In Error to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
Section 4184 of the Code of Alabama provides that
'if any man and woman live together in adultery or
fornication, each of them must, on the first conviction of
the offense, be fined not less than $100, and may also be
imprisoned in the county jail or sentenced to hard labor for
the county for not more than six months. On the second
conviction for the offense, with the same person, the
offender must be fined not less than $300, and may be
imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor
for the county, for not more than 12 months; and for a third
or any subsequent conviction with the same person, must be
imprisoned in the penitentiary or sentenced to hard labor
for the county for two years."
Section 4189 of the same Code declares that 'if any
white person and any negro, or the descendant of any negro
to the third generation, inclusive, though one ancestor of
each generation was a white person, intermarry or live in
adultery or fornication with each other, each of them must,
on conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary or
sentenced to hard labor for the county for not less than two
nor more than seven years.'
In November, 1881, the plaintiff in error, Tony
Pace, a negro man, and Mary J. Cox, a white woman, were
indicted under section 4189, in a circuit court of Alabama,
for living together in a state of adultery or fornication,
and were tried, convicted, and sentenced, each to two years'
imprisonment in the state penitentiary. On appeal to
the supreme court of the state the judgment was affirmed,
and he brought the case here on writ of error, insisting
that the act under which he was indicted and convicted is in
conflict with the concluding clause of the first section of
the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, which declares
that no state shall 'deny to any person the equal protection
of the laws.'
FIELD, J.
The counsel of the plaintiff in error compares
sections 4184 and 4189 of the Code of Alabama, and assuming
that the latter relates to the same offense as the former,
and prescribes a greater punishment for it, because one of
the parties is a negro, or of negro descent, claims that a
discrimination is made against the colored person in the
punishment designated, which conflicts with the clause of
the fourteenth amendment prohibiting a state from denying to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
The counsel is undoubtedly correct in his view of
the purpose of the clause of the amendment in question, that
it was to prevent hostile and discriminating state
legislation against any person or class of persons.
Equality of protection under the laws implies not only
accessibility by each one, whatever his race, on the same
terms with others to the courts of the country for the
security of his person and property, but that in the
administration of criminal justice he shall not be
subjected, for the same offense, to any greater or different
punishment. Such was the view of congress in the
re-enactment of the civil-rights act, after the adoption of
the amendment. That act, after providing that all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right, in every state and territory, to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, declares that they shall be
subject 'to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding.' 16 St. c. 114, § 16.
The defect in the argument of counsel consists in
his assumption that any discrimination is made by the laws
of Alabama in the punishment provided for the offense for
which the plaintiff in error was indicted when committed by
a person of the African race and when committed by a white
person. The two sections of the Code cited are
entirely consistent. The one prescribes, generally, a
punishment for an offense committed between persons of
different sexes; the other prescribes a punishment for an
offense which can only be committed where the two sexes are
of different races. There is in neither section any
discrimination against either race. Section 4184
equally includes the offense when the persons of the two
sexes are both white and when they are both black.
Section 4189 applies the same punishment to both offenders,
the white and the black. Indeed, the offense against
which this latter section is aimed cannot be committed
without involving the persons of both races in the same
punishment. Whatever discrimination is made in the
punishment prescribed in the two sections is directed
against the offense designated and not against the person of
any particular color or race. The punishment of each
offending person, whether white or black, is the same.
Judgment affirmed. |