American citizen on board of an American or
foreign vessel on a voyage commenced with the intent of
carrying slaves from one foreign country to another, though
no slaves have been received on board; A vessel sailing to
African coast for purpose of taking slaves on board was
"employed or made use of" in transportation or
carrying of slaves within Act of Congress of May 10, 1800,
§§ 2, 3, 18 U.S.C.A. § 427, penalizing persons serving on
board such vessels) |
1841 |
Groves v.
Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449, 40 U.S. 449, 10 L.Ed.
800(U.S.La.,1841)(A contract made in violation of fixed and
settled policy of state against allowing introduction of
slaves as merchandise or for sale would be void) |
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The Amistad, 15
Pet. 518, 40 U.S. 518, 10 L.Ed. 826 (U.S.Conn.,1841)(Negroes
who were kidnapped in Africa and carried to Cuba in
violation of laws and treaties of Spain and who subsequently
took possession of vessel and killed captain were not
"pirates" or "robbers" so that
restitution of negroes to Spanish claimants could be
compelled under provisions of treaty with Spain for
restitution of merchandise rescued out of hands of pirates
or robbers on the high seas (Under law of Spain African
slave trade is abolished and negroes thereby introduced into
dominions of Spain are free; Slaves under the laws of Spain
which were recognized by laws of Spain as property capable
of being lawfully bought and sold would constitute
"merchandise" within provision of treaty with
Spain for restitution of "merchandise" rescued out
of hands of pirates or robbers on the high seas; Negroes
kidnapped in Africa and unlawfully transported to Cuba in
violation of laws and treaties of Spain did not constitute
property of Spanish claimants within provision of treaty
with Spain for restitution of merchandise rescued out of
hands of pirates or robbers on the high seas; Negroes who
had been kidnapped in Africa by slave trader and who had
seized ship and attempted to sail back to Africa but had
sailed to United States where they were captured could not
be returned to shore of Africa under provisions of
prohibitory slave trade act since negroes were not taken
from Africa or brought to the United States in violation of
the laws of the United States).) |
1842 |
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536
(1842). |
1842 |
Supreme Court Ruled federal agencies had to carry
out Fugitive Slave Laws |
1843 |
Williams v. Ash, 1
How. 1, 42 U.S. 1, 11 L.Ed. 25 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1843)(A
testator bequeathed to her nephew certain slaves, with a
proviso in her will "that he should not carry them out
of the state of Maryland, or sell them to any one, in either
of which events I will and desire the said negroes shall be
free for life." After the decease of the testator, the
legatee sold one of the slaves. Held, that the bequest of
the testatrix of the slave to her nephew under the
restrictions imposed by the will was not a restraint or
alienation inconsistent with the right to the property
bequeathed to the legatee, and that by the sale the slave
became free; A slave is capable of receiving a bequest of
freedom on the happening of a contingency which is not too
remote. Such a bequest is a specific legacy) |
1844 |
Adams v. Roberts,
2 How. 486, 43 U.S. 486, 11 L.Ed. 349 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1844)(On
the trial of a petition for freedom, a paper was produced,
which was a copy of a deed of manumission executed in
December, 1801, by the owner of certain slaves in Virginia,
among them the mother of the petitioner, to become free on
the 1st of January, 1814, to which paper the names of two
persons were attached as witnesses. In January, 1802, the
grantor went into court in Fairfax county, Va., and ordered
it to be recorded; but it did not appear whether the two
witnesses were there with him or not. The grantor resided in
the District of Columbia. Under these circumstances, and
under the statute of Virginia passed December 17, 1792, a
prayer to the court to instruct the jury that the petitioner
was not entitled to freedom, was properly refused; The
mother of the petitioner becoming free on the 1st of
January, 1814, the exact time of the birth of the
petitioner, whether before or after that day, was a fact for
the jury; and a prayer to the court which would have
excluded the consideration of that fact was properly
refused) |
|
Rhodes v. Bell, 2
How. 397, 43 U.S. 397, 11 L.Ed. 314 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1844)(The
District of Columbia being still governed by the laws of
Maryland and Virginia which were in force anterior to the
cession, it is not lawful for an inhabitant of Washington
county to purchase a slave in Alexandria county and bring
him into Washington county for sale; if he does the slave
will become entitled to his freedom) |
1847 |
Jones v.
Van Zandt, 5 How. 215, 46 U.S. 215, 12 L.Ed. 122, 3 Ohio Law
Rep. 453 (U.S.Ohio,1847)(Under Act Cong. Feb. 12, 1793, §
4, 1 Stat. 305, respecting fugitives from justice and
persons escaping from the service of their master, on a
charge for harboring and concealing fugitives from labor,
the notice need not be in writing by the claimant or his
agent, stating that such person is a fugitive from labor,
under section 3 of the above act, and served on the person
harboring or concealing such fugitive, to make him liable to
the penalty of $500 under the act; Clear proof of the
knowledge of the defendant, by his own confession or
otherwise, that he knew that the colored person was a slave
and fugitive from labor, though he may have acquired such
knowledge from the slave himself or otherwise, is sufficient
to charge him with notice; Such notice, if not in writing,
and served as aforesaid, may be given verbally by the
claimant or his agent to the person who harbors or conceals
the fugitive; and a general notice to the public in a
newspaper is not necessary to charge him under the statute;
any overt act so marked in its character as to show an
intention to elude the vigilance of the master or his agent,
and which is calculated to attain such an object, is a
harboring of the fugitive within the statute; A claim of the
fugitive from the person harboring or concealing him need
not precede or accompany the notice; In this case, the first
and second counts were held to contain the necessary
averments that the colored man escaped from the state of
Kentucky into the state of Ohio, of notice that he was a
fugitive from labor within the description of the act, and
that the defendant harbored him. The counts were also held
to be otherwise sufficient; Act Cong. Feb. 12, 1793, § 4, 1
Stat. 305, making it an offense to harbor or conceal
fugitive from labor was designed merely to render effective
the guaranty of constitution providing that no person held
to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof
escaping into another shall in consequence of any law or
regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor
but shall be delivered upon claim of the party to whom such
service or labor may be due; In Act of Cong. Feb. 12, 1793,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 305, making it an offense to harbor or conceal
a fugitive from labor, the words and their derivatives must
be construed in reference to the subject matter of the
statute and the nature of the offense; As regards meaning of
Act Cong. Feb. 12, 1793, § 4, 1 Stat. 305, making it an
offense to harbor or conceal a fugitive from labor to harbor
often means to secrete; Under Act Cong. Feb. 12, 1793, § 4,
1 Stat. 305, making it an offense to harbor or conceal a
fugitive from labor the gist of the offense consists in the
concealment of another's property under knowledge that it
belongs to another and not in a claim being previously made
and refused; Under Act Cong. February 12, 1793, § 4, 1
Stat. 305, respecting the concealment of a fugitive from
labor if the information given to party orally or in writing
is such as ought to satisfy a fair minded man that he is
concealing the property of another, it is his duty under the
constitution and laws to cease to do it. The act of
congress, approved February 12, 1793, respecting fugitives
from justice and labor, is not repugnant to the constitution
of the United States, nor to the ordinance of 1787;
Receiving the fugitive at 3 o'clock in the morning, at a
place in the state of Ohio about 12 miles distant from the
place in Kentucky where the fugitive was held to labor, from
a certain individual, and transporting him in a closely
covered wagon 12 or 14 miles, so that the boy thereby
escaped pursuit, and his services were thereby lost to his
master, is a harboring or concealing of the fugitive within
the statute; and this, though the boy should be recaptured
by his master) |
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Miller v.
Herbert, 5 How. 72, 46 U.S. 72, 12 L.Ed. 55 (U.S.Dist.Col.,1847)(Under
a statute of Maryland, passed in 1796, a deed of manumission
is not good, unless recorded within six months after its
date; and this law is in force in Washington county,
District of Columbia.) |
1848 |
Sims v. Hundley, 6
How. 1, 47 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed. 319 (U.S.Miss.,1848)(Contracts
for the sale of slaves were valid in the State of
Mississippi in the year 1835). |
1850 |
Fugitive Slave Law, September 18, 1850, 9 Stat.
462(any person who shall harbor or conceal any fugitive from
service or labor, escaping from one state into another, so
as to prevent his discovery and arrest, after notice or
knowledge that he was such a fugitive, shall be subject to a
fine not exceeding $1,000, and, on indictment and
conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six months, and
shall forfeit and pay, by way of civil damages, to the party
injured, the sum of $1,000 for each fugitive so lost, to be
recovered by action of debt.) |
|
Randon v. Toby, 11
How. 493, 52 U.S. 493, 13 L.Ed. 784 (U.S.Tex.,1850)(Crime
committed by those who introduced negroes into country in
violation of law did not attach to all who might afterwards
purchase negroes). |
|
Strader v.
Graham, 10 How. 82, 51 U.S. 82, 13 L.Ed. 337 (U.S.Ky.,1850)(Every
state may determine status, or domestic and social
condition, of persons domiciled within its territory, except
in so far as powers of states in this respect are restrained
or duties and obligations imposed upon them by the federal
constitution; State of Kentucky could determine for itself
whether employment of slaves in Ohio should make them free
on their return to Kentucky) |
1851 |
Bennett v.
Butterworth, 12 How. 367, 53 U.S. 367, 13 L.Ed. 1026 (U.S.Tex.,1851)(In
proceeding to require accounting by mortgagee in possession
of slaves, master properly rejected account rendered under
management which showed gross negligence or wilful default
by mortgagee in failing to keep slaves engaged in useful
employment. In proceeding to require accounting by mortgagee
in possession of slaves, master properly stated charge for
hire of slaves as commencing three months after date of
death of mortgagor, which occurred while mortgagee had
possession). |
|
Norris v.
Crocker, 13 How. 429, 54 U.S. 429, 14 L.Ed.
210(U.S.Ind.,1851)(Act Cong. 1850, c. 60, § 7, 9 Stat. 464,
providing that any person who shall harbor or conceal any
fugitive from service or labor, escaping from one state into
another, so as to prevent his discovery and arrest, after
notice or knowledge that he was such a fugitive, shall be
subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000, and, on indictment
and conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six months,
and shall forfeit and pay, by way of civil damages, to the
party injured, the sum of $1,000 for each fugitive so lost,
to be recovered by action of debt, repeals by implication
Act 1793, c. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 305, which provided that any
person who should harbor or conceal any such fugitive after
notice that he was such a fugitive from labor should forfeit
and pay to the claimant the sum of $500, to be recovered by
action of debt, saving also to the claimant his right of
action for any damages sustained, and bars all actions
pending under said act of 1793 at the time of the repeal. |
|
Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79 53 U.S. 79, 13 L.Ed.
901 (U.S.Miss.,1851)A statute of Mississippi prohibited the
bringing of convict slaves into that state, or the holding
of them when brought in; and also declared that no slaves
should be brought into the state without a certificate,
signed by two freeholders in the county and state from which
the slaves were brought, that the slaves had not, within
their knowledge and belief, been convicted of felony, and,
in a subsequent section, imposed a penalty of $100 on any
person purchasing or selling a slave contrary to this
statute. Held, that this statute did not enable the
purchaser to set up illegality of consideration to avoid
payment of the purchase money. A statute of Mississippi
prohibited the bringing of convict slaves into that state,
or the holding of them when brought in, and also declared
that no slaves should be brought into the state without a
certificate, signed by two freeholders in the county and
state from which the slaves were brought, that the slaves
had not, within their knowledge and belief, been convicted
of felony, and, in a subsequent section, imposed a penalty
of $100 on any person purchasing or selling a slave contrary
to this statute. Held, that this statute did not make void a
contract of sale of slaves brought into the state without
the required certificate. |
1852 |
Moore
v. People of State of Illinois, 14 How. 13, 55 U.S. 13, 14
L.Ed. 306 (U.S.Ill.,1852)(A state statute, making it penal
to harbor or secrete a fugitive slave, or otherwise hinder
or prevent his lawful owner from retaking him, is
constitutional and valid) |
1853 |
Amis v. Myers, 16
How. 492, 57 U.S. 492, 14 L.Ed. 1029 (U.S.La.,1853)(Evidence
that slaves were purchased by defendant in execution by
procuring acceptance and discount of a draft, that the
plaintiff, when defendant in execution was unable to provide
funds for payment of draft, caused draft to be paid by his
own factor and agreed to take slaves as his property, that
plaintiff's name was inserted in bill of sale and that
defendant exercised no act of master ship over slaves and
denied any interest therein, justified judgment restraining
sale of salves in execution of judgment against the
defendant). |
1854 |
Kansas-Nebraska Act repealed Missouri Compromise |
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Wanzer v. Truly, 17
How. 584, 58 U.S. 584, 15 L.Ed. 216 (U.S.Miss.,1854)(Where a
portion of slaves purchased were lost because of defect in
vendor's title, and a process of garnishment had been served
upon purchaser by creditors of vendor who had absconded in
insolvent circumstances, purchasers, against whom judgment
had been rendered in garnishment proceeding, were entitled
to value of the slaves and the costs incurred in suit in
connection with loss of slaves). |
1856 |
Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 60 U.S. 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (U.S.Mo.,1856)(The
provision in Act Cong. passed March 6, 1820, 3 Stat. 545,
commonly known as the Missouri Compromise act, prohibiting
the holding and ownership of slaves in the territory of the
United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not
warranted by the constitution, and is therefore void; Right
of property in slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution. The federal government has no power over
person or property of citizens except what citizens of the
United States have granted and no laws or usages of other
nations or reasoning of statesmen or jurists on relations of
master and slave could enlarge powers of government or take
from citizens rights reserved. No federal tribunal may deny
the right of property in slave, or deny to slave owners
benefit of provisions and guarantees provided for protection
of private property by the Constitution, since the
Constitution recognizes such right of property and makes no
distinction between slaves and other property. Under federal
Constitution, federal government has no right to interfere
with reserved power of states to regulate slaves for any
other purpose but that of protecting rights of owner). |
1858 |
Ableman v. Booth,
21 How. 506, 62 U.S. 506, 16 L.Ed. 169 (US Wis 1858)(The
District Court of the United States for the District of
Wisconsin has exclusive and final jurisdiction of an offense
committed in that district under the act commonly called the
"Fugitive Slave Law."; The commissioner duly
appointed by the District Court of United States for the
District of Wisconsin had lawful authority to issue warrant
and commit person accused of violating the fugitive slave
law of September 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462. Holding that Act
Cong. Sept. 18, 1850, 9 Stat. 462, commonly called the
"Fugitive Slave Law," is constitutional in all its
provisions). |
1860 |
Vigel v. Naylor, 65
U.S. 208, 16 L.Ed. 646, 24 How. 208 (1860)(On a petition for
freedom, the petitioner proved that one Kirby had
emancipated all his slaves by will, some immediately, and
some at a future day. In order to bring herself within this
category and show that she had been the slave of Kirby, she
offered to prove that her mother and brother and sister had
recovered their freedom by suits brought against George
Naylor, whose administrator, Henry Naylor, was the defendant
in the present suit, and that it was very unusual to
separate from the mother a child so young as the petitioner
was at the time of Kirby's death. Held, that the evidence
offered was admissible. |
1861- 65 |
US Civil War |
1861- 62 |
Confiscation Acts |
1862 |
Morrill Land Grant Act |
1863 |
The Emancipation Proclamation |
State Laws
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