Duncan Kennedy
excerpted from: Duncan Kennedy, the Limited Equity
Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided
Society , 46 Howard Law Journal 85-125, 85, (Fall 2002) (42 Footnotes)
The limited equity cooperative is a form of housing tenure in which
shareholder residents manage their buildings, within limits imposed by a
charter, and have the right to get back what they have paid for their
shares plus an allowance for improvements, if and when they decide to
leave. The limited equity cooperative (hereinafter "LEC") is
neither a common form, nor one that seems likely to become common in the
near future. It is nonetheless a hardy if rare perennial.
. . .
So far, I have outlined a set of complex choices that remain to be
made after the developer has opted for the LEC form. In this section, I
suggest a larger context of political debate that will condition those
choices. The body of literature that seems most relevant is that
generated by CLS and CRT. For purposes of bringing this work to bear on
the design of a LEC, here is a summary of the most salient choices on
the table.
The first issue: The developer could target the subsidy to help the
most deserving, competent, and potentially upwardly socially mobile of
the poor to move up into the lower middle or middle class. Or the
developer could target the subsidy to help the very poor, more likely
demoralized and less upwardly mobile (the underclass), to improve or
transform their lives at the bottom of the rigid American race/class
hierarchy, without imagining that they will assimilate to the mainstream
multicultural American middle class model.
The second issue: The developer could choose a model of tenants'
rights, professional management, and "juridification"
(reliance on courts for resolution of disputes). Or the developer could
choose a model of the coop as a collective in which rights and duties
are loosely defined (through standards rather than rules) and residents
must use the political process of coop governance to accomplish their
objectives. Paradoxically, the tenants' rights strategy makes the
resident look more like a "normal" property owner than does
the "coop as collective" model.
The third issue: The developer could design the coop as part of a
community- oriented strategy of mobilization, particularly for defense
both against downward spirals and against gentrification. Or the
developer could design it merely as a stabilizer, devoted to securing
the best interests of the residents, even when those diverge from the
interests of the community.
The debates within critical race theory, and between CRT-- and CLS--
identified writers, have a lot of relevance to these issues, and at the
same time a certain quality of distance, abstraction, or even denial, at
least as it now seems to me.
A. Targeting the LEC Subsidy and the "Talented Tenth"
Debate
The highly respectful dialogue between John Calmore and john powell
about "ghetto enrichment" vs. "fair housing" is
relevant to the first issue, of how to allocate subsidies between
different classes of poor people. As part of general advocacy of
dispersal of ghetto communities through housing and educational
desegregation, powell emphasizes the importance of choice for
minorities, including the choice to exit the ghetto, either to a
predominantly minority middle class community or to an integrated
community. (He is particularly concerned with access to good education.)
He is against the notion that the interests of those who would leave if
not subjected to racial discrimination in the housing market should be
sacrificed to the interests of those who will stay in the ghetto and be
worse off as a result of the exit of the better off.
Calmore emphasizes, first, that putting resources into dispersal
through fair housing law will mainly benefit the upwardly socially
mobile at the expense of the more disadvantaged, and that it will dilute
minority political power, dispersing elites and reducing the capacity of
ghetto residents to mobilize to protect their interests. This debate
gets added urgency from William Julius Wilson's analysis of the
"concentration effects" produced by the departure of the black
middle class from the ghetto beginning in the 1960's. According to
Wilson, the class-segregated communities of the "truly
disadvantaged" reproduce a variety of "pathologies," in
part, because of the absence of black middle-class role models and black
middle-class contacts.
In our context, the issue presents itself somewhat differently.
Allocating LEC units to those who need deeper subsidies may reduce the
number of subsidized units, for two reasons: by increasing the amount of
initial capital subsidy per unit (so that monthly charges are affordable
for the target group), given lower income residents, and by increasing
the costs or difficulties of LEC resident participation in governance.
Moreover, subsidizing the upwardly socially mobile does not remove them
from poor neighborhoods, assuming the LECs are sited there (though LEC
residency may be the first step on the way out). These factors somewhat
reduce the power of the Calmore critique in this context. But here's the
rub: the underlying difference of approach is deep enough so that it is
unlikely that anyone committed to either position will think that these
particularities of the LEC context should tip the balance. The heat of
the debate comes from factors that apply fully to LEC's.
First, there is the question whether the LEC subsidies are likely to
be wasted if not directed to the upwardly socially mobile. There is no
consensus among CRT or CLS writers about the nature of class divisions
either within minority communities or within the various white
communities. In one view, there are diverse cultures of poverty, so that
helping the very poor, whatever their race or ethnicity, emphatically
requires more than just non- discrimination and job access. There is a
real danger that directing LEC subsidies to the very poor is just to
waste them, whereas targeting them by "creaming the pool" or
"cherry picking" holds out a much greater chance of success.
The upward mobility strategy is based on recognition that the total
amount of subsidies will never be enough to transform the lives of the
masses of the poor. The only plausible long run strategy for the poor,
in this view, is triage, chipping away, hoping to reduce the size of the
poor population at the margin. Eventually there will be few enough of
the poor left so that it is plausible to make a large societal
investment in "upgrading their human capital," so that they
too can be integrated, socially and economically, into the mainstream
The response might be twofold. The main thing the very poor need in
order to no longer be poor is to be freed of racial oppression and given
access to economic opportunity. The anticipation that they will waste
the subsidies is largely based on a stereotype. Moreover, non-profit
community-based affordable housing initiatives have a moral obligation
to the whole community, not just those capable of exiting and likely to
do so. In the long run in which triage reduces the mass of the poor to
manageable proportions, today's poor will most certainly be long dead.
Suppose we define success of the subsidy as, at a minimum, the
creation of a viable affordable unit whose occupant does not deteriorate
the quality of life for his or her neighbors, and on the upside as the
use of the subsidy to significantly improve the overall quality of life
of the resident. Even if the rate of success is lower for very poor than
for upwardly mobile poor residents, the allocation is justified by the
obligation of the community, represented by the Land Trust, to do what
it can for the most needy, as opposed to those more able to help
themselves. (Note the analogy to the argument, mentioned above, for
making public housing, housing of last resort for the homeless.)
A second, distinct disagreement that is likely to influence one's
view of how to target LEC subsidies as between the upwardly mobile and
the very poor has to do with the participation ideal that is one of the
motives for any LEC scheme. Some of those committed to participation
will see the attempt to combine residents from different subcultures of
poverty--the upwardly mobile with the very poor--as analogous to denying
them exit from the ghetto through fair housing. Given the collective,
interdependent character of neighborhood and building life, the only
hope for creating decent environments, characterized by the middle class
values and behaviors that the upwardly mobile poor want, is to exclude
the very poor. Or at least to restrict their numbers far enough, in the
name of the mixed income concept, to avoid concentration effects and let
the upwardly mobile have secure control, both of formal apparatuses and
of the informal life of the project.
In the other view, this position again relies on stereotypes, and is
moreover a typically uptight, black or white, bourgeois phobic reaction
to the legitimate particularities (as opposed to pathologies) of the
cultures of the different poor communities. Participation is a value for
its own sake, but it is also a means to empowerment. The LEC should have
it as an affirmative goal to create contexts for personal transformation
through the admittedly often draining and unpleasant process of group
formation and skills building. To the limited extent we decide to
subsidize the very poor, we should try to do it in ways that have at
least the possibility of this kind of empowerment built into them. The
point is not to help them become in their turn upwardly mobile, but to
help them develop the capacities for organization and mobilization they
need to defend their interests in a system that systematically oppresses
them.
Put in stark terms, the tension here is the same as that which
motivated the early W.E.B. Du Bois to formulate his "talented
tenth" strategy, aimed to provide high quality educational and
other resources to the minority of the black population most likely to
be able to participate effectively in mainstream American life. Critical
race theory doesn't provide answers, but it poses the question with a
richness that was largely absent in legal discussions of race before the
1960's.
It is a mistake, it seems to me, to see this debate as internal to
the African American intelligentsia. The issue of whether to skim or to
mobilize has divided the white left in the United States, and the left
in Europe, for a hundred years (since the recognition of the social
problem generated by capitalist economic development). It is worth
noting that the moderate leftists, center-leftists, or social democrats,
who have won elections and developed legislative reform strategies over
the last hundred years, have almost always (not absolutely always)
chosen the skimming approach. For the more radical advocates of
mobilization, it seems obvious that one reason for this has been their
fear that mobilization would jeopardize their place in the larger
political/economic capitalist system within which they have real,
however limited, access to state power.
B. The Definition of Participation and "The Rights Debate"
The "rights debate" between some CLS writers and some CRT
writers is clearly relevant to the "tenants' rights" vs.
"coop as a collective" debate. In the rights debate, Patricia
Williams and Richard Delgado each argued that minorities, in general,
are rightly oriented to legal regimes that provide clear, formally
realizable, and easily administrable rules, which define legally
enforceable rights. They criticized critical legal theorists like Peter
Gabel, Frances Olsen, Mark Tushnet, William Simon and myself, who argued
that, at least as a matter of utopian aspiration, leftists should favor
moving in the direction of regimes of standards (e.g., good faith,
reasonableness) combined with small scale collective governance, and
oppose reliance on regimes of judicially enforceable individual rights
as the answer.
In my doubtless biased view, Williams and Delgado each ignored the
basic CLS claim that rules and standards, juridified individualist and
informal collective regimes, respond to Americans' typically
contradictory preferences with respect to making ourselves vulnerable to
other people. All one can do in situations of internal contradiction of
this kind is choose ad hoc compromises, while hoping for transcendence
in the long run. In the LEC context, for example, it doesn't make sense
to argue that minorities or people of color are intrinsically more
favorable to and better served by regimes of judicially enforceable
rules defining individual rights along with professional management and
juridification. It would make no more sense to argue, as Delgado's
position suggested, that as between people of color formality is
dispensable because of the vibrant community that characterizes their
interactions.
Whatever may be the case when we are discussing relations between
powerless minorities and powerful majorities (e.g., police/suspect, case
worker/welfare recipient, or landlord/tenant interactions), as soon as
we take up the design of a LEC in which the residents are all poor and
the majority of them are likely to be people of color, it is plausible
that if we polled them they would split. Some would strongly favor the
rules/individualism model, and others the opposite.
As a preliminary matter, but only as that, as we will see shortly, it
seems that the "tenants' rights" approach resonates with the
upward social mobility strategy. It makes the residents look more like
owners than the "coop as collective" model, and it promises
them protection for their individual interests against the possible
arbitrariness of the LEC's governance structure, including both the Coop
Board and the Land Trust. Well-defined rules, professional management,
and juridification protect the resident's investment of hard earned
savings in the unit, and provide independence vis à vis the life style
choices and other preferences of fellow residents, while minimizing the
amount of time and effort that have to be devoted to running things.
Time and effort better devoted to getting ahead as best one can in the
larger economic and social system.
On the other side, the "coop as collective" model resonates
with the idea that the coop is, first, part of a community whose members
recognize their inter-dependence and a shared culture forged in
adversity, not just a collection of atomized individuals. Second, it
resonates with a strategy of mobilization in which new forms of group
living promise to raise consciousness and provide a base for action in
and of the community.
Since the conflicts provoked by the Community Action Programs of the
Johnson Administration, with their requirement of maximum feasible
participation of the poor, there has been, as far as I can tell, a deep
split among activists and intellectuals interested in these matters over
how to tilt, and how far, toward one approach or the other. To one side,
it looks as though the participation ideal is utopian, often destructive
of the very values it espouses, and vulnerable to the evils of elitist
manipulation by professionals skilled at bureaucratizing, of chaos when
the limited organizational and managerial abilities of the poor are
over-strained, and of demagoguery and internal abuse when bad actors
manage to seize the vulnerable procedures that supposedly guarantee
participation.
To the other side, professional management companies and courts seem
likely to be hostile to the participatory aspirations of the LEC, and to
collaborate with those residents who want to turn it into nothing more
than another form of low-income housing. To my mind, the most
interesting, and the richest in description, of the work on this topic
is Lucie White's.
Speaking, again, realistically, the people who will decide this will
be those with the power to condition the subsidies that make the LEC
attractive, and those who develop the LEC. I don't think they can
plausibly rely on any supposed generic preference of people of color for
one kind of solution or the other. Moreover, I do not think it is
plausible to take either solution to its logical extreme. In short, I
think the decision makers, whether they are white or black or Latino,
whether they have authentic ghetto roots or hereditary elite status in
their respective communities, will have to make up their own minds based
on their values and their politics, without being able to appeal to
notions either of community or of identity to solve the problem for
them.
C. The LEC as Strategic Actor vs. Resident Interest Protector
The strategic actor idea has all the ambiguity of other strategies
based on the idea of mobilization. It is risky, it presupposes a common
interest beyond the building and also presupposes that the Land Trust
will decide when to pursue that interest, and it smacks of elitism or
paternalism. The Land Trust, however formally representative of the
community, is almost certain to be dominated by well-educated
professionals rather than by the disadvantaged residents and community
members in whose interests it will claim to be choosing and executing a
strategy.
On the other hand, defining itself as the representative of the
residents, and disregarding the interests of the community as a whole,
risks playing into a downward spiral, hurting the residents themselves
over the long run. In an upward spiral situation, maximizing the
residents' interests means collaborating in gentrification, with
possibly disastrous displacement effects for the larger constituency
that is supposed to benefit from affordable housing initiatives.
The strategic actor conception will make it hard for residents to
know where they stand, because it relies on situational good judgment
rather than on rules, and it provides no final arbiter to which
residents can appeal against what they think is a misguided strategic
decision. It conceives the Land Trust as part of a community-oriented
strategy rather than part of an individual rights-creation strategy, and
assumes that proactive intervention, as opposed to passive minimizing of
resident losses, is desirable in itself. It takes the goal of community
responsibility or stewardship much more seriously than does the opposite
conception.
D. The Deeper Political Conflict Underlying the Three Debates
As I have presented them so far, it seems obvious that the upward
mobility approach aligns loosely with the "tenants' rights"
and "residents' interests" approaches to internal governance
and neighborhood role. The notions of mobilizing the very poor, of the
"coop as a collective," and of the neighborhood strategic
actor also seem mutually supportive. In this section, I speculate that
this alignment derives from the existence of a deeper level of division
within CRT and CLS writings, between conflicting or contradictory ideas
about what a progressive social policy looks like in a situation of race
and class stratification in a modern post-industrial economy.
The underlying, not very much theorized conflict would be, to my
mind, between:
Attitude I: The goal of racial liberation is to eliminate
discrimination, both its present diffuse, pervasive reality, and its
historical effects. The problem is that a racist system treats similar
individuals differently, and oppresses people as group members. The
solution is to put minorities in the position they would have been in if
they had operated under the same legal regime as the majority operated
under, both the formal law in the books and the informal law in action.
Beside anti-discrimination, the two clear implications are affirmative
action in employment and education, and reparations. Reparations, in
turn, mean both reparations for slavery, and reparations for the large
economic benefit that whites as a group have derived at the expense of
blacks from the operation of the system according to racist rules of the
economic game. This might be described as the left liberal strand in
critical race theory.
It is not at all classically liberal, because it is based on the
ideas that race is a group phenomenon, and that there is group
responsibility of whites to blacks based on the historical and present
collective implication of whites in the oppression of blacks. It is also
race conscious rather than color blind, and it is neither intrinsically
assimilatonist (in Cornel West's sense) nor "integrationist."
Demanding non-discrimination, affirmative action, and reparations is in
fact consistent with highly valuing black culture, and with resisting
the dispersal of black residential communities, the dissolution of black
enterprises, and a widespread practice of racial intermarriage. (It is
also consistent with the opposite, assimilationist and integrationist
approaches.)
But it is liberal in that it is based on applying to the white
community the standards of justice and injustice, legality and
illegality, that have characterized the white community's own dominant
internal ideology. It treats the rules of the game in the white
community, which combine a property and contract regime with limited
government intervention through tax and transfer to redistribute in
favor of the poor, as just. Or at least as sufficiently just so that we
can use the failure to live up to the standards of modern liberalism as
a way to measure wrongs to blacks, both the wrong of slavery and the
wrong of discrimination within the post-slavery economy and society. And
it treats the rules of the game as sufficiently just so that the white
losers in the game played according to these rules have no claim of
injustice that they can set off against or oppose to the minority claim
that whites are collectively responsible to blacks. There is no
suggestion that poor whites have claims that are close enough to those
of blacks as a group to form the basis of an alliance.
Moreover, this first approach is liberal in that it embraces dominant
liberal ideals with respect to upward social mobility, meritocracy,
ostensible preference for rules over standards, devotion to legally
enforceable, justiciable rights, professionalism, and, finally, intense
distrust of collectivism and mobilization.
Attitude II: A quite different approach would say that the rules that
apply within the white community have the problem that they generate
radical injustice within the white community. If we imagine that the
same rules had applied to blacks, there might very well have emerged an
even more radically unjust, hierarchical class division within the black
community than actually exists. That is, differences among blacks in
education, income, wealth, and employment might well be even more stark
than they now are. Moreover, leveling the playing field through a
combination of anti-discrimination, affirmative action, and reparations
today might well have the effect of accentuating the current divisions
within the black community. Unless, that is, the reparations were used
self-consciously to develop programs that would help minority
communities in ways that undermine rather than accentuating their
internal cultural differences and economic inequalities. This might be
described as the radical strand in critical race theory.
For the radical strand, the ideal is to forge minority communities
that resist collectively, rather than by acquiring individual
entitlements defined in the terms of the mainstream. The ideal is to
base resistance on a revaluation of the cultures that developed in
oppressed communities in response to oppression, and to link resistance
to a wider program of transformation of the whole political/economic
modern capitalist system within which the different resisting
communities are embedded.
Each attitude has serious internal problems. For the left liberal
attitude, there is the problem that the ideal of joining the system by
embracing mainstream ideals (not including color blindness or
integrationism, as explained above) points in two directions. It favors
an "upward mobility" + "tenants' rights" +
"residents' interests" model in many situations, for
relatively obvious reasons. But there are other situations in which
upward social mobility, security of person and property, and
neighborhood quality seem to depend on abandoning that perspective for
the opposite one.
As we have seen, individual tenants' rights may empower the bad
actors in the building, permitting them to jeopardize everyone's
interest in the payment of the group mortgage and shielding anti-social
behavior. In this situation, LEC shareholders firmly in the upwardly
socially mobile camp may find themselves switching to an informalist
collective attitude. Likewise, when it seems that the neighborhood
prisoner's dilemma will create incentives for everyone to bail out to
avoid being the last person, caught with the bag of declining property
values in a downward spiraling neighborhood, the neighborhood strategic
actor concept may seem the only hope.
That this is the case is interestingly illustrated by the emergence
of tough love anti-due process thinking, first in Boston in the debates
about the legitimacy of expedited eviction procedures, and about the
eviction of residents held responsible for acts of family members, in
the context of tenant management initiatives in public housing. More
recently it has resurfaced in the writings of Tracey Meares and Dan
Kahan on Chicago public housing initiatives that restrict due process
rights in order to fight criminal and specifically gang dominance in
public housing. In these cases, there is intense debate about what
residents really want, and neither side can plausibly claim to speak for
the community.
For the more radical attitude, the problem is the vague and utopian
character of the aspiration to find ways out of what seems the
overwhelming stability and power of the dominant system. First, there is
the raw power of force that supports the system. Second, there is the
more subtle, but perhaps more important ideological hegemony that it has
achieved for the upwardly mobile members of oppressed communities, that
is, for the very elites that seem indispensable for successful
mobilization of oppressed groups seen as collectivities. But even if
there were more of a will, the way is not clear. In short, what exactly
does it mean to ask that resources made available either as reparations
or as part of the general tax and transfer systems of the welfare state
should alleviate rather than exacerbate internal class differences and
promote the possibility of mass mobilization?
The two attitudes outlined are not mutually exclusive. It is not
necessary to choose between them. Most people seem to participate to
some extent in both. It is possible to compromise between their
seemingly inexorable demands. More, it seems to me that it is not only
possible, but necessary and desirable to compromise them as soon as one
is speaking of a concrete policy initiative like the LEC, given the
internal problems of each. The more radical attitude is my own, but I
definitely do not hold it definitely. I see it as transcending the left
liberal attitude, but as requiring constant revision, limitation and
modification in the left liberal direction in the face of the actual
circumstances.
So for any particular LEC proposal, I would want to go as far as
possible in the more radical direction, but be willing to draw back in
the direction of upward mobility, "tenants' rights," and
"residents' interests" to the extent the situation demanded
it. In other words, teasing out the deeper conflicts that play out in
designing any particular LEC doesn't solve those conflicts, or indicate
unequivocally what LEC design is best. What it does is provide
orientations, arguments, and larger understandings within which to
choose more intelligently.
CONCLUSION
By way of a conclusion, it may be useful to return to the question:
Why LECs, rather than subsidized non-profit rental or home ownership
opportunities? I answered above that the shareholders likely choose the
LEC because the developer offers it at a subsidized price. The donors
and the non-profit developer choose it for its mix of long term
affordability, participation, and community responsibility features. In
the design of the details, these values have to be traded off over and
over again, and each value turns out to be open to a variety of
interpretations, or to comprise sub-goals that must be traded off as
well.
I approached this process of tradeoff in a pragmatic way, treating
the LEC in general, and the specific form chosen by the designer, as
solutions to the practical problem of what to do with available
subsidies for low-income housing. The choices made are inevitably
influenced by a context that includes our current lopsided
maldistribution of income, our class and race system, our social
problems, and the dim prospects for their substantial amelioration in
the near future. In this specific context, the objections to the LEC
form that I canvassed in Part I above seem weak, and the case for a
much-expanded LEC sector quite strong.
It is worth asking, and trying very briefly to answer, a somewhat
different question: Does the LEC form represent an ideal? Is it the
housing tenure form that we would prefer in an imagined utopian future
society? The conventional mainstream utopia is one in which people who
work hard can, if they want to, attain single-family home ownership. How
does the development of a LEC sector relate to that project?
In the discussion thus far, it was easy for me to ignore my own
housing preferences and choices. The role I adopted was that of the
policy analyst hoping to clarify the choices facing the designer of LECs
for today's world. Home ownership is expensive, and would allocate the
whole subsidy to the first occupant; subsidized rental comes with
minimal incentives to improve, and no participation rights; the LEC
seems a good compromise. It is irrelevant that I am the co-owner
occupant (with my wife) of a single-family house in an urban
neighborhood, have the great bulk of my savings tied up in equity in
that house, that it has increased greatly in value since we bought it,
and that we would probably choose condo over either rental or coop
tenure, if they were comparably priced and home ownership not an option.
When we shift the discussion, from choosing the beneficiaries and the
form of subsidies for the poor in our existing society, to utopia, these
personal choices become relevant. My ideas about utopian housing
arrangements are influenced by my personal situation, although my actual
choices have been no less contextually determined than the policies for
the poor we have been discussing thus far. In designing a utopia, one is
much freer than one is in the real world, to try to implement a
particular value orientation. For me, this would be an orientation to
spiritual and cultural development, and to communal self-realization,
over economic betterment, once a culturally relative minimum level is
achieved. It is a bias against materialism, and also against the values
of competitive capitalist acquisition as a way of life.
I am speaking of a general tilt rather than anything as coherent,
demanding, or specifiable in detail as a philosophy. But the bias
suggests an attitude toward one's housing, and toward the design of
utopian housing schemes for society as a whole. It suggests that it is
important to secure housing minima, and then to encourage the pleasures
people can derive from improving the use value of their housing, and
from participating in collective decision making about the building or
the neighborhood where they live. It suggests less concern (than a
person with a different bias would feel--not no concern) for making sure
that residential housing is available as a vehicle for conspicuous
consumption and speculative investment, and less concern for making sure
that people leave one other alone within their respective spheres of
right.
Of course these are by no means universally accepted values, but we
are talking about utopia, not revolution. They are not, contrary to what
is often said, particularly elite or elitist goals, since they are
common, to a greater or lesser degree, to the world's mass religions, as
well as to a part of the secular intelligentsia worldwide. LECs might be
a useful element, though only an element, of a utopian scheme that
attempted to realize these values more fully than they would be realized
in the more mainstream utopia of universal single-family home ownership,
graduated in quality, and spatially segregated according to income and
class.
The creation of a right to housing, and decommodification, are the
two most familiar alternative ideas in this area. The right to housing
usually means an entitlement, vis à vis the state or federal
government, to a minimum of shelter, regardless of ability to pay and
behavioral suitability. It is not a utopian idea, except in the sense
that we are a long way from realizing it, since it proposes a minimum,
rather than a housing ideal. Decommodification, on the other hand, is
utopian: it proposes that, in a good society, the group (not necessarily
a large group or a central government, but necessarily some local or
more remote collectivity) would plan the community, design, construct,
and maintain its housing stock, and allocate it on the basis of need.
You could have a right to shelter in a decommodified system, or not.
In such a scheme, it would make sense that participants were
shareholders in LECs. The form we have been discussing, particularized
through all those detailed choices in design, would allow different
groups and sub- groups to work out their own versions of use value,
participation, and community responsibility (and of conspicuous
consumption, through the definition of goldplating restrictions). We
could define the right to housing as a universal right to participate as
a shareholder, with the collective financing the whole initial payment,
if necessary. The LEC form would give the members possessory and
participation rights in whatever housing the collective allocated to
them according to need. I can easily imagine voting that LECs be the
main form of tenure in the decommodified sector (though, of course,
there would be all kinds of special needs requiring other forms as
well).
In my utopian version, however, the decommodified LEC sector would
co-exist with a commodified housing sector, to which people could resort
if they wanted to spend surplus income on housing (in accord, of course,
with the egalitarian, communitarian, and environmental requirements of
the utopia in question). They might want to consume more than what was
allocated to them on the basis of need, or to live in communities
designed and governed according to principles different from those
animating the collectively built community. They might also want to use
their private residences to gamble, speculate, or empire-build in the
real estate market. They might even create a fully private LEC sector.
The commodified sector would serve not just freedom of choice, but also
the orientation to play, creativity, and rebellion that complements the
more sober orientation served by the LEC sector.
Revisiting my own preferences, and trying to get a sense of what I
would prefer in my own utopia, I think it would depend on the
historically contingent evolution of its different parts, and that my
preferences might very well vary from time to time. But I would want to
spend at least some substantial time on the LEC side, and maybe all my
time. So there is a utopian as well as a pragmatic, utilitarian argument
for LECs, at least to my mind, and it doubtless influences those of us
who favor this form as a vehicle for affordable housing under our
present far-from-utopian circumstances.
[a1]. Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School.
In memory of Gary Bellow with many thanks to Jeanne Charn. |