Corruption in China: Tigers and Flies Beware
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This chapter explores the state of corruption in China from both governmental and civic perspectives. An exclusive focus on governmental corruption limits one’s understanding of the “corruption problem.” A more complete grasp requires one to consider the body politic, as the roots of the problem may well extend into the civil society at large. The chapter is divided into the following sections: a brief history of corruption in China, coming of age in the People’s Republic of China, corrupt methods and means, President Xi Jinping and the anti-corruption campaign, and the path ahead.

Brief History

The corruption problem in China and efforts to combat it are not new. “For centuries,” Evan Osnos (2014: 249) writes, “every generation of Chinese leaders unveiled its own strategy to root out our corruption.” The strategy that emerged in Chairman Mao’s “new” China in 1949 following the end of World War II and the bloody conclusion of the Chinese civil war (1946-49) rested heavily on egalitarianism, abolition of private property, presumption of class conflict, restructuring of the family unit, collectivism in agricultural production, and one-party rule. Revolutionary zeal and idealism would surely tame self-interest fueled by corruption opportunities.

Such idealism was a natural companion for “rule by virtue” (de zhi), a cardinal principle handed down through the ages. The teacher and philosopher Confucius (551 BC-479 BC) is largely credited with articulating the relationship between governing and morality. “He who exercises government by means of virtue may be compared to the North Star, which holds its place while all other stars turn around it” (Braineyquote 2015)
Personal morality and governmental morality are joined at the hip in the world of Confucianism. “When a prince’s personal conduct is correct,” Confucius said, “his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.” Those who rule without virtue are unworthy of being followed.

Philosophy and reality, however, are not always synchronized. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that China’s journey through time is not unlike the journeys of many other countries in which “good” and “bad”, virtue and vice co-exist or with one or the other dominate in a given era. Government corruption—the abuse of public power for private gain—as well as civic corruption (the abuse of private power or position for gain) can be found in every society, present and past. “Without exception,” writes Professor Olivia Yu, “the Chinese government has never been corruption-free since the country emerged as a socialist system in 1949” (Yu 2008, 161). Andrew Wedeman (2012: 90) notes that even in the early years (1951, 1952, 1953) of the PRC, the party made a vigorous effort to curb corruption. Campaigns in each of these years “targeted corruption within the political and economic systems . . . [but] for the most part, those accused of corruption in the early days were apparently guilty of relatively minor offenses (2012: 90).

Corruption in both public and private sectors is defined as a crime in nearly every country. China has more than 1,200 laws, rules and directives against corruption but implementation is widely believed to be ineffective. Three offenses in China are regarded as corrupt: graft, bribe taking and embezzlement.

Civic corruption is even more insidious than government corruption. When individuals or groups or gangs contrive ways and means of cheating or stealing or lying in
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a widespread manner, the civic culture and the values that underpin it can fray to the point of civic breakdown. That is, the lubricant of society--trust of others (colleagues, friends, family), governments, institutions--is badly damaged thereby fostering social discord and challenging life and governance in many ways.

Consider several recent calamities and controversies in China—the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the 2011 Wenzhou train crash, the 2008 tainted instant milk formula for babies, and sponsorship fees to gain entry to top educational institutions.

The Sichuan Earthquake of 2008 claimed more than 60,000 lives with more than 10,000 school children victims when a 7.9 magnitude quake struck in the afternoon of May 12th. Schools throughout the stricken region collapsed in a pancake manner. Shoddy building construction was believed responsible, perhaps resulting from corruption. Angry parents at several destroyed schools demanded an investigation of possible official malfeasance and corruption (Yardley 2008—NYT, May 25)

The Wenzhou train crash involved two high-speed trains, one of which rammed the rear of the other--forty deaths resulted and 191 passengers were injured. Crash investigators found sloppy development of the signaling equipment, bidding irregularities in the contracts to develop the equipment, and lapses by safety inspectors who were supposed to ensure its quality (LaFraniere 2011, NYT, Dec 28 ) Two former top officials of the Railway Ministry were singled out for blame—Liu Zhijun, the railway minister and his deputy chief engineer, Zhang Shuguang. Five months before the crash, Mr. Liu was arrested on corruption charges. In 2013, Liu Zhijun was found guilty of taking bribes and abusing his powers. He received a suspended death sentence and is likely to face life in prison. “The court presented Mr. Liu as a case study in the corrupt self-enrichment among officials” in
The 2008 tainted instant milk tragedy resulted in the deaths of “six babies and more than 300,000 children fell ill from drinking milk products that had been tainted with melamine, a toxic chemical” (Wong 2013 NYT July 25). The police suspected that some dairy farmers and milk dealers may have diluted milk with water to increase the volume for sale and then added melamine to disguise the dilution (Bradsher 2008 NYT Sept. 13). The milk producer, Sanlu, “discovered that farmers had been adding melamine to boost the protein levels, but the company did not order a recall; instead, it persuaded the local government to bar the press from reporting it” (Osnos 2014: 174).

Parents pay “sponsorship fees” to gain entry to top schools! But isn’t education free and guaranteed in China? Well, not exactly. In China’s highly competitive society education is a highly sought commodity that parents, if they can afford it, are eager to buy. “Nearly everything has a price . . . from school admissions and placement in top classes to leadership positions in Communist youth groups. Even front-row seats near the blackboard or a post as class monitor are up for sale” (Levin 2012 NYT Nov 21). Sponsorship fees or bribes enable parents to acquire an educational commodity for their children and, conversely, teachers who are poorly paid can enhance their income. So, it is a two-way street. Critics of the state-run education system claim it is overrun by bribery and cronyism and contributing to the growing gap between the wealthy and the poor (Levin 2012 NYT nov 21). “Corruption in education,” says Liao Ran who runs programs in Asia combating graft for Transparency International, “has become rampant” (Roberts 2013 Bloomberg Businessweek April 4).

These four cases point directly at the viciousness of civic corruption in contemporary
China life.

Coming of Age in the People’s Republic of China

Chairman Mao was determined to rapidly transform a largely rural, agrarian, illiterate peasant population into a modern industrial state. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was for all practical purposes the state and an allegiance to its cause was demanded of all. Central to governing by the Communist party was the collectivization of the economy in the form of communes and ambitious goals of production. Private ownership of land was abolished. Equally suspect were customs, traditions, religion and Confucian values.

Indeed, by the 1960s following the economic failures of the planned economy as embodied in the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), Mao became increasingly convinced that a more radical solution was needed. A Cultural Revolution was needed to unleash the chains of tradition, culture, custom, religion, and superstition that bound the ordinary Chinese to a past that did not serve the future. Thus the Cultural Revolution was no friend of Confucianism. A full throttled attempt was made to extinguish Confucian thought and ideals that were viewed as contrary to egalitarian values enshrined in the 1949 Revolution and Communist ideology. Confucianism, among other things, cherished family values and respect for elders, ideals that did not fit well with collectivities and communes that formed essential social units in the new China. Rule by virtue fell by the wayside.

So by nearly all accounts, the Cultural Revolution was a “decade-long descent into ideological madness that crushed millions . . . “ (Kuhn 2012) Or as Wasserstrom (2010, 58) states: “It was a time of utopian hopes that turned into dark nightmares, an era when children turned on their parents and friends betrayed friends, swept up in the ideological fervor of a particular campaign or simply a desire for self-preservation.”
The nightmare began to ebb with Mao’s death in 1976 and the ascension to power by Deng Xiaoping who is credited with the “reform and opening” of China that was launched in 1978. He initiated a series of bold economic reforms that tempered Communist ideology with limited forms of private entrepreneurship (Wassertrom, 70). The era of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was set in motion, an era of Communist ideology balanced by pragmatism. Deng claimed that it didn’t matter whether a cat was black or white as long as it caught mice, because if it caught mice it was a good cat. “Translation: It doesn’t matter whether the Chinese economy is Communist or capitalist, as long as it works” (Smith 2012, 253).

Deng’s band of reformers began the transition from a command economy to a market-based economy. The World Bank boldly claims that China’s reforms yielded spectacular results over the past 30 years with an economy that grew on average about 10 percent a year, lifted more than 600 million people out of poverty, and reduced the poverty rate from 84 percent in 1981 to 13 percent in 2008 (World Bank 2013). The man who changed China, writes Michael Elliott, “. . . improved the life chances of more people, faster, than has ever been done before in the history of humankind” (Elliott 2008).

China’s economic miracle of course did not happen overnight, yet 30 years is a short night all things considered. Nor did the “miracle” occur without resistance. As the Vice Premier of China at the birth of China’s opening-up policy, Li Lanqing recalls, it was no cakewalk. Yet, in his view, while “the demise of the Cultural Revolution gave China a new lease on life . . . It took no less than a Herculean effort, however, to eradicate the political and ideological aftermath of this catastrophe” (Laqing 2009, 31).

Still, the country was in no mood for another round of radical change. Consequently,
China’s leaders chose to move the reform of the economy along a path that can be described as “. . . Gradualism with an experimental approach; a strong commitment; and the active, pragmatic facilitation of the state” (Zeng 2011).

The path to state capitalism (markets with an authoritarian flavor) was not straightforward. The legacy of a command economy where prices were set by government authorities operating alongside large State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and a startup “free” market yielded a “dual price system” throughout much of the 1980s. In the early reform period, both the government and the market determined prices for the same goods. Thus the opportunities for financial slippage, indeed outright graft, embezzlement, and bribery were ripe. Nonetheless, China’s leaders were determined to “free up” prices consistent with a gradual and pragmatic opening up of the economy.

The transition from a “command” economy to a “market” economy is often a bumpy road filled with corruption opportunities and potholes. However, the reform and opening that Deng set in motion did not singularly produce corruption in contemporary China. To reiterate a point made earlier, “corruption existed before reform, albeit mostly in discreet and often petty forms. Reform did, however, lead to a surge in corruption by opening up new opportunities for officials to use their authority to enrich themselves” (Wedeman 2012: 80).

Rapid economic growth and corruption typically go hand-in-hand. So it is not surprising that corruption has been on the rise over the past 30 years. Reliable corruption statistics are difficult to compile but there is some information available. The Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC) investigates corruption allegations against members of the CCP. The Commission is delegated the authority to inspect, investigate,
and sanction party members who misbehave. Since the early 1980s, the CDIC has punished or disciplined 130,000 to 190,000 party members each year (Pei 2007). During one five-year stretch, death sentences were handed down for 350 party members found guilty of corruption (O 262). Harsh penalties (death sentences and lengthy jail terms) would certainly signal seriousness about cracking down on corruption. However, a closer look suggests that only a very small proportion of party members and government officials are punished. Most receive a warning; only 20 percent are expelled from the CCP, and less than 6 percent are criminally prosecuted (Pei 2007). “Therefore the odds of an average corrupt official going to jail are 3 out of 100, making corruption a high-return, low risk activity” (Pei 2007)

A different body, the Ministry of Supervision—which also has sanctioning authority—investigates government workers accused of corruption that are not party members. Administrative punishment can include a reprimand, demotion, dismissal or referral for criminal prosecution. Among the three bodies with anti-corruption authority, the legal system acts on the smallest number of cases.

Bribery and embezzlement are the most common abuses. The direct costs of corruption in 2003, the latest year for which there is an estimate, was $86 billion. Other common abuses on record include selling and purchasing government appointments and land acquisition and transfers. “Typically, local officials use illegal (and sometimes violent) means to acquire farmland at low prices and later sell the user rights of the land to developers in exchange for bribes” (Pei 2007). Chinese scholar Minxin Pei (2007) asserts “collusion among local ruling elites (corruption cases involving groups of officials who cooperate and protect each other) . . . has transformed entire jurisdictions into local mafia
states.” He points to “Fuyang, a city of 9 million, located in Anhui Province of producing a succession of corrupt party chiefs and mayors.” Included among those punished was a succession of police chiefs and bureaucratic chiefs.

China’s National Audit Agency uncovered misappropriated and misspent public funds that amounted to $170 billion for the period 1996 to 2005. The audits included practices such as overstating the number of staff, setting up slush funds, misappropriating special funds, and collecting illegal fees (Pei 2007). It is estimated that approximately 18,000 corrupt officials in the period 1994-2008 fled the country taking with them an estimated 800 billion yuan ($128 billion US) in plundered assets (Broadhurst 2013 SCMP).

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2014 ranks China as number 100 among 174 countries ranked, tied with Surname and Algeria. The United States is ranked number 17, tied with Hong Kong, Ireland, and Barbados. So, one might say that China is in the middle of the pack regarding the severity of the corruption problems it experiences. Corruption measures like the CPI are helpful but still insufficient to gauge the depth and corrosive nature of the problem on ordinary people. And, conventional wisdom holds that the corruption that is not seen is like the submerged part of the iceberg, much larger than the tip. The reality in China today is that the corruption we see suggests that the corruption we don’t see is gigantic.

Media stories of corruption are quite common and, as Minxin Pei (2007) notes, “high profile scandals paint a grim picture of corruption in China”. Perhaps the most notorious story in recent times is the case of 63-year-old Bo Xilai, a disgraced Communist Party aristocrat and former Politburo member. He was the Communist Party secretary of the sprawling (nearly 29 million) Chongqing municipality and an aspirant for a seat on the
powerful CCP standing committee. In March 2012 he was put under house arrest and a month later, expelled from the Politburo as a disciplinary investigation began over allegations of corruption and abuse of power. A few months later, he was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party. A year later he was sentenced to life imprisonment for taking 20 million yuan ($3.2 million US) in bribes, embezzlement of 5 million yuan and abuse of power.

His fall from power was made even more dramatic by his wife’s murder conviction in August. His wife, Gu Kailai, was found guilty of killing British businessman Neil Haywood in a dispute over economic interests that involved her son. She now faces life in prison as the court handed her a suspended death sentence.

Bo Xilai, a princeling whose father was a revolutionary hero, is described as a man with an insatiable ambition who pursued a path to power that is littered with ruthlessness. At age 17, he joined the Red Guard and is said to have denounced his father who was purged by Mao and spent twelve years in prison. In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s forces turned on both father and son who was shipped to a Beijing labor camp for five years (Wines 2012).

After Mao’s death, both father and son were back in the fray. The father, Bo Yibo, became vice premier in 1979 and young Bo was on his way up. He was named mayor of Dalian, married Ms. Gu whose family pedigree included a father who helped lead Communist resistance to the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s. In the mid-1990s, Bo was appointed governor of Liaoning Province and given a seat on the 370 member Central Committee. In 2007, he was made party secretary of Chongqing and set about spearheading an anti-and corruption campaign that received international attention. His populist self-
Methods and Means

Those who engage in corrupt behavior can be quite creative. Consider the use and abuse of creating and selling phony receipts to pad one’s pocketbook, i.e., graft. New York Times reporter David Barboza (2013c) writes that phony receipts are widely used to defraud multinational corporations such as the British pharmaceutical giant Glaxo-SmithKline of millions of dollars. Receipt fraud is a two-way street that sellers and buyers travel. And, it is not limited to a single type of receipt. In Shanghai, signs are posted throughout the city for all kinds of fake receipts: travel receipts, lease receipts, waste material receipts, and value-added tax receipts. Fake receipts are even marketed on Web sites. Not everyone gets away with this kind of corruption. In 2010, Chinese authorities claim to have raided 74,833 enterprises that had filed false inventories with the government. And, in Zhejiang province a business man was jailed in 2013 for “helping 315 companies evade millions of dollars in taxes by issuing fake invoices . . . “ (Barboza 2013c, 10). Government officials are not immune either. A government official from China’s Gansu province was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve for using fake receipts to embezzle millions of dollars. But why do employees who work for government agencies or state-owned enterprises bolster their compensation by filing fake invoices? Professor Wang

Bribes and kickbacks, of course, are the staple of much corruption in China. There is scant evidence that government officials and CCP members are immune. The list of candidates includes judges. Journalist Evan Osnos (249) recounts the story of Hu Gang, a fifty year old man who could not resist the “dark arts of success” by bribing judges with cigarettes, banquets, visits to massage parlors. In return, Hu’s auction business to handle foreclosures expanded rapidly in which “a single signature from a judge bestowed the right to a hefty commission on the sale of buildings, land, and other assets” (249)

Tigers and Flies Beware

Are China’s leaders winning or losing the battle with corruption? The emerging consensus is that China’s leader are well aware of the gravity of the situation but are up against the powerful forces of state capitalism, human ambition, and opportunity in a high growth economy. “On one hand,” says Shengming Tang (1997, 140), “self-enrichment and pursuit of personal wealth have finally become a socially approved goal. On the other hand, only a very small number of Chinese people can get rich . . . In the Chinese context, the strain is even sharper and harder because Chinese people have endured a long period of poverty, and self-enrichment has become a socially approved goal only recently.”

It is not a pretty picture—is it? But heed this call by President Xi Jinping that the failure to reign in corruption could cause the “collapse of the Party and the downfall of the state.” And, speaking before the disciplinary arm of the CPC, he said: “Power should be
restricted by a cage of regulations.” That is, sound disciplinary, prevention and guarantee mechanisms are needed “to ensure that people do not dare to, are not able to and cannot easily commit corruption” (Xinhua 2013). Both flies” (low-level functionaries) and “tigers” (high-level officials) should be caged (caught). He further advocated eight steps to restrain official excesses including “no welcome banner, no red carpet, no floral arrangement or grand receptions for officials’ visits.” Former President Hu Jintao also voiced his concerns in his final speech before the CCP in the Great Hall of the People: “Combating corruption and promoting political integrity, which is a major political issue of great concern to the people, is a clear-cut and long-term political commitment of the Party. If we fail to handle this issue well, it could prove fatal to the Party, and even cause the collapse of the Party and the fall of the state. Leading officials at all levels, especially high-ranking officials, must readily observe the code of conduct on clean governance and report all-important matters. They should both exercise strict self-discipline and strengthen education and supervision over their families and their staff; and they should never seek any privilege” (Xinhua 2012).

President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign launched after he became the general secretary of the CCP in 2012 is in high gear. The “tiger” Bo Xilai, as described previously, has been caged. Another “tiger”, retired former Politburo Standing Committee Zhou Yongkang who also once led China’s domestic security agency, has been expelled from the CCP. He has been accused of “taking bribes, helping family members and cronies plunder government assets and leaking official secrets” (Buckley 12/6/2014). An elder son who purchased two oil blocks from the State-owned energy giant China National Petroleum Corporation pocketed more than $80 million when he quickly resold them (Pei NYT
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10/17/14). The official Xinhua news agency announced the expulsion of Zhou, noting that investigators found that he “exploited his position to obtain unlawful gains for multiple people, and directly or indirectly through his family took massive bribes” (Buckley ditto). Zhou Yongkang is the first member of the elite Politburo, retired or active, to face criminal investigation in a corruption case. Is a “cage” awaiting Mr. Zhou?

Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has caged 50 tigers or senior officials with vice ministerial ranks and above since he took office compared with only 30 in the five years prior to his appointment as CCP general secretary (Pei NYT 10/17/14).

The crackdown on corruption has even ensnared “flies” in coal rich regions. Seven of the 13 party members who run Shanxi Province have been stripped of power or thrown in jail for collusion with coal barons. The lavish lifestyles of coal barons was made possible by an “incestuous network of entrepreneurs and party officials who bought and sold government posts to maintain control of the area’s lucrative coal mines . . . “ (Johnson12/28/14) A government official, for example, who controls the allocation of mines to investors and can close one if he decides it is unsafe is an easy mark for those seeking ill-gotten gains. The Chinese newsmagazine Caixin spent three months investigating the culture of corruption and found that local businessmen spent about $150,000 a year bribing officials, with one lucrative government post costing $650,000.

The fight against corruption continues unabated and until it is won, there is likely to be much social disharmony. But is this outcome immutable? Can corruption and prosperity co-exist in a manner that does not foster discord? The answer to this question is much debated in the current literature.

The Road Ahead
Perhaps the most intriguing question about corruption in China’s future is the consequences for ordinary Chinese. That China has prospered significantly over the past several decades is beyond dispute. Nor is there much dispute about the growth of corruption in kind and scale since the reform and opening in the late 1970s. There is, however, as noted previously, disagreement about the interplay between growth and increasing corruption. The conventional wisdom, along with supporting evidence, is that economic growth creates many opportunities for corrupt behavior that, in turn, is harmful to the society. And, as suggested by the Chinese leaders quoted above, corruption can become a deadly cancer. So given the experience of steady, indeed spectacular growth of the economy in the post-Mao era in conjunction with the steady onslaught of corruption and widespread perception that Chinese regimes have been unable or unwilling to cage a sufficient number of “tigers and flies” to bring the corruption beast to heal, why does the country continue to prosper? Perhaps the answer is that the conventional wisdom is wrong.

Consider the persuasive case made by Georgia State professor Andrew Wedeman in *Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China* (2012). He notes that critics (Qinglian He 2004; Minxin Pei 2006; Fan and Grossman 2001) of China’s efforts to control corruption point to low rates of detection, lax punishments, and the assumption that the guilty are often protected by powerful patrons. His study, however, of the revealed rate of corruption drawn from an examination of the raw data on indictments from 1970-2008 shows a downward trend since 2000 (2012: 143). Thus he concludes that

“even though corruption intensified as the deepening of reform progressively loosened controls and spawned new opportunities for illicit activity, corruption never really spiraled out of control.
On the contrary, as corruption worsened, the regime responded first with a series of short-term bursts of hyper enforcement (“campaigns”) designed to wipe out corruption. When these failed to dramatically reduce the level of corruption, the regime launched a sustained war of attrition . . . and while its efforts may not have been entirely or perhaps even largely successful in dramatically reducing corruption, the mere fact that the regime battled corruption prevented it from spiraling out of control. The regime’s sustained war on corruption has thus acted as a governor, albeit an imperfect one that has at least kept corruption in check” (2012: 141).

Insofar as Wedeman’s analysis is correct, one might conclude that while China is winning the war on corruption it is losing many battles along the way. So should China stay the course? That is, keep doing what it has been doing, or should new strategies be devised? And, the even bigger question is: can rising rates of corruption and rapid growth be sustained?

**New Directions?**

Can China stamp out corruption with more top-down enforcement, including hefty punishment for offenders? Perhaps it is wishful thinking to imagine that corruption can be eliminated altogether, but it is not wishful thinking to do more to control the galloping rate of corruption. Indeed, there may be a tipping point reached where social unrest, fueled by corruption widens the already large gap between the “haves” and “have nots” or calls into
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question the competency of the government to deliver public services, challenges the very survival of the regime.

Let’s look at the range of options available to Chinese leaders to avoid a tipping point.

1. **More effective enforcement.** The anti-corruption dragnet now in place is caging tigers and flies but even more can be done. Steps are already being taken to step up enforcement. One important step was announced in early November 2014 with a plan approved that would increase the staffing and status of the General Office of Anti-Corruption. This office was established in 1995 and is responsible for prosecuting cases investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Wang Qishan, who heads the CCDI, said the party would continue to put pressure on cadres and gradually build effective systems so that they ‘don’t want to be corrupt’ and ‘can’t be corrupt’ (Lin Jing SCMP 11/3/14).

2. **Improve the education and training of officials and the public.** Enforcement does have limits. China “can seek to improve the aggregate level of honesty by educating officials and the public on the negative consequences of corruption, try to convince them that corruption is morally wrong, and signal that those subject to official extortion or witnesses to corruption that they should report illegal demands” (Wedeman 144). A tall order? Without question but much like the challenge in collecting taxes, the more effective tax collection system rests heavily on the voluntary behavior of the taxpayer to be honest and forthcoming.

3. **Promote greater transparency.** Opportunities for corruption typically shrivel when transactions are made more visible. Transparency is also an effective anti-dote to risk-takers; it raises the probability of getting caught. Of course the vehicles for fostering
transparency such as a vigorous and open media, including the Internet, are necessary. China certainly has a distance to travel in promoting transparency.

4. **Pursue political reform.** Minxin Pei, a noted Chinese scholar, notes that Beijing has favored a top-down approach with the routine issuing of tough-sounding directives and regulations to curb corruption at the local level (2007). Such centralizing initiatives (e.g., rotating provincial anticorruption chiefs, dispatching inspection teams to the provinces to check up on provincial party bosses) have limited effects. A more comprehensive approach is needed that reduces the role of the state in the economy, increases judicial independence, and mobilizes the power of the media and civil society is required (2007: 4). Wishful thinking? Maybe, maybe not.

China’s future is not knowable but there is every reason in this hyper-connected world to rally behind China’s war on corruption. Is it not so?

**REFERENCES**


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